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Contrary to the proposition of “secularization theory”, Christianity has neither 
disappeared, nor retreated into the private realm. Rather, it has transformed 
itself into new forms with new characteristics, and continues to play a 
significant role in the public sphere, by engaging in society through new ways, 
a development that unleashes its potential as a reflexive agent for individuals, 
society, and the global community. 
 
The objective of this research is to revisit and re-articulate the sustainability 
and potential, the substantial value of Christianity, by examining the 
trajectories of a morphological transformation of Christianity in the latest 
modern world through a new post-secular approach beyond both the 
discourse of “secularization” and that of “religious resurgence”, and the public 
presence of Christianity based on the socio-political engagement of 
Christianity in the public sphere in both empirical and normative aspects; and 
to reconstruct the substantial meaning of Christianity as a reflexive agent by 
examining its potential through discussion of how the Christian faith can inspire 
and impact on the formation of human being in today’s global capitalist society 
on the one hand, and establishing a foothold to overcome its intrinsic defects 
as a religion through radical reflection in the post-postmodern paradigm by on 
the other. 
8 
The central argument of the thesis is that neither modern nor postmodern 
approaches and neither secular nor anti-secular positions are conceptually 
able to penetrate the ambiguities of the presence of religion in contemporary 
society. Going for a post-secular and post-postmodern approach does not 
mean to apply linear thinking. The suggestion is rather to think of a way that 
does not deny both but tries to think beyond them (“re-modern). 
 
In doing so, this study delves deeper into a sociology of religious meaning in 
society rather than a sociology of religion, and socio-philosophical theology 
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Chapter 1. Introduction  
1.1. Description of the Study  
Contrary to the proposition of “secularization theory”,1 Christianity has not 
disappeared. Rather, it has transformed itself into new forms with new 
characteristics, and continues to play a significant role in the public sphere by 
engaging in society through new ways,2 a development that unleashes its 
potential as a reflexive agent for individuals, society, and the global 
community.3 The imperative to reflect upon the transformative landscapes of 
Christianity in today’s context is the starting point of this research project. This 
study will explore the trajectory of the transformation of Christianity through a 
new approach, and attempt to reconstruct the substantial meaning of 
Christianity as a reflexive agent by examining its potential on the one hand, 
and establishing a foothold to overcome its intrinsic defects as a religion on 
the other. In doing so, this study delves deeper into a sociology of religious 
meaning in society rather than a sociology of religion, and socio-philosophical 
                                           
1 Steve Bruce (ed.), Religion and Modernization: Sociologists and Historians Debate the Secularization Thesis 
(Oxford: Oxford UP, 1992); God is Dead: Secularization in the West (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002); Rajeev Bhargava 
(ed.), Secularism and Its Critics (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998); See also Hugh McLeod, “Introduction”, in 
Hugh McLeod and Werner Ustorf (eds.), The Decline of Christendom in Western Europe, c1750-2000 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP, 2003).  
  For almost a century, the classic secularization thesis was the dominant agenda in social scientific disciplines, 
religious research and history for the understanding of the relationship between religion and society in the modern 
world. I will deal with this subject in detail in Chapter 2: Two Pivotal Epistemological Paradigm Changes.  
2 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007); Hans Joas, Faith as an Option: 
Possible Futures for Christianity, trans. by Alex Skinner (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2012). 
3 Markus Vinzent, “Re-Modernities: or the Volcanic Landscapes of Religion”, Journal of Beliefs & Values, Vol. 32. 2 
(August 2011): 143–160; Marius C. Felderhof, Revisiting Christianity: Theological Reflections (Surrey and 
Burlington: Ashgate, 2011); Ulrich Beck, A God of One’s Own (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008).  
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theology rather than philosophy of religion. 
 
In contrast to the expectation expressed both by academia and by the popular 
press that religion would weaken and dissipate, from the final decades of the 
twentieth century religion has been revisited and rethought, and now appears 
before the wider public in wide-ranging guises. Indeed, recent years have seen 
an increase in the number of theoretical, empirical and normative challenges 
to the master narrative of the secularization thesis, the assumption that with 
modernization religion had become both irrelevant to how we live and 
increasingly privatized, and consequently would cease to exist, or at least 
become invisible. From the 1980s a wide range of empirical observation, 
especially from a global comparative perspective,4 has indicated the opposite 
of secularization, what can be termed “the return of religion” or “religious 
revival”, and it is also generally agreed that there has been a turning point in 
terms of the visibility of religion in the public sphere.5 While sociologists like 
Steve Bruce and David Voas still insist on “the death of God”, pointing to 
statistical evidence showing a decline in participation in religious institutions,6 
                                           
4 Grace Davie, Europe: The Exceptional Case: Parameters of Faith in the Modern World (London: Darton, Longman 
and Todd, 2002); Peter L. Berger (ed.), The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics 
(Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1999); Philip Jenkins, The Next Christendom: The Coming of Global Christianity 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2002). 
5 The most salient attempt to untangle the complex of meaning used in sociological discourse is that undertaken by 
the Spanish-American sociologist of religion José Casanova, Public Religion in the Modern World (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1994); Hans Joas, “The Future of Christianity”, The Hedgehog Review, Vol. 13.1 
(Spring, 2011): 74-82 
6 Steve Bruce, God is Dead: Secularization in the West (Oxford and Malden: Blackwell, 2002); David Voas, “The 
Continuing Secular Transition”, in Detlef Pollack and Daniel V. A. Olson (eds.), The Role of Religion in Modern 
14 
this secularist theory is being undermined by other sociologists; indeed, the 
classic secularization thesis is no longer tenable either empirically or 
normatively. Sociologists such as Peter L. Berger, Zygmunt Bauman and 
Jürgen Habermas, or more recently, José Casanova, Charles Taylor, and 
Hans Joas, are pointing toward a new cultural landscape and employing terms 
such as “post-secular”7 to describe it. Peter Berger, one of the pioneers of 
secularization theory, describes this situation with a rueful tone:  
Certain religious institutions have lost power and influence in many societies, 
but both old and new religious beliefs and practices have nevertheless 
continued in the lives of individuals, sometimes taking new institutional forms 
and sometimes leading to great explosions of religious fervor. Conversely, 
religiously identified institutions can play social or political roles even when 
very few people believe or practice the religion that the institutions represent. 
To say the least, the relation between religion and modernity is rather 
complicated. 8  
This latter statement is very suggestive in terms of reflexion on morphological 
transformation. Similar changes in attitude and attention can be found 
throughout the world, not least in the European societies that form the 
heartland of secularization. If these phenomena are in any way indicative of 
                                           
Societies (London: Routledge, 2008), pp. 25-48. 
7 See Chapter 2.2. 
8  Peter L. Berger, “The Desecularization of the World: A Global Overview”, in Peter L. Berger (ed.), The 
Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans,1999), p.3. 
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where we are temporally, then it is little wonder that there is talk of the “post-
secular”,9 and increasing discussion of the new visibility of religion in the 
public sphere. Indeed, the study of religion, rather than being considered 
marginal in many humanities faculties, or disregarded in social science, will 
increasingly be seen as necessary.  
 
In this new context the sociology of religion should be less obsessed with the 
decline of religion and more attuned to the new forms assumed by all the world 
religions. These new forms can be found at three levels: 1) in individual 
mysticism, invisible religion and cults of the individual; 2) in congregational 
religion, from new religious movements to the global expansion of 
Pentecostalism and charismatic communities; and 3) in a re-emergence of the 
world religions as transnational imagined communities, vying with, if not 
replacing, the nation-state for a prominent role on the global stage.  
 
Meanwhile, from another viewpoint, the events of 11 September 2001, 
subsequent religious-based political events, and the terror attacks in Norway 
on 22 July 2011 have driven the new interest in religion to the fore, so that the 
place of religion in the public realm is once again the subject of lively and 
urgent debate. There has been increasing academic interest both in an 
                                           
9  Whatever the wider meaning of that term, the most important concept is a reflexive response to classic 
secularization thesis. The definition to be used in this thesis will be discussed in Chapter 2. 
16 
ostensible religious resurgence and in the very features of secularism itself. 
Various major conferences or forums on religion are being planned around the 
world, and newly funded research centres and research projects on “religion 
and politics” are being launched.10 Without doubt, religion has returned as a 
contentious issue in the public sphere.11  As Craig Calhoun, a prominent 
American sociologist, indicates, religion encompasses contradictory figures, 
such as threat or inspiration, enslavement or emancipation, making war or 
making peace, destruction or revitalization, unreflective conviction or prophetic 
challenge. He maintains that while the darker aspects of this character cannot 
easily be absorbed into the public sphere, and should not be, nevertheless, 
prophetic religion, i.e. righteous indignation against injustice and vital passion 
to engage critically with existing institutions and dangerous trends, demands 
and deserves our critical attention.12 
 
In this respect, Ulrich Beck stresses that the secular society must become 
post-secular, i.e. critical and open-minded towards the voices of religion. He 
argues that:  
                                           
10 See Chapter 2.2.3.  
11 Jürgen Habermas, “Religion in the Public Sphere”, European Journal of Philosophy, Vol.14.1 (2006): 1-25; 
"Secularism's Crisis of Faith: Notes on Post-Secular Society", New Perspectives Quarterly, Vol. 25 (2008): 17-29. 
The paper, “Religion in the Public Sphere” was presented at The Holberg Prize Seminar, Bergen, Norway, 30 
November, 2005). Available at: http://www.holbergprisen.no/images/materiell/2005_symposium_habermas.pdf# 
nameddest=habermas;  
12 Craig Calhoun, “Afterword: Religion’s Many Powers”, in Edurado Mendieta and Jonathan Vanantwerpen (eds.) 
The Power of Religion in the Public Sphere (NY: Columbia University Press, 2011), pp.118-133. 
17 
Permitting religious language to enter the public sphere should be regarded 
as enrichment, not as an intrusion. Such a change is no less ambitious than 
the general toleration of secular nihilism by the religions. (…) We need a 
sociology of the effect of religion on society; to examine the cultural 
productivity and destructiveness of religious belief, and to capture the power 
and hold that religion has today.13  
As Ulrich Beck correctly points out, the loss of function as a result of 
differentiation and the trend toward “individualization”14 does not necessarily 
imply that religion has lost influence and relevance, either in the political arena 
and the culture of a society or in individuals’ personal conduct. Rather, religion, 
and for the purposes of this thesis Christianity in particular, transforms in its 
form and characteristics, re-invents itself, and takes new shape in a changed 
world, to act in society in new ways. 
 
In order to engage in diagnosis and prognosis about the transformation of 
religion, we must replace “the secularization theory” with more plausible 
accounts of the place and role of religion in the public sphere, and of its present 
and future significance. Furthermore, we need a new theoretical approach to 
the relationship between religion and its engagement with politics. Finally, 
                                           
13 Ulrich Beck, A God of One’s Own (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008), p.156.  
14 The concept of “Individualization” is discussed in Chapter 3 of this thesis. For the more precise and analytical 
concept of “individualization”, as distinct from privatization, see Ulrich Beck, A God of One’s Own (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 2008), pp.79-84, 93-131; Detlef Pollack and Daniel V.A. Olson (eds.), The Role of Religion in Modern 
Societies (NY and Abingdon: Routledge, 2008). 
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each one of us has a responsibility to revisit and rethink the core of the 
disciplines in which we work, in order to accommodate religion and religious 
issues in our analyses of late modern societies as both central theoretical 
difficulties and urgent practical considerations. In this respect, my own 
scholarly interest in the changing religious scene focuses on the morphological 
transformation of Christianity, including movements emerging outside of 
institutional religion, and on its socio-political engagement with and relevance 
to socio-political issues15 in a contemporary paradigm. 
1.2. The Objective of the Study 
The purpose of this research is to examine the current social location and role 
of Christianity, focusing on the trajectories of its morphological transformation, 
the challenges it faces, and its socio-political engagement. The direction of the 
thesis is guided by two aims: First, the intention is to explore the most recent 
typologies of religious transformation of Christianity through a new approach, 
as opposed to a “numbers game” account of the growth and decline of 
Christianity, or a simple exploration of the grand scenario of the secularization 
                                           
15  The importance of the socio-historical variability underlying the public/private dichotomy has been widely 
acknowledged in the literature. See, for example: Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public 
Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society, trans. Thomas Burger with the assistance of Frederick 
Lawrence (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989); Jürgen Habermas, “Further Reflections on the Public Sphere”, in Craig 
Calhoun (ed.), Habermas and the Public Sphere (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,1992), pp.421-461; Craig Calhoun, 
“Introduction: Habermas and the Public Sphere”, in Craig Calhoun (ed.), Habermas and the Public Sphere 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), pp.1-48; Thomas G. Goodnight, “Habermas, the Public Sphere, and 
Controversy”, International Journal of Public Opinion, Vol.4. 3 (1992): 243-255; Simon Susen, “The Philosophical 
Significance of Binary Categories in Habermas’s Discourse Ethics”, Sociological Analysis, Vol.3. 2 (2009): 97-125; 
“Remarks on the Concept of Critique in Habermasian Thought”, Journal of Global Ethics, Vol. 6. 2 (2010): 103-126. 
19 
thesis or of religious resurgence as a testimony to de-secularization. Secondly, 
the thesis will explore the relevance and value of substantial Christianity in 
terms of its socio-political engagement and activities in civil society. The 
overall aim is to develop theoretical insights into the role of religion in society, 
and into the interrelations between Christianity and society, especially in the 
current context. 
 
It is necessary to explain my initial motivation for engaging in this study. At the 
outset of my undergraduate studies in theology and sociology, as a Christian 
believer I was confronted with two troubling issues, one relating to the internal 
problems within Christianity, and the other to the relationship between 
Christianity and the wider society:16 First, the Korean churches and Christian 
institutions such as theological colleges, various united organizations and the 
religious press have been deeply fractured, and cannot find a common ground 
for the development of individuals and the whole society; more seriously, this 
has become a source of conflict within inter-religious and extra-religious, as 
                                           
16 My personal experience is contextualized by the following historical observations and sociological analyses. See, 
for example: The Society of the History of Christianity in Korea (ed.), A History of Christianity in Korea Vol.Ⅲ (Seoul: 
The institute of the History of Christianity in Korea, 2009); Chi-jun Noh, Hanguk Gaesingyo Sahoehak: Hanguk 
Gyohoeui Wigiwa Jeonmang [Korea Protestant Sociology: Crisis and Prospect of Korean Church (Seoul: Hanul 
Academi, 1998); Soo-in Lee, “Gaesingyo Bosubunpaui Jeongchijeok Haengwi : Sahoehakjeok Gochal” [Political 
Activity of Conservative Protestant: Sociological Analysis], in KyongJe wa Sahoe [Economy and Society], Vol.64 
(Seoul: Winter, 2004); Soo-in Lee, Hangukui Kugga, Simin Sahoiwa Gaesinkyoui Jeongchi Sahoijeog Teado 
Byundong: 1960s-1990s [State, Civil Society and the Change of Socio-political Attitude of Protestants: 1960s-
1990s, PhD thesis (Ewha Womans University, 2002); Won-gyu Lee, Hankuk Gyohoiui Hyeonsilgwa Jeonmang 
[The Reality and Prospect of the Korean Church] (Seoul: SeongSeo Yungusa, 1996), Hanguk Kidokgyoui 
Jeongchijeok Teado [The Political Attitude of Korean Protestantism, 1972-1990 (Ⅱ)], KyongJe wa Sahoe [Economy 
and Society], Vol.16 (Seoul: Winter,1992). 
20 
well as intra-religious relationships.17 Secondly, I could not ignore the fact that 
although the churches in South Korea still show numerical strength as an 
example of successful religious resurgence, nevertheless, as Philip Jenkins, 
David Martin, Grace Davie and Minho Chung note,18 there is a deep and 
growing antipathy to the Korean churches in Korean society, and a strong and 
widespread tendency to consider them as an obstacle to social progressive 
development. This adversarial picture of the relation of Christian faith to 
Korean society has arisen not only from the modern paradigmatic society, but 
also from numerous problems caused by Christian action: religious 
fundamentalism, political conservatism combined with red-complex, nepotism, 
and graft and corruption.19 
 
This historical picture reveals many perplexing disparities between the 
Christian denominations (intra-religious), between Christianity and the other 
                                           
17 For example, the churches and religious institutions are divided into conservatives and progressives, each 
appropriating the Bible according to their own purposes and situations. The polarization between the two groups 
reflects the hostile reality of Korean politics and society. The two parties barely know, let alone understand, each 
other. The friction and conflict in the Korean church worsened under postcolonial rule, while the Korean War and 
division into North and South so strained Korean society that the country has suffered gravely since, undergoing 
trials such as military regime, human rights abuses and economic polarization.  
18  Grace Davie, Europe: The Exceptional Case (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 2002); David Martin, 
“Evangelical Expansion in Global Society”, in Donald M. Lewis (ed.), Christianity Reborn: The Global Expansion 
of Evangelicalism in the Twentieth Century (Michigan and Cambridge: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 2004); Philip Jenkins, 
The Next Christendom: The Coming of Global Christianity (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002); Min-ho 
Chung, The Spirit of Capitalism in Korea: Tracking the Rapid Growth and Stagnation of the Korean Protestant 
Church in the 90s (The University of Birmingham, Ph.D. Diss., 2005). 
19 Soo-in Lee, Hangukui Kugga, Simin Sahoiwa Gaesinkyoui Jeongchi Sahoijeog Teado Byundong: 1960s-1990s 
[State, Civil Society and the Change of Socio-political Attitude of Protestants: 1960s-1990s, PhD thesis (Ewha 
Womans University, 2002); In-Chul Kang, Hankukui Gaesingyowa Bangongjuui [Korean Protestantism and Anti-
communism] (Seoul: Jung Sim, 2006).  Korean Protestantism apparently grew expeditiously between the 1960s 
and the early 1990s, across the whole range of Protestant denominations. However, I doubt whether the Korean 
church is still growing. 
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religions (inter-religious), and between Christianity and the non-religious 
society (extra-religious), and indicates a lack of integrity that has elements of 
irony and tragedy. Together, these phenomena have undermined the 
credibility of the church in contemporary society; 20  indeed, the Korean 
churches and their theologies are on the verge of losing their power and 
influence in the public sphere.  
 
In this social context, where some individuals seem to have far too much 
religious faith and others far too little, and where there is mutual 
incomprehension and antagonism between the two groups, I struggled 
to find a way to solve my inner conflict. I had reached a crisis point at which I 
would either stop believing and studying theology, or must search for a new 
horizon of recognition for the substantial value of Christianity. In order to 
concretize my faith, I finally decided to participate in a student Christian 
movement that organizes a volunteer mission for disenfranchised people in 
the rural area and metro Seoul, and to try to illuminate from a holistic 
perspective the relation between church and society and the role of Christianity 
in the contemporary world. After graduating from college I remained active in 
the Christian student movement, now as part of the general staff. 
 
                                           
20  In-chul Kang, “Soolyeom Hogeun Hegemony?: 1990 yondea Eehoo Gaesingyo Jihyeongui Byeonhwa” 
[Convergence or Hegemony?: The transformation of Protestant Topography since 1990], Kyungjewa Sahoe 
[Economic and Society], Vol. 62 (Summer, 2004). 
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At that time, I reached out to various Christian organizations to bridge the 
estranged Christian groups. Through this process I observed many 
misunderstandings and distrust between the Christian denominations and 
between liberal and conservative Christian groups, and prejudiced reading of 
the Bible by Korean churches. I also realized that there exist many differences 
in the interpretation of Christian mission, and in what people put into action. In 
response to this situation, I organized the Forest and Tree Forum, which aims 
to shed light on the relation between church and society and on the role of 
Christianity in 21st century Korea, from a holistic perspective. My experiences 
provided me with stepping stones to embody a Christian faith in the world. 
They further showed me that faith and practice must go hand in hand, and that 
different traditions must come to reconciliation and broaden the common 
ground among them, transforming fractured existence through communicative 
dialogue and holistic understanding, if the churches or religious communities 
are truly to serve the larger society.  
 
My personal faith journey brought me to consider more deeply a major concern: 
Is Christianity still important for individuals, the whole society, and the global 
community? My personal and colloquial concerns residing in the main question 
deepened my thinking on the potential of Christianity, and encouraged me to 
reconsider Christianity as a foothold for a new movement in the contemporary 
social and historical context. This continually developing train of thought about 
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the role of Christianity and related themes finally began to crystalize into more 
detailed academic interests and the following questions:  
 
An Overarching Research Question: Is Christianity still important for 
individuals, the whole society, and the global community today and for the 
future? 
Does Christianity still possess possibility, sustainability and significance in the 
public sphere? What is the potential value of Christianity?  
This research is mainly interested in examining any assurance, sustainability 
and possibility of Christianity under current conditions, focusing on: 1) the 
trajectories of morphological transformation of Christianity; 2) the social 
presence of Christianity bound up with faith-based praxis in the public sphere; 
3) discussion of the potential of Christianity as a reflexive agent. 
 
Question 1 (Chapter 2): What sort of methodological approach is most 
appropriate to answer my research questions? 
Above all, this research needs to construct two new approaches: 1) the post-
secular, in order to understand the trajectories of morphological transformation 
of Christianity and to explore in depth the secular condition that is not captured 
by the classic secularization theory; and 2) the post-postmodern, beyond the 
non-committed and deconstructive postmodern, to enable us to rediscover the 
potential of Christianity, making sense of how we can best live our lives in 
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today’s global capitalist society. 
 
Question 2 (Chapter 3): How does Christianity transform in the modern world? 
- How does the encounter of Christian faith with modernity change the nature 
and experience of faith? 
- What negatively ferments the religious atmosphere, or, for that matter, 
modernity itself, or religiosity itself?  
- Should the transformation of Christianity be considered a religious crisis, or 
does it present new possibilities?  
The aim is to trace the trajectories of morphological transformation of 
Christianity, with reference also to the changing condition of religious milieus, 
through a new approach based on a more fundamental understanding of both 
the substantial features of Christianity21 and the secular condition that is not 
captured by the classic secularization theory. 22  Examination of this 
morphological transformation is not limited to institutionalized religion, but is 
broadened to encompass diverse types of Christianity existing today. 
 
Question 3 (Chapter 4): How does Christian faith engage in the public 
sphere?23  
                                           
21 Markus Vinzent, “Re-Modernities: or the Volcanic Landscapes of Religion”, Journal of Beliefs & Values, Vol. 32. 
2 (August 2011): 143–160; Marius C. Felderhof, Revisiting Christianity: Theological Reflections (Surrey and 
Burlington: Ashgate, 2011); Ulrich Beck, A God of One’s Own (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008). 
22 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007); Hans Joas, Faith as an Option: 
Possible Futures for Christianity, trans. by Alex Skinner (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2012). 
23 How would I, as a Christian believer, embody my faith both in my personal life and in the social context? A similar 
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- Where is Christianity located in the public sphere? 
- What is the role of Christianity today? How does Christianity play a 
substantial role in contemporary society? 
- What are the characteristics of its faith and its main attitudes to socio-political 
issues in the modernization process?  
The third question aims to re-illuminate the position and role of Christianity in 
the public sphere by examining its socio-political engagement through faith-
based praxis in historical and sociological aspects, and to find its potential and 
relevance to socio-political issues in the normative view of the contemporary 
modern paradigm. Consequently, the study attempts to reconstruct the 
substantial value and significance of Christianity in life.  
 
Question 4 (Chapter 4): How can we locate Christianity as a reflexive agent in 
a post-postmodern paradigm? 
- Can we conceive of a Christian faith that will once again inspire and impact 
on the formation of human being in today’s global capitalist society?  
- What is the potential of Christianity as a reflexive agent in that global capitalist 
society? 
- How should Christianity overcome its intrinsic defects - religious dogma, 
exclusive truth, metaphysical absoluteness, top-down-oriented authority - in 
order to be reintroduced as a legitimate actor of civil society? 
                                           
question, that of mediation or, in D. Bonhoeffer’s words, of “who is Christ for us today?”, is still very much alive. 
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- How can Christianity be concerned with finding authentic truth, justice, 
intrinsic values and significance in the many perplexing disparities of values in 
intra-religious, inter-religious, and extra-religious relationships; and how are 
we best advised to live in today’s global capitalist society?  
The fourth aim of this research is to investigate how we can relocate 
Christianity as a reflexive agent in a post-postmodern paradigm. To do so, first, 
this research attempts to examine why Christianity has emerged as a focal 
point of recent radical socio-political philosophy, and to explore the fascination 
with the potential of Christianity as a reflexive agent in a re-modern perspective, 
not from a simple self-congratulatory position within a religious perspective, 
but with the intention of re-assessment through a co-operative appreciation of 
radical social philosophy and theology. Secondly, this research attempts to 
make radical proposals to overcome the inherent defects of Christianity, in 
order that it might be reintroduced as a legitimate actor of civil society. To 
accomplish this, the study engages in dialogue between theology and social 
philosophy in the post-postmodern context, focusing on the challenging 
discussion of radical intellectuals, including Alain Badiou, Slavoj Žižek, Giorgio 
Agamben and Ulrich Beck, discussion that is concerned not with religions’ 
claims to truth from a religious perspective, but with the connections between 
religion and the social world. 
 
In summary, the objective of this research is to revisit and re-articulate the 
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sustainability and potential, the substantial value of Christianity, by examining 
the trajectories of a morphological transformation of Christianity in the latest 
modern world through a new post-secular approach beyond both the 
discourse of “secularization” and that of “religious resurgence”, and the public 
presence of Christianity based on the socio-political engagement of 
Christianity in the public sphere in both empirical and normative aspects; and 
to reconstruct the substantial meaning of Christianity as a reflexive agent by 
examining its potential through discussion of how the Christian faith can inspire 
and impact on the formation of human being in today’s global capitalist society 
on the one hand, and establishing a foothold to overcome its intrinsic defects 
as a religion through radical reflection in the post-postmodern paradigm by on 
the other. 
1.3. Hypothesis of the Study 
The central hypothesis of this research includes the following considerations: 
1) A re-assessment of the sustainability, relevance and substantial value 
of Christianity, which can be made through two pivotal epistemological 
paradigm changes: i) from the modern and the postmodern to the post-
postmodern, and ii) from the secular to post-secular re-modern 
paradigm (Chapter 2). 
2) Christianity can be re-embedded as a defence of lost causes and a 
reflexive agent in the latest crisis in post-postmodern thinking (Chapter 
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2.1 & Chapter 4). 
3) “Secularization theory” as an evolutional and inevitable historical model 
must be modified and deconstructed (Chapter 2.2 & Chapter 3). 
∙ Conversely, the growth and resurgence of Christianity does not always mean 
the success of religiosity over the secular. The judgment that interprets the 
explosive growth of conservativism as the triumph of religious authenticity 
over modernization, maintaining that what has occurred is that, by and large, 
religious institutions have survived and even flourished insofar as they have 
not tried to adapt themselves to the alleged requirements of a secularized 
world, is both self-triumphant and reductive.  
∙ The numerical fluctuation of Christianity should not be regarded as a result 
of contemporary interest in religiosity itself or the challenge of the outside itself, 
but as caused by the conjunction of socio-political particularities and the 
unique characteristics of the particular Christianity. In other words, people are 
neither more nor less religious today than they may have been in the past. It 
does not make sense that human existence becomes more religious or more 
secular depending on a particular context. Rather, the retention of the religious 
movement’s social influence depends on how it deals with new social change, 
that is, its attitude to the challenge and intervention from spheres beyond 
religion, such as so-called modernism or postmodernism.24  
4) The profound epistemological paradigm shift from secularization to 
                                           
24  For example, the impetus to the powerful movement of counter-secularization was neither evangelical 
Protestantism itself nor universal modernity itself; rather, the driving factor behind its establishment as probably the 
most vibrant religious force in Korea today is the encounter between the evangelical character in Korea and its 
socio-political activity in contemporary modernization. 
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post-secular offers a plausible framework for understanding present-
day religious topics and their relevance. In opposition to the grand 
scenario of “secularization”, Christianity does not disappear, but takes 
on new forms in a changing world (Chapter 3). 
∙ Recognition of the transformation of Christianity reminds us that the fact that 
people attend religious services less frequently does not mean that their lives 
are less shaped by religious ideas.   
∙ The church as an institution is giving way to a more community-oriented and 
life-oriented religiosity, which is emancipating itself from ecclesiastical control 
and religious norms. The 20th and early 21st centuries have proved not only 
the decline but also the reinvention and resurgence of traditional religions 
alongside the rise of new forms of religion and spirituality. 
5) The classification of religion as an essentially private matter is 
misguided; indeed, religion has never been essentially private. 
Christianity became not privatized, but individualized. The re-entering 
of religion into the public sphere does not represent a return to a 
previous order, but the taking on of a new role in a civil society (Chapter 
4). 
∙Christianity’s encounter with the public arena takes place through a new way: 
no longer dominant and controlling, it becomes a movement challenging and 
being challenged, serving and being served. 
6) Christianity can develop into a reflexive agent through faith-based 
praxis, by overcoming religious dogma, exclusive truth, metaphysical 
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absoluteness and top-down-oriented authority in the contemporary 
modern paradigm (Chapter4). 
1.4. Methodology Employed  
1.4.1. Key Concepts  
1.4.1.1. The Transformation of Christianity 
Transformation is usually defined as an act, process, or operation to change 
the form, appearance, nature, or character of something.25 The concept of 
transformation, which is mainly used in biology, refers to the genetic alteration 
of a cell that occurs naturally in an entity in a state of competence, resulting 
from the direct uptake and incorporation of exogenous change from its 
surroundings.26 
  
This study uses the concept of transformation in order to capture the trend of 
the change in Christianity in the contemporary world. In the sense of a process 
that is occurring naturally, transformation of Christianity is different from 
reformation, and in the sense of alteration it is different from obsolescence or 
degeneration. Moreover, transformation implies the mutual interaction of 
                                           
25 Albert Sydney Hornby, Michael Ashby and Sally Wehmeier (eds.), Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of 
Current English (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).  
26 Transformation was first demonstrated in 1928 by a British bacteriologist, Frederick Griffith. Details are available 
at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transformation_(genetics) .    
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Christianity with exogenous social changes, neither only dependent variables 
nor only independent variables. Thus, in order to fully understand the 
transformation of Christianity, it is necessary to develop a better understanding 
of the secular and of the prototypes of the further stages of Christianity in a 
post-secular perspective, going beyond the secular and the non-secular. 
 
In this respect, transformation of Christianity is a discursive and multi-
dimensional picture that is not captured by an account of numerical fluctuation 
of religious institutions and their members. Transformation of Christianity can 
be delineated in two aspects: in morphological form and in its activating way 
in human life. 
 
When post-secular means neither the secular nor the non-secular, but a 
religious transformation that depicts religion as a social significance within the 
civil society, what are the prototypes of the further stages of Christianity in the 
contemporary context? As previously stated, it is impossible to delineate a 
simple and general pattern of transformation of Christianity, and none of the 
many possible definitions of church, as a Christian morphology seem to 
describe a single one of the churches analysed in this study.27 The differences 
run much deeper than surface level, and the types of contemporary modern 
                                           
27 José Casanova, Public Religion in the Modern World (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994); David Martin, 
The Future of Christianity: Reflection on Violence and Democracy, Religion and Secularization (Surrey and 
Burlington: Ashgate, 2011). 
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Christianity in both morphological existence and a way of expressing its faith 
are so various, depending on historical processes, the socio-political 
environment, cultural patterns, denominational positions, and self-definitions, 
that the tighter to describe what Christianity is today is, the more contradictions 
surface; the more confined to sketch its portrait is, the more elusive the notion 
of ‘the’ church becomes; and the more confined to shape a way Christian faith 
exist and engaged in is, the less beneficial in understanding the role and 
meaning of Christianity in the public sphere of civil society.  
  
However, there is no doubt that the transformation of a religious typology is in 
progress, one that is renewing the visibility of religion in the public sphere and 
will have far-reaching effects upon both the study and the practice of religion. 
Casanova argues that sociology of religion should be more attuned to the new 
forms into which religion is being transformed in diverse ways, rather than the 
exaggerated triumph of religious revival or obsession with the decline of 
religion. 28  While contemporary religious phenomena have disproved the 
classical secularization expectation that with the rise of modernization religion 
will decline, they do not demonstrate the reverse idea of a continued rise of 
the public importance of religion. Werner Ustorf contends that words such as 
“secular” and “religious” have increasingly become language fossils, 
                                           
28 José Casanova, “Rethinking Secularization: A Global Comparative Perspective”, The Hedgehog Review , Vol. 8 
(Spring & Summer, 2006): 7-22 
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terminological survivals of the power games of the established churches and 
the culture of agnostic liberalism, which are both currently losing their previous 
dominant position and power to control minds. 29  Therefore, in order to 
examine the transforming Christianity in the contemporary paradigm, we need 
a more appropriate and persuasive concept to replace the outdated and vague 
classifications of “secular” and “religious”, or “decline” and “revival”.30 In this 
circumstance, in order to capture the transformation of Christian organizations, 
rather than articulating clear definitions or typology the crucial tasks are to 
locate these “religious mobilizations” as points of social energy,31  and to 
discern just where such changes are leading.  
 
Perhaps the most salient phenomenon to be observed in the contemporary 
religious transformation is the development and massive dissemination of a 
religiosity that is based increasingly on individualization, whereby people are 
“persuaded, pushed, dragooned, or bullied into new forms of social 
association". 32  The thesis of religious individualization proceeds from the 
assumption that with increasing modernization, the religious do not disappear, 
but change their appearance.  This can be observed in the various types of 
                                           
29 Werner Ustorf, “Global Christianity, New Empire and Old Europe”, in Frans Wijsen and Robert Schreiter (eds.), 
Global Christianity Contested Claims (Amsterdam and New York: Rodopi B. V., 2007). 
30 José Casanova, “Rethinking Secularization: A Global Comparative Perspective”, The Hedgehog Review , Vol. 
18.2 (2006): 281-300 
31 Charles Taylor, “Religious Mobilizations”, Public Culture, Vol. 18.2 (2006):  281-300. 
32 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), p.445 
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resilient or persistent Christian morphology, as will be presented in 
subsections of Chapter 3: 1) re-invention of explicit Christianity: the global 
expansion of more conservative forms of Christianity; 2) the new vitalization of 
implicit Christianity such as faith communities; and 3) integrating Christianity 
into the civil society movement as social capital at the civil society level.33 
 
Accordingly, we can point to two clear trends in the theorem of religious 
individualization, developing both inside and outside the churches: “resurgent 
Christianity” as a transformation of institutionalized Christianity, and 
“disestablished Christianity” 34  as an anomalous transformation. In this 
dissertation on the transformation of Christianity in the context of a post-
secular and re-modern world, particular consideration will be given to this 
apparent paradox, where one picture comprises two contradictory parts.35 I 
assume that the themes of post-postmodern transition and ecclesial identity 
come together in a newly transforming Christianity. It should be noted that we 
are not dealing with a postmodern concept. The God of one’s own is the 
                                           
33 This agenda will be presented empirically in Chapter 3. 
34 I have borrowed the concept “disestablishement” from James W. Heisig’s interesting article “Christianity Today: 
The Transition to Disestablishment”, Inter-religio, Vol.30 (1996): pp.63-79. Dr. James W. Heisig is a philosopher 
who specializes in the field of philosophy of religion. He is director of the Nanzan Institute for Religion and Culture, 
Nanzan Univeristy, Nagoya, Japan. This article is a translation of a lecture delivered on 29 October 1996, the 
second of a series of talks on “The Significance of the World Religions Today” sponsored by the Institute for Oriental 
Philosophy (Sõka University, Japan).  
35 Traditional institutionalized religiosity and forms are going down on the one hand, individualized religiosity are 
increasing, including individual spiritual forms of new Christian faith communities and movements and the churches 
embedded by individualized religiosity although it still has institutional forms. Ex) some of evangelical Pentecostal 
churches (See 3.2.2) 
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pinnacle of a long process embedded in the Christian tradition itself. 
1.4.1.2. The Public Presence of Christianity 
This research employs the concept of “public presence of Christianity” to 
understand and re-illuminate the place and role of Christianity in the public 
sphere, as a countervailing argument to the privatization thesis. During the 
latter half of the twentieth century scholars have observed a growing visibility 
of religion in civil society, contrary to the expectations of the privatization view. 
However, the visibility of religion in the public sphere is not always a positive 
feature. Sometimes it becomes the source of social trouble. 
In this thesis, “public presence of Christianity” refers to the situation in which 
religious institutions, the churches, and various groups and individuals 
identified with Christianity have a role and influence in civil society via 
involvement in social agenda issues through the process of “entanglement” 
and “intertwinement” with the whole society. In this context, it is important to 
note first that the subject of action designates every entity that has Christian 
faith, or acts under the influence of Christian faith, not only the churches or 
religious institutions. Thus, our concern is not with who the subject of action is, 
but with the content of the action. Assessment of the public presence of 
religion is not concerned with whether religion is (re-)entering the public sphere, 
but rather with whether the socio-political actions that religion is taking are 
valid and relevant to individual life and the whole society. A second point 
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concerns the way Christian entities engage in social agenda. As stated above, 
the public presence of Christianity denotes social participation and solidarity 
of Christianity through the process of entanglement and intertwinement, 
neither dominance, nor a political assertion or coercion of strong Christianity. 
Finally, public presence of Christianity designates not an action participating 
in religious agenda, but an action participating in life-oriented social matters. 
To take an example, Casanova’s notion of public religions clings too closely to 
the traditional location of religion rather than its substantial action, and focuses 
solely on religion rather than religiosity or religious faith. Therefore, instead of 
the term “public religions”, this study will use “public presence of religion” in 
order to describe the kind of role that certain characteristics of religions or the 
religious play in the development of global human society, through social 
participation, solidarity, and entanglement. It does not seek to answer the 
question of to what extent religion holds a dominant position over the secular 
challenge, but what religiosity of Christian faith inspire and impact in the 
formation of human being in the contemporary world. 
Indeed, when considering social influence or place it is difficult to express the 
result numerically. In addition, because “faith” itself is an invisible substance, 
a social scientific approach to this discourse has inherent limits. Therefore, a 




1.4.2. Methodology  
The most important methodological approach of this research is concerned 
with the mapping of two pivotal epistemological paradigm changes to construct 
the theoretical framework: 1) from the modern and the postmodern to the post-
postmodern, and 2) from the secular to the post-secular. The post-postmodern 
and the post-secular frameworks respectively are applied to two agendas in 
the social study of religion undertaken by this research: first, the ongoing 
morphological transformation of Christianity, and second, the potential value 
of Christianity in terms of its social presence in the public sphere.   
 
In addressing the former agenda this research employs a mainly sociological-
empirical approach, through analysis of historical sources and sociological 
materials and statistics. Of course, a contemporary treatment of these issues 
cannot remain limited to Europe or the North Atlantic area, but must adopt a 
global comparative perspective. An ethnocentric attitude is no longer tenable 
once it becomes evident that throughout much of the world processes of 
modernization are accompanied by processes of religious revitalization. 
Together with such empirical considerations, in investigating the meaning of 
the phenomenological trajectories this thesis also employs a theoretical 
approach developed through discussion of a wider sociological literature on 
contemporary society and religion, focusing on the individualization theory of 
religion. This research needs the interdisciplinary study between theology and 
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social philosophy and the insights gained from religious sociology studies, but 
more importantly, it must advance deep into the territory of various 
methodologies and literatures.  
 
With regard to the second agenda, this dissertation investigates how 
Christianity is engaged and re-embedded in the public sphere as a response 
to contemporary socio-political issues, and what constitutes goodness, truth, 
and justice in the socio-political attitudes and activities Christianity brings to 
civil society. More significantly, it explores the potential value of Christianity as 
a reflexive agent in the world. These complex interrelations demand closer 
scrutiny from an inter-disciplinary methodology that draws on sociological and 
political theories, social philosophy, and theology. Specifically, I will ground my 
analysis in a careful reading of progressive intellectual literature, seeking to 
gain an understanding of the wider progressive milieu from which it has 
emerged; in empirical study of progressive spirituality groups and networks; 
and in discussion of a wider sociological literature on contemporary society 
and religion. Moreover, with regard to normative concerns, the interweaving of 
social philosophical and sociological understanding is crucial. This research is 
concerned not with claims to truth from a Christian perspective, but with the 
connections between religion and the social world and with the extent, limits 
and future of Christianity.  
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This research adopts two new approaches to the social study of religion by 
reflecting upon the concepts of the post-postmodern and the post-secular. 
First, the post-postmodern will be set as a framework to analyse the 
development of Christianity from the object of modern demystification or a lost 
cause of postmodern deconstruction into a reflexive agent, particularly in the 
context of what Beck terms the “risk society”. Secondly, the post-secular will 
be set as a framework to explore the trajectories of the transformation of 
Christianity, with an academic interest in understanding the change of the 
wider religious milieu from which it has emerged, and more significantly, its 
position and role in civil society. The two pivotal frameworks are not 
inconsistent with each other, but are closely related, and on the same 
epistemological horizon. 
 
In terms of methodological principles, this dissertation will make particular use 
of inter-disciplinary methodologies situated between a sociology of religion 
and a social philosophy relevant to a study of the transformation of Christianity 
and the substantial meaning of Christianity as regards its social presence in 
the public sphere. Research questions on these two central topics will provide 
not only possible answers located between the universal and the particular, 
the constant and the variable, but also a very important marker as a subject 
for study in relation to the gap between Christianity and the church. We have 
to emphasize a qualitative rather than a quantitative approach to the 
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relationship between religion and society, and then question whether the crisis 
applies to the organized and established churches only, or to Christianity as a 
whole. Concrete methodology will be introduced in each chapter.  
 
1.5. Structure of the Study 
The thesis is divided into five chapters, each composed of a number of 
subsections. Chapter 1 provides an introduction to the work. It states the 
objectives of the study, including my personal background and initial 
motivation for engaging in this research, describes the hypotheses and 
methodology, including two key concepts, and sets out the structure of the 
dissertation. Finally, it states the contribution and limitations of the study.  
 
Chapter 2 aims at mapping two pivotal epistemological paradigm changes as 
the theoretical frameworks for the research: the shift from the modern and the 
postmodern to the “post-postmodern”, and from the classic secularization 
theory to the so-called “post-secular”. After briefly considering the historical 
development of the modern and the postmodern on the one hand, and of 
secularization theory on the other, the chapter critically examines the various 
meanings attributed to the “post-secular” and “post-postmodern”, finally setting 
out the most relevant definitions for this research concerning the potential of 
Christianity. Both these concepts provide new approaches, not only for 
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understanding the ongoing morphological transformation of Christianity 
beyond the secularization thesis and the notion of triumphant religious 
resurgence, but also for empirical analysis and normative interpretation of the 
social presence of Christianity, related to a faith-based praxis in the public 
sphere; and for investigation of the potential of Christianity as a reflexive agent 
in post-postmodern discourse. The final subsection of Chapter 2 deals with the 
relationship of Christianity to modernity, postmodernity, and re-modernities 
respectively. 
 
Chapter 3 presents a descriptive account of the ongoing morphological 
transformation of Christianity, including the changes of religious milieus. 
Finally, in order to interpret this phenomenon, the chapter examines theories 
of individualization of religion within the sociology of religion. Chapter 3 is 
consecutively historical, sociological, and partly analytical in nature. Despite 
the descriptive unfolding of the argument, this research is structured by that 
argument, and not by chronological narration for its own sake. 
 
Chapter 4 comprises a reconfiguration of the place and role of Christianity in 
the public sphere. This chapter seeks in particular to specify the challenges 
and complexities associated with recent attempts to empirically and 
normatively reconfigure the place of religion against the privatization of religion. 
The first subsection analyses conceptually how far a more relaxed stance on 
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the public uses of religion can be systematized into a post-secular stance on 
public justification. The second subsection uses concrete cases to explore how 
Christianity assumes important public roles in the justification of political 
stances and how diverse Christian actors interact with other organizations, 
humanists, and secularists within the secularized social structures of late 
capitalism. The third subsection presents a normative approach to the social 
presence of Christianity, specifying religious reason-giving in theories of 
ethical citizenship, political discourse, and the public sphere, and engaging 
critically with the recent work of Jürgen Habermas and Charles Taylor. In doing 
so it reveals that one challenge currently faced by Christianity is the intellectual 
discussion that thematises both a more transformative process of mutual 
engagement and the wider generation of social solidarities that integrates 
political communities. 
The Forth section examines the potential of Christianity as a reflexive agent in 
a re-modern perspective, and offers radical proposals to overcome the intrinsic 
defects of the religion in order that it might be reintroduced as a legitimate 
actor of civil society in the public sphere. The chapter focuses on the 
challenging ideas of radical intellectuals, including Alain Badiou and Slavoj 
Žižek. The discussion is based on a new re-modern approach. In the first, I 
examine why Christianity has emerged as a focal point of recent radical socio-
political philosophy, and seek to explain the new fascination with its worldly 
potential. The second analyses possible solutions to the inherent deficiencies 
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of Christianity, and tries to reformulate its religious intrinsic attributes, such as 
subject, truth, and transcendence, through dialogue between theology and 
social philosophy in a re-modern paradigm. 
 
Chapter 5 provides a brief summary of the main arguments, and offers 
recommendations. 
1.6. Contributions and Limitations  
1.6.1. Contributions 
Firstly, this research tries to demonstrate that theology has a contribution to 
make to the debates of the sociologists and social philosophers about the way 
they understand the place of religion in contemporary society. This contribution 
is first and foremost a critical review of these ways of understanding and, 
subsequently, a widening or an enrichment of the scholarly repertories. 
 
Secondly, it is intended that by subjecting the classic secularization theory and 
the concept of religious resurgence to thorough scrutiny, the research will offer 
two new methodological approaches to religious studies.  
 
Thirdly, this research will present the possibility, sustainability and significance 
of Christianity, by re-illuminating its location and role in the world through a 
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new post-secular approach. 
 
Finally, a re-modern approach to the study of Christianity will contribute both 
to finding possible clues as to how individuals and the global community can 
live well in the global capitalist society, and to paving a way for the process of 
reconciliation in extra religious, inter-religious, and intra-religious conflicts by 
overcoming the intrinsic defects of Christianity, namely religious dogma, 
exclusive truth, metaphysical absoluteness, and top-down-oriented authority. 
1.6.2. Limitations of the Research 
Firstly, this research is limited to analysing the contemporary developments 
and changes within the fold of Christianity, so that it can be different from the 
religious phenomena occurred in the other religions. 
 
Secondly, since this study is focused on the two main branches of Christianity, 
Catholicism and Protestantism, it can function alongside a relatively 
unreflexive categorization of religion. 
 
Thirdly, because this research is mainly focused on the transformation of 
Christianity in developed civil society, it rules out the contemporary 
developments and changes of religion in society where basic condition for civil 
society is not yet developed, such as communist countries, Islam where 
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religion and politics is not differentiated, and undemocratic societies. Thus, it 
seems to be oriented to the western religious situation, and to prevent us from 
fully comprehending the contemporary changes of Christianity in non-Western 
societies. However, it does not start from the view point of the heritage of 
modern Western thought, but holds careful consideration to the changes of 
religious milieus in multiple modernities on a global scale. 
46 
Chapter 2. Two Pivotal Epistemological Paradigm 
Changes: Mapping the Theoretical Frameworks  
How can we re-locate Christianity as a reflexive agent in the historical and 
social context of the early 21st century?  
This chapter is concerned with the development of a conceptual framework 
that will enable a proper understanding of the contemporary modern world and 
of the place of religion within it. The research approach is based on two 
profound epistemological paradigm shifts: 1) from the modern and the 
postmodern to the post-postmodern,36 and 2) from the secular to the post-
secular.37  
First, the idea of the modern, a strand of intellectual life that dominated 
Western culture from the late 1970s, has run out of steam. Since the 
appearance of Zygmunt Bauman’s important book Modernity and Holocaust,38 
                                           
36 The “post-postmodernity” concepts in the field of social science are numerous, diverse and rarely in full agreement 
with each other. In this study I mainly employ the post-postmodern constellation entailed in Markus Vinzent’s 
concept of “re-modernities”.  
37 I refer to the term in Habermas’s article, “Notes on a post-secular society”, even though I would differ with regard 
to the perspective of the term. 
38 Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust (Cambridge: Polity, 1989); Postmodernity and its Discontents 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997); See also Hans Joas and Wolfgang Knoebl, Social Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), pp. 475-84.  
Whether barbarism constitutes a separate breakdown of civilization or whether it is very much part of modern 
rationalization and bureaucratization, has produced a lively theoretical debate. Rather than viewing the Holocaust 
as a deviation from an emancipatory path, barbarism and civilizational breaks are perceived as inherent qualities, 
and for some even as inevitable outcomes of modernity and Enlightenment. Zygmunt Bauman’s arguments in his 
book Holocaust and Modernity (1989) express a radicalization of the aforementioned modernity equals 
barbarization thesis. For Bauman, the Holocaust is no longer a perversion of the principles of rationality, but rather 
it represents a civilizational break of modernity, and its direct outcome insofar as it provides the necessary logistics 
for its execution. 
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it has been apparent that modernity is problematic, a way of thinking that has 
implicitly endorsed an ethos of tolerance and non-violent coexistence, but has 
been unable to provide a foundation for that ethos. Questions of truths, 
structure and rightness have been deconstructed and dismantled by 
postmodern scepticism, while religiosity has secured its own position and gone 
its own way regardless of criticism.  
Secondly, during the 1990’s, around the time that postmodernism reached its 
height in Europe and North America and their respective academia, there 
appeared another strange appellation sharing the “post” prefix – “the post-
secular”, suggesting the end or another stage of classic secularization 
theory.39 The return of religion in the late twentieth and early twenty-first 
centuries, and in particular the resurgence of politicized religion on the world 
stage, marked a break with the conventional theory of secularization that had 
prevailed for two hundred years. Over the last two decades, these 
developments have prompted much critical debate among doubters, sceptics 
and open adversaries. Historians and sociologists who claim no longer to 
accept the secularization theory, at least in its modern form, have created a 
valuable body of alternative scholarship, recognizing that the turn to the “post-
secular”40 is indeed a contested and multifaceted trend. 
                                           
39 Ulrich Beck, A God of One’s Own: Religion’s Capacity for Peace and Potential for Violence, trans. Rodney 
Livingstone, (Cambridge: Polity, 2010), pp.19-46, 156. 
40 Jürgen Habermas, "Secularism's Crisis of Faith: Notes on Post-Secular Society", New Perspectives Quarterly, 
Vol. 25 (2008): 17-29. It is also available at http://www.signandsight.com/features/1714.html. Accessed on 3 
January 2015. This is the text of a lecture that he delivered at the Nexus Institute of the University of Tilburg in 
March 2008. 
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The present thesis takes a pragmatic approach to these conceptual difficulties. 
Neither in the case of the post-secular nor in that of the post-postmodern can 
we impose clarity of usage by definite decree. Thus, what is required is 
sensitivity to the different ways in which the term is used, and a willingness to 
see the diversity of the designated objects in the diversity of meaning itself.  
The purpose of this chapter is not to state clear and unambiguous definitions 
of the key terms, but rather to examine “re-modernities” and “the post-secular” 
as responses to modernism and postmodernism and to secularism, and to 
scrutinize both post-postmodern implications with regard to the renewal of 
modernity, going beyond the modern and the postmodern, and the central 
arguments of the post-secular as a reformulating of secularization and 
religious transformation, by reflecting briefly on the historical situation from 
which our questions arise and provisionally clarifying the recent academic 
usage.  
2.1. From the Modern and the Postmodern to the Post-
postmodern 
What phase of history are we living in today? How can we define the period 
captured in this research?  
Since the late 1980s numerous attempts have been made to understand the 
world as it has evolved out of modernity and postmodernity, and scholars 
continue to generate important questions concerning the current features of 
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modernity. Now it is widely accepted that the modern and the postmodern are 
no longer tenable. As Markus Vinzent points out, “the contemporary 
discourses have developed beyond modernity and postmodernity”.41 
How can we best conceptualize the contemporary condition, if it is neither 
modern nor postmodern? In order to grasp this configuration, this research will 
attempt to reformulate a conceptual tool that will enable a proper 
understanding of today’s world and of the place of Christianity within it. 
However, this will neither revolve around terminological issues, nor explore a 
protracted and tedious discourse about the value of modern or postmodern 
paradigms per se.  
2.1.1. Discussion regarding Modernity and Postmodernity 
Before looking more closely at the main themes, it is worth considering briefly 
the relation of the postmodern to the modern, because it is not possible to 
draw the whole picture of the social transformation of the latter part of the 
twentieth and the early twenty-first century without engaging the contemporary 
vision and sensibilities through the modern and the postmodern, even given 
the great diversity of opinion on what constitutes modernity or postmodernity. 
Taking example questions, can it be true that postmodernity is a new era 
marking the end of modernity, and has modernity collapsed under the pressure 
                                           
41 Markus Vinzent, “Re-Modernities: or the Volcanic Landscapes of Religion”, Journal of Beliefs & Values, Vol. 32. 
2 (August 2011): 143–160; He also takes note of the pointer provided twenty seven years ago by Italian design 
theorist Andrea Branzi, to a world that was to be no longer postmodern, but post-postmodern. See Andrea Branzi, 
Learning from Milan: Design and the Second Modernity (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1988).  
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of the postmodern?   
2.1.1.1. The modern thinking / modernity 
The term “modern” generally refers to the narrative of a new era, distinct from 
the medieval world view, feudalistic authority or conventional tradition, and 
characterized by rationalization, industrialization, capitalism, secularization, 
and the nation-state,42 which has been reached through a process of historical 
transition marked by Renaissance, Reformation, the Enlightenment and the 
French Revolution.43  
Modernity in terms of economic and social structures may also refer to 
tendencies in the new economic, social, cultural and political conditions of an 
emerging fully industrialized civilization, as in Anthony Giddens’ description of 
modernity.44 In this context, modernity has been associated with cultural and 
intellectual movements intertwined with technological culture and industrial life. 
More specifically, it is associated with a complex of economic institutions, 
especially technology, scientific advancement, industrial production and a 
                                           
42 Chris Barker, Cultural Studies: Theory and Practice (London: Sage, 2005), p. 444.  
43 The term "modern" emerged in the 5th century, originally distinguishing the newly Christianized Roman era from 
two forms of paganism, the heathens of antiquity and the unregenerate Jews. Etymologically, the term comes from 
the Latin “modernus” rooted in “modo”, "just now". However, the term entered general usage only in the 17th 
century, in the debate centred around the question "Is Modern culture superior to the classical Greek and Roman 
culture?" In these usages, "modernity" denoted renunciation of the recent past, favouring a new beginning, and a 
re-interpretation of historical origin. In general, it is safe to say that modernity implies civilization and the era 
cultivated by the West, which germinated with the Renaissance in the 16th century and was accelerated by 
the Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution in the 18th century. See Shmuel N. Eisenstadt (ed.), Patterns of 
Modernity, Volume. 1: The West (London: Continuum International Publishing, 1987).  
44  Anthony Giddens, Conversations with Anthony Giddens: Making Sense of Modernity (Stanford: Stanford 
UP,1998). 
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market economy, and a range of political institutions, including the nation-state 
and mass democracy.45 
Of course, modernity has always been a highly relativist term; the aspect of 
modern historical process varies considerably according to particular 
indigenous culture and historical context, and there are myriad opinions on the 
issues raised.46  Nevertheless, at the theoretical level we can explain the 
concept of modernity with reference to the points of agreement among the 
divergent approaches to it. What is peculiar to modernity is typically 
understood by three shifts of philosophical consciousness, as the fundamental 
principles of a new historical phase.  
According to the sociological tradition, the first indicative parameter of 
modernity is the progress of “rationality” in all social spheres. Max Weber 
(1860-1920) and Émile Durkheim (1858-1907) assumed that the phenomena 
of rationality would become dominant in the arts, the state, academia and the 
economy. Here, the most ardent academic approach is based on positivism,47 
                                           
45 Ibid. 
46 J.C.A. Pocock, “Modernity and Anti-Modernity in the Anglophone Political Traditions”, in Shmuel N. Eisenstadt 
(ed.), Patterns of Modernity, Vol. 1: The West (London: Continuum International Publishing, 1987); Jürgen 
Habermas, “Modernity versus Postmodernity”, trans. Seyla Ben-Habib, New German Critique, Vol.22 (1981): 3-14; 
F. Bourricaud, “Universal Reference and the Process of Modernization”, in Shmuel N. Eisenstadt (ed.), Patterns of 
Modernity. 
47 Positivism is a philosophy of science based on the view that in the social as well as natural sciences, data derived 
from sensory experience, and logical and mathematical treatments of such data, are together the exclusive source 
of all authentic knowledge. Data that is received through the senses and then "verified" is known as empirical 
evidence. According to this view society is like the physical world in that it operates according to laws. Introspective 
and intuitional attempts to gain knowledge are rejected. Although the positivist approach has been a recurrent 
theme in the history of Western thought, the concept was developed in the early 19th century by the philosopher 
and founding sociologist, Auguste Comte. Comte argued that society operates according to its own laws, much as 
the physical world operates according to gravity and other laws of nature. 
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derived from the rationalist concept. The positive natural sciences direct us to 
a conclusion that the exclusive source of all authentic knowledge in the social 
as well as natural sciences is the data derived from sensory experience, and 
logical and mathematical treatments of such data, based on the empirical 
method of natural science. The main task undertaken by modern rationality 
was to remove the mysterious myth and magic regarded as inherited from 
traditional religion. Human beings were now attempting to hold the omniscient 
and almighty power once attributed to gods, explaining their disenchantment 
as reason’s independence, leading to liberation from mystery.  
The second marker of modernity is understood as the principle of “individual 
subjectivity” 48  and “autonomy”. This structure of subjectivity is rooted in 
Descartes’ (1596-1650) “abstractive subjectivity” represented in his famous 
aphorism, “cogito ergo sum”,49 and in Kant’s (1724 -1804) idea of absolute 
self-consciousness. 50  For Kant, the human being is the subject of 
consciousness, able to reflect himself by setting himself as the object. 
Moreover, Kant’s “critical reason”, justified as the rationale of the critique of 
pure reason, the critique of practical reason, and the critique of judgment,51 
                                           
48 In general, the Reformation, the Enlightenment and the French Revolution are regarded as historical turning points 
that invoke subjectivity in the cultural and civilizational history of humankind. See Jürgen Habermas, The 
Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, trans. Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge : Polity Press, 1987), p.37.   
49 René Descartes, Discourse on Method and Meditations on First Philosophy (Fourth Edition), (Indianapolis and 
Cambridge: Hackett Publishing, 1998) 
50  Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason [Kritik der reinen Vernunft, 1781], trans. J. M. D. Meiklejohn (NY, London; 
Penguin, 2007). 
51 Kant’s magnum opus, the Critique of Pure Reason, aimed to unite reason with experience to move beyond what 
he took to be failures of traditional philosophy and metaphysics. Kant published other important works on ethics, 
religion, law, aesthetics, astronomy, and history. These included the Critique of Practical Reason [Kritik der 
53 
has confidence in the subjective ability of oneself and acts as judge upon the 
whole culture.  
Within the sociological tradition, it has frequently been claimed that the 
consequence of subjectivity is increasing differentiation. In the context of the 
discussion on modernity, this refers to social differentiation, the separating out 
of each social sphere from ecclesiastical control. However, in the modern 
paradigm, to create order means neither to cultivate nor to extirpate 
differences; rather, it means licensing them, and this implies a licensing 
authority. Obversely, it also means de-legalizing unlicensed differences. Order 
must be an all-inclusive category. It must also remain forever a belligerent 
camp, surrounded by enemies and waging wars on all its frontiers. The 
unlicensed difference is the main enemy. In the shape of the unlicensed 
difference, modernity fought the real enemy: the grey area of ambivalence, 
indeterminacy and undecidability.52 
The third marker of modernity is the strong conviction, created through the 
combination of these concepts and a certain set of attitudes towards the world, 
of the ability to build an improved society. This serves as a driving force for the 
coming to maturity of a nation or culture, as seen in higher levels of civilization, 
social development and decency; industrial society and the capitalist market; 
more complex social organizations and political differentiation; heterogeneous 
                                           
praktischen Vernunft, 1788], the Metaphysics of Morals [Die Metaphysik der Sitten, 1797], which deals with ethics, 
and the Critique of Judgment [Kritik der Urteilskraft, 1790], which looks at aesthetics and teleology. 
52 Zygmunt Bauman, Intimations of Postmodernity (London: Routledge, 1992). 
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cities and urbanization, and the media of mass communication.  
These multiplicities of modernity all refer to existential matter, and indicate a 
decisive cognitive shift whereby the modern is separated from the normative 
implications of the past. Largely as a result of these characteristics, modernity 
is vastly more dynamic than the past. 
Talcott Parsons, as the leading theorist of this tradition, viewed modernity as 
a uniform, unambiguously structured pattern in progress towards harmonious 
integration.53 The historical evolution to modernity was viewed as likely to 
succeed, thus assuring that traditional societies would be provided with the 
resources for what Parsons called a general process of adaptive “upgrading”, 
including economic take-off to industrialization, democratization via law, and 
secularization and science via education.54 
From this perspective, the term modernity encompasses the activities and 
output of human self-realization, variously understood as the story of progress, 
or reason and freedom, or human rights. With the Enlightenment modernity 
became identified with rationality, subjectivity, and a master narrative of 
progress, while the collapse of the preordained order was celebrated as 
liberation. The meaning of this development lies in the bigger picture, which 
extends across space but also across time. These changes were expected to 
lead to the adoption of new values and modern life-styles, which would be 
                                           
53 Talcott Parsons, Structure and Process in Modern Societies, (New York: Free Press, 1960); Sociological Theory 
and Modern Society (New York: Free Press, 1967). 
54 Talcott Parsons, The System of Modern Societies (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1971).  
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intrinsically superior to whatever preceded them, and would clash sharply with 
religious traditions, intellectual bondage, and conventional social systems. 
Some commentators define modernism as a socially progressive trend of 
thought that affirms the power of human beings to create, improve and 
reshape their environment with the aid of practical experimentation, scientific 
knowledge, or technology.  
In the long run, so deeply did the narrative of human progress become 
embedded in our world, that the spread of modernization, it was hypothesized, 
would indeed lead to the long-term and inevitable demise of religion at both 
the social and the individual level. The withdrawal of god would mean a 
triumphant entry of man.  
2.1.1.2. The relation of the postmodern to the modern 
However, the Western European disillusionment induced by fascism, Nazism 
and the Second World War cast critical doubt on the historical achievement of 
the modern civilization. The dissatisfaction with subsequent historical 
experience reached a peak in the late 1960s, and prompted a revisiting of 
modern themes such as reason, subjectivity, and progress as the reigning 
paradigm of world development.55   
The so-called postmodern thinking as a criticism on the modern was severe.  
It revealed the violent and spurious nature of the truth chased after by modern 
                                           
55 Postmodernism refers to a resistant movement to modernism, formulated in a broader sense from the second 
world war to the attacks of September 11, 2001, and in a narrower sense from 1968 through the 1990s. 
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thinking, the brutality and unreasonableness of the human beings revered as 
rational, and how human society realized by human reason had turned into a 
new uncivilized society rife with repression, discrimination, and exploitation, 
not with morality and justice. Graham Ward describes this landscape in detail: 
Modernity's implosion occurs when the process of mediation – dialogue, 
dialectic, and debate – can no longer be held to operate; when certain 
incommensurable perspectives become apparent; when the subject 
increasingly loses the distinctiveness of its position and likewise the object; 
when the natural is seen as already cultivated; when the private is 
increasingly subject to social policy and internalizes a public surveillance; 
when the universal is recognized as representing a certain power/knowledge 
interest which necessarily marginalizes other interests. And so the hierarchy 
of values implodes, with no appeal possible to an authority outside the 
system itself – no principle, no shared ontology, no grounding epistemology, 
no transcendental meditation. 56 
Here, we can capture postmodern thinking as a unique way of seeing a world 
which, after the 1960s, appeared broken by historical events.57 However, it is 
not desirable to categorize the diverse postmodern thinking as one trend. 
Indeed, the concept of postmodernism is particularly difficult to capture, 
because the starting point of postmodernism, modernism itself, is already 
                                           
56 Graham Ward, “Introduction, ‘Where We Stand’”, in Graham Ward (ed.), Blackwell Companion to Postmodern 
Theology (Malden and Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2005), p. xix. 
57 Frederic Jameson, Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (Durham: Duke UP,1992); David 
Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change (Cambridge, MA and 
Oxford: Blackwell, 1990). 
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vague and confusing. While we cannot easily reach consensus on what 
postmodernism means, we can certainly agree that it is a response to 
modernism.58 Thus, it will be helpful to grasp postmodernism as a kind of 
mental attitude or atmosphere in the late modern society, rather than a 
theory.59 
Therefore, here, we can understand that the term postmodernism may refer to 
“a style of thought” that doubts and takes a critical attitude towards modern 
rationales based on the Enlightenment norms of reason, objective truth, 
subjectivity, universal progress, and a grand narrative.60  
From this it follows that our world is contingent, diverse and unstable, that our 
knowledge is relative, subjective and fallible rather than certain and absolute, 
and that truth is neither objective nor valid, but inherently ambiguous, and that 
no single narrative can be predominant. Received ideas that are the products 
of a particular historical and cultural milieu must, therefore, be stringently 
deconstructed.  
How is postmodernism different from modernism? Postmodernism as a style 
of contemplating in the post-capitalism world may be differentiated from 
modernism in four aspects: 1) a general suspicion of reason; 2) the death of 
modern subjectivity; 3) the doubt of the master narrative; and 4) the emphasis 
                                           
58 Postmodernism literally means after the modern movement. 
59 Stuart Sim, “Preface to the third edition: The Modern, the Postmodern and the Post-postmodern”, in Stuart Sim 
(ed.), The Routledge Companion to Postmodernism (London and NY: Routledge, 2011), p.ⅶ. 
60 Terry Eagleton, The Illusions of Postmodernism (Malden, Oxford, Melbourne and Berlin: Wiley-Blackwell, 1996), 
p.ⅶ. 
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on difference. These act as clues to the theory and thought of postmodernism. 
Thus, they provide an invaluable starting point for our examination. 
 
1) A General Suspicion of Reason 
One distinguishing feature of postmodern thinking is the questioning of the 
idea central to the Enlightenment project, the supremacy of human reason.61 
That is, postmodern thinking attempts to deconstruct the concept of self-
reflective human being as the subjectivity of thinking and doing according to 
reasonable principles, pointing out that the faculty of reason and rationality has 
never been the fundamental foundation to resolve the problems faced by 
humankind; on the contrary, it is considered that the present crisis in 
contemporary culture and civilization may be a result of the oppressive role 
played by reason and rationality. Postmodernism has alerted us to the fact that 
the attempt born out of the Enlightenment to discover universal truth through 
reason alone has been abandoned. One current manifestation of this is the 
persistent assault on foundationalism. 
Postmodernists point out that rationalism as a particular discourse scheme of 
the modern thinking represses all dissenting viewpoints as inferior in the name 
of rationality and reason. Such argumentations are articulated particularly in 
the work of French philosophers such as Jean-François Lyotard (1924-1998), 
Michel Foucault (1926-1984), Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995), Jacques Derrida 
                                           
61 Yet, one ought to ask whether postmodernity is a rejection of rationality or rather the recognition of its limitations. 
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(1930-2004), and Jacques Lacan (1901-1981), and in spite of many 
differences between them, they share a common stance in terms of their 
critical destruction of the legitimate role of reason.62 
Foucault, for example, argues from a historical perspective, that the ideology 
of universal reason is a product spawned by the power-knowledge connection 
of a particular time, and the determination of what counts as reason or 
knowledge and what does not is a result of the discourse formulated by the 
norms of rationality that constitute the dominant social life in a certain 
context.63 Thus, in the dominant epistasis of a particular reason the other 
dissenting reason must be silenced, excluded, and seen as unreason in the 
social and public domain. In Foucault’s analysis, reason as the normative 
foundation for critical assessment reveals its limitations and crisis, urging us 
to reject the universal justification of instrumental rationality.  
As a consequence, it is contended that our knowledge is relative, subjective 
and fallible rather than certain and absolute, and that truth is inherently 
ambiguous. In line with criticism of reason, a postmodern way of thinking also 
forces us to doubt objective truth, historical subjectivity, and overarching and 
totalizing blueprints for human progress in the form of grand-narratives. The 
late modern and postmodern condition becomes fluid, open-ended, 
                                           
62 Hyo-nyeong Yoon (et al.), Critique on The Concept of the Subject: Jacques Derrida, Jacques Lacan, Louis 
Althusser, Michel Foucault (Seoul: Seoul UP, 1996), pp.1-14. 
63 In his analysis, Foucault refers to the way in which particular truths and norms appear in relation to the types of 
universality and absoluteness in history as the “micro-physics of power” or “genealogy of power-knowledge”. See 
Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish (New York: Vintage,1977); The History of Sexuality: An Introduction (NY: 
Pantheon Books, 1978 ); Power and Knowledge (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1980). 
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incommensurably more so than in earlier phases of modernity. Received ideas 
that are the products of a particular historical and cultural milieu must, 
therefore, be stringently deconstructed.  
However, the crisis of reason that offered the normative foundation for critical 
assessment produces further serious problems: a lethargy of criticism 
pervaded with cynicism, and fundamentalism.64 
 
2) The Death of the Modern Subject 
Whereas modernism began with the birth of the subject who makes a decision 
by himself and acts autonomously, postmodernism declares the death of the 
subject. One important issue common to the various strands of postmodern 
thought is the dismissal of subjectivity, which is closely related to the 
postmodern criticism of reason. Postmodern thinking focuses on the distortion 
and dislocation of the historical continuity that was promised by the realization 
of modern subjectivity. It is contended that although we seem to live as 
autonomous subjects, in fact, we are only social figments fabricated by the 
social structure.  
Michel Foucault argues that the subject articulated by the modern thinking is 
no more than an intellectual product formulated in the episteme context, by 
                                           
64 While postmodernists believe that they have to find a way of criticism without rational justification, because crisis 
of criticism comes from reason, Habermas thinks that it is possible to offer a new normative ground for criticism by 
replacing reason of the modern subject with communicative reason. Jürgen Habermas, The Philosophical 
Discourse of Modernity, trans. Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987).  
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differentiating oneself from the other through an ideology in order to maintain 
political and economic power.65 Lacan describes a subconscious subject who 
is far from a rational human being. 66  Emmanuel Levinas argues that 
the conscious "I", as the subject of thought, the starting point of traditional 
metaphysics, is the absolute subject with self-identity, the subject of Selbstheit 
(ipséité), which, however, excludes the object as the other and is therefore 
restricted and not what it pretends to be.67 Taking a similar line to Levinas, 
Derrida is deeply suspicious of the fixed, binary polarities between the 
absolute subject with self-identity and the other. He criticizes the absolute 
subject with self-identity as a fiction formulated by the contrastive structure of 
traditional metaphysics, one that denigrates and excludes the other as a 
secondary derivation by illuminating differences between subject and other. 
He argues that the other is not just opposite to the subject, but is concealed 
by the subject, a constitutive immanent fragment included within it.68 
Rather than upholding the authenticity of the individual, via Levinas, Derrida, 
Foucault and Lacan, postmodernism announced the death of the subject. The 
argument common to all of them is that the subject as the conception of a 
unique, private self is not the substance; subjective individuals with reflexive 
                                           
65  Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977 (NY and Toronto: 
Random House, 1998). Foucault calls the knowledge system that produces power “discourse”. It is no more than 
the social process that constantly regulates and defines the object. 
66 Jacques Lacan, Écrits: A selection, trans. A. Sheridan (NY: Norton, 1977). 
67 Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Dordrecht: Kluwer 
Academic Press, 1978). 
68 Jacques Derrida, “différance” (1968), Speech and Phenomena, trans. David B. Allison (Evanstone: Northwestern 
UP, 1973). 
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reason can be subordinate to structural power, and the consequences for the 
self-defining human being can be damaging. In this intellectual environment 
social science is cast into the same boat as that in which the humanities have 
been adrift during the modern period of uncertainty and unreliability. 
Hence, postmodern thinking is caught in a predicament. The sort of 
postmodern thought outlined above is meaningful in its acute analysis of the 
modern project as repressive, a form of producing power, yet in deconstructing 
the subject as a social actor or agent it reveals its limitation in terms of ability 
to make a new social transformation. On the questions of what valuable 
destination we should pursue, and how, postmodernism is silent. Its low 
estimation of individual actors and moral responsibility makes an answer 
impossible. The critical problem with postmodernism is the lack of ethical 
perspective to monitor authority and resist the structural power. Can we 
struggle against repressive conditions without postulating the subject of our 
action?  
 
3) A Grave Doubt about Grand Narratives and the Centralization of Scepticism 
The most important feature of postmodernism is the denial of grand narratives. 
According to Lyotard’s The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, 
accepted as one of the most comprehensive accounts of postmodern critique 
in this respect,69 the grand narratives of the Enlightenment created universal 
                                           
69 See Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, trans. Geoff Bennington and 
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truth, human progress, the maturity of civilization towards a one-dimensional 
world, and universal discourses. Postmodern thinking, then, attacked the 
grand narrative stories that tried to explain the whole of society and history, 
because those who had experienced totalitarianism could not believe in the 
possibility and progress of human being and history expressed in those 
narratives were considered to be no longer tenable. That is, postmodern 
thinking was for Lyotard a welcome new opening which meant the flourishing 
of alternative cultural interpretations and identities based on the various newly 
emerging local narratives, and a reflection on boundless possibility of human 
progress centred on reason. Hence, this has led many postmodernists to 
abandon belief in universal truth, convinced that there is nothing more than 
conflicting and incompatible local narratives.70  
In the same vein, postmodern debate criticises the very backbone of modern 
society and culture: reason, truth reality and essence. Thus, postmodernism 
tends to be relativistic and anti-foundationalistic, because the attempt born out 
of the Enlightenment to discover universal truth through reason alone has 
been abandoned. In this regard, postmodernism follows Nietzsche, who 
disintegrated the metaphysical foundation itself, resulting in nihilism. For 
Derrida, the “metaphysics of presence” that argues that all words have a 
corresponding reality is a philosophical grand narrative that must be 
                                           
Brian Massumi (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984). 
70 Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, and Richard Rorty, among others. 
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deconstructed. In this regard, the followers of Lyotard and Derrida place their 
trust in relativism rather than universalism, and various mini narratives rather 
than meta-theory that can examine objectively. Hence, because 
postmodernism has a negative attitude toward a comprehensive philosophical 
truth and political justice, grand stories dissipate into mini narratives. As a 
result of this stance, by absolutizing deconstruction of a critical method, 
confusing essence with essentialism, fundament with fundamentalism, and 
totality with totalitarianism, postmodernism has lost its capability to reconstruct 
an alternative reality. 
 
4) The Emphasis on Difference 
The postmodern dismisses central discourses such as dominant culture, 
essential constituent, and overall plan, and pays more attention to diversity 
rather than unity, periphery part rather than central part, the others rather than 
the self. The postmodern view illuminates the world as composed of a play of 
difference and as an indefinite number of meaning-generating agencies. 
Consequently, in this postmodern perspective society can be reduced to a 
relatively self-sustained and autonomous text, and all subjects with their own 
respective logics are armed with their own facilities of truth-validation.71  
Postmodern invalidation of any dominant ideology or central concept allows 
space for the so-called “politics of difference”, including the various and 
                                           
71 Zygmunt Bauman, Intimations of Postmodernity, pp.35-39. 
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dispersive stories made by outsider groups to ensure their own identity against 
the governing discourse. This can be seen in the postmodern concern with the 
stories of the other driven away into the periphery: women’s protest against 
patriarchy, homosexuals’ revolt against heterosexism, non-Western 
resistance to the Western orientalism that manipulates difference to maintain 
status. 
The postmodern perception that the other is excluded from the symbolic order 
and regulated by the sovereign discourse as the relatively inferior allows that 
other, decentralized by existing power relationships, to be embedded as a new 
centre of political action. Here, postmodernism is effective in analysing and 
investigating the causes of the exclusion of periphery groups. Its worldview 
has contributed to the dissipation of fixed ideas on sex, ethnicity and religion, 
and to the expansion of the individual's conscious horizons. There is now a 
general understanding that to accept the other and to admit difference in 
communities is a postmodern condition.  
On the other hand, whereas postmodernism contributed to the diversification 
of society by admitting unique voices alienated in social discourse, it made an 
error in devaluating the solidarity of community; by absolutizing difference it 
produced socio-cultural separatism. Postmodernism that insists on the 
universalization of difference discounts the possibility of community. Moreover, 
we should note that clinging to a certain bond does not necessarily mean 
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failure to admit difference. As “the subject within community”,72 we embody 
our identity in community, and at the same time have close links with the other. 
2.1.1.3. The inheritance and limits of the postmodern thinking 
We have examined the four main points of postmodernism: a suspicion of 
classical notions of reason, the death of the subject, the end of grand 
narratives, and the emphasis on difference. This sort of postmodern thinking 
is still valid, valuable, and successful, both in terms of offering the critical 
conceptual frame necessary to overcome the limitations of modern thinking, 
and in respect of critically assessing and analysing the historical condition and 
the current changes in our 21st century capitalist society.  
Whereas postmodernism has had aesthetic success in its cultural analysis of 
the late capitalist society, it has failed politically, since it offers no indicator or 
ideology, and deconstructs the subject that takes the lead in social 
transformation. The motivation of postmodernism is political, but its expression 
and method are aesthetic. Such internal contradictions have resulted in a 
natural failure to build an ideological alternative for a new age.  
In postmodern phenomena, people’s interest shifts from social, ethical, and 
political matters to aesthetic matters; image overwhelms narratives; 
the uncertainty of daily life denies ultimate truth, and scientific decision has 
                                           
72 Honi Fern Haber, Beyond Postmodern Politics: Lyotard, Rorty, Foucault: Selves, Community and the Politics of 
Difference (New York: Routledge, 1994). The term, “the subject within community” is equivalent to Enrique Dussel’s 
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Dussel, Ethics and Community, trans. R. Barr (New York: Orbis Books, 1998), p.17. 
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been decoupled from moral decision.  
As has been said before, postmodernism discarded rational dialectic and 
rendered itself vulnerable to accusations of relativism and nihilism by criticizing 
indiscriminately reason, rationality and truth; exorcized all possible action of 
the subject, actors and agents from society by reducing the subject to a 
particular social construction, an illusion of individuality or self-presence; and, 
misunderstanding recognition of the whole as a turning toward totalitarianism, 
ignored foundation, essence and grammar so as to be able to integrate mini 
narratives and diverse stories. When the social is reduced to a mere system 
of differences, and difference is absolutized as universality, then relativism and 
dissolution easily fall into the trap of irresponsibility and omission. Such 
postmodern rhetoric cannot adequately explain the meaning of social action 
and change, and does not face the political and economic reality and the 
context of global power.73 Hence, we cannot find the potential for the future 
development of society in the postmodern cultural phenomena, because 
postmodernism denies any unifying concept. In this respect, Eagleton makes 
the significant observation that the postmodern project that aims just for 
difference may be an illusion, and ultimately may be an excessively impractical 
reaction to modernity.74 
As a result, so-called progressive postmodernism may be viewed as a 
                                           
73 David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change (Cambridge, MA 
and Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), p.117. 
74 Terry Eagleton, The Illusion of Postmodernism, pp.118-121 
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conservative ideology that affirms the maintenance of the status quo. This 
reveals the limitation of the postmodern project. I believe that instead of giving 
up on modernity and its project as a lost cause, we should learn from the 
mistakes of those extravagant programs that have tried to negate modernity.75 
We should recognize that postmodern thinking is indicative of rather than a 
solution to present problems.76 Perhaps post-postmodern discourses may 
provide an indication at least of the direction forward.  
2.1.2. Post-postmodern Discourses beyond the Modern and the 
Postmodern: Reflexive Modernity, Liquid Modernity, Multiple 
Modernities, and Re-modernities 
As we have seen, from the late 1980s dissatisfaction with postmodernism has 
prompted the rethinking of postmodern statements and modern themes.77 
More broadly, there has been a revisiting of changing social trends, not only 
in terms of the historical sequence of waves of modernization, but also with 
regard to a reassessment of far-reaching contemporary discourses, which can 
no longer be captured by the previous framework.  
Attempts to grasp the changing nature of modernity and its discourse have 
been made in diverse fields. Andrea Branzi, an Italian design theorist, 
                                           
75 Jürgen Habermas, “Modernity versus Postmodernity”, p.11. 
76 Terry Eagleton, The Illusion of Postmodernism, p.135. 
77 Jeffry C. Alexander, “Modern, Anti, Post and Neo”, New Left Review , Vol. 210 (1995): 63-101/ p. 86. 
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proposed that the contemporary world was no longer postmodern, but post-
postmodern; in his booklet Learning from Milan (1989), he introduced the term 
“second modernity”, and 17 years later he altered this to “new modernity”.78 
The German architecture theorist, Heinrich Klotz, captured the new situation 
as the “second modernity” (1994), 79  as did music scholar Claus-Steffen 
Mahnkopf (1998, 2005, 2008). 80  Indeed, the term "second modernity", 
referring to a phase after postmodernity, has appeared in theories of art, film, 
new music and architecture. 81  If this term captures the current change 
correctly, then can it be regarded as the harbinger of a post-postmodern trend, 
and what is emerging from it? 
Intensive sociological study of these new approaches really began in 1994, 
with the publication of Reflexive Modernization: Politic, Tradition, and 
Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order, which contains contributions from three 
of the most important theorists in contemporary European sociology: Ulrich 
Beck, Anthony Giddens and Scott Lash. In their joint Preface, the authors 
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make the welcome suggestion that “the protracted debate about modernity 
versus postmodernity has become wearisome”.82 Referring to the concept 
that goes beyond the modern and the postmodern, Ulrich Beck coined the 
phrase “reflexive modernity or second modernity”, and together with his 
associates diffused the topic of “reflexive (second) modernity”. 83  Other 
notable readings of the new approaches to the changing nature of modernity 
beyond the limitations of modernism and postmodernism include the “light” or 
“liquid modernity” of Zygmunt Bauman and Sven Kesselring; 84 
Israeli sociologist Shmuel Eisenstadt’s “multiple modernities”;85 and the “re-
modernities” of theologian Markus Vinzent.86 
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While these new approaches may not necessarily provide a convergent 
perspective on the changing nature of contemporaneity and its discourse, 
each concept offers decisive implications for a response to postmodernity and 
different visions of what the whole of the modern entails, as distinct from 
classical modernity. Thus, the specific concepts reinvented by the new 
approaches can be regarded as post-postmodern views to grasp the 
configuration beyond the modern and the postmodern. That is, each of these 
approaches can be construed as, on the one hand, an attempt to re-
conceptualize the continual grounding of the whole modern theme, balanced 
by revising the modern problems posed by the postmodern critiques; and on 
the other, to grasp the transformative and discursive modernity under late 
capitalism and globalism, which previous frameworks were unable to capture. 
More than anything else, the new approaches engage in reflective speculation 
on the changes.  
Such post-postmodern thinking results from the recognition that the 
postmodern was not a final solution for social problems produced by the 
modern, and that “modernity has not vanished but has entered a new phase”.87 
Yet while post-postmodern thinking criticises the postmodern, it does not reject 
the postmodern critique of the modern worldview, and also does not insist on 
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a return to the modern as one single theme. 
Consequently, it is not replicates of modernity, nor do they provide a simple 
conflation of modernity and postmodernity, but rather an understanding of their 
usage in the context of the decline of postmodernism and the contests over 
the meaning of modernity. In this context it is beneficial to outline each of the 
new approaches. In the sub-sections below, this research briefly examines 
three productive concepts: 1) reflexive/ second Modernity, 2) liquid modernity, 
and 3) multiple modernities; and then attempts to reformulate “re-modernities” 
as a complementary and further developed concept. 
2.1.2.1 Reflexive / second modernity 
Reflexive, or second, modernity is a theory that is pragmatically oriented to 
questions of reconstruction, as a concern of the political agenda, rather than 
to deconstruction as in postmodernism. It is embedded within an action-
oriented approach to social change that sharpens the awareness of social 
responsibility and culpability.  
Reflexive modernity, as the name implies, involves “rational self-reflection” as 
the very possibility of rational inquiry, in order to overcome the misreading of 
the ideal of objectivity advanced by modernist scholarly paradigms.88 Unlike 
the anti-foundational perspective of postmodernism, reflexive modernization is 
decisively programmatic in the sense of utilizing individual freedom to address 
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the risks incurred in the modern context. Individual actors are capable of self-
monitoring activities and self-confrontation. 89  The reflexive modernization 
stands as a first-line of defence against postmodernism in its insistence on the 
role of rational agency in a world characterized by the runaway effects of 
modernity. 
Reflexive modernity sets itself apart from postmodernity. While postmodernity 
expressly discarded the truth-claims of classical modernity and the avant-
garde, reflexive modernity negates the negation of truth; indeed, it is 
committed to the guiding principle of truth, and can produce convincing works 
once again because this self-commitment is much more serious than the 
emphatic truth claimed in classical modernity. 
The issue of uncertainty that lies at the heart of postmodernism is also a major 
concern in the reflexive modern perspective, but there is a decisive difference 
in that according to reflexive modernity, this uncertainty must be accepted, or 
can be pragmatically managed as part of self-monitoring activities that 
contribute to the way social situations are perceived, assessed and changed. 
This constitutes a programmatic effort to identify the nature of boundary 
construction and the power to change boundaries.  
2.1.2.2. Liquid modernity 
Liquid modernity, which Bauman substitutes for postmodernity, is critically 
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concerned with liquidity, fluidity and lightness of contemporary social 
conditions. At first glance, the idea of liquid modernity seems to be linked with 
the postmodern stress on the flexibility and mutability of all relationships as 
opposed to the inadequacies of solid modernity. However, this new discourse 
on a liquid foundation can be interpreted as a challenge beyond modernism 
and postmodernism, in that Bauman criticizes the inability of postmodernism 
to confront the emerging conditions of inequality in the West and elsewhere, 
by intensively illuminating the dark side of liquid modernity.90  
On the other hand, this new approach to the entire modernity is not completely 
disconnected from postmodernity, because the sense of flexibility and 
uncertainty implicit in the postmodern has continuity with the concept of social 
fluidity and liquidity, without abandoning some of its ideas.91 In other words, 
the postmodern contains possibility that gives us pause for thought: to take 
one example, the modern problem of institutional stability has been 
reinterpreted within certain terms inherent to the postmodern perspective. 
This new sense of liquefaction and desultoriness reflects the diminishing role 
of the spatial dimensions of social life and highlights the central importance of 
the flow of time and social change. In the time-space duality, it is time 
associated with change, flexibility, mobility and overall ‘lightness’ that matters 
in liquid society. Information moves with the speed of the electronic signal and 
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has eroded territorial state power. The liquid and fluid condition suggests that 
fixed categories have become otiose, unable to reflect rapidly changing 
circumstances and social cultural upheavals. 
In this respect, it can be said that liquid modernity supersedes the growing 
stability of the modern and de-stability of the postmodern with growing liquidity; 
form and formlessness with flexible form; solid boundaries and the dismantling 
of boundaries with flexible boundaries; deconstruction of identity with the 
flexibility of identity. 
Fluidity of identity brings with it a new sense of freedom, as well as challenges 
to preconceived notions of institutional stability. Liquid situations provide 
ample opportunities for innovation, thus undermining all efforts to establish 
formal bases in collective projects.92 Social change is not just an intrinsic part 
of any society; it also produces a tendency towards the acceptance of new 
values underlying our conception of existence. 
Modernity appears solid in the sense that the rapid centralization of 
institutional power overwhelms any individual effort to keep tradition in place, 
and makes “Western expansion seemingly irresistible”.93 However, Bauman 
construed the reflexive process inherent in modernity as having ‘softening’ 
effects on institutional structures. Thus, new knowledge generated by 
modernity can be applied reflexively to undermine its apparent solidity.  
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2.1.2.3. Multiple modernities 
“Multiple modernities”,94 as espoused by Shmuel Eisenstadt, posits a new 
notion of worldwide modernity that cannot be accounted for by the Eurocentric 
theories of modernity. The term involves an understanding of modernity 
entirely different from the idea of singular, homogeneous, teleological 
convergence in the modernization process, advocating that modernity is not a 
uniform idea, but takes different forms in different places. In his article based 
on the comparative sociological approach to modernity, Eisenstadt argues that 
the best way to understand the modern world is “to see it as a story of continual 
constitution and reconstitution of a multiplicity of cultural programs”. 95  By 
taking into account the plurality, multiplicity, and complexity of world societies 
and cultures, the idea of multiple modernities allows the possibility of ways of 
being modern other than one arrived at through a convergent route to an 
original European modernity.  As a result, the unilinear, universal vision of 
modernity is now seen as having been largely abandoned in the social 
sciences, in favour of these “multiple modernities”. 
The viewpoints attributed to multiple modernities seem to represent 
an extension of the postmodern discourse, undermining modernity’s 
foundation by questioning a universal, unilinear myth of modernity. Yet the 
idea of multiple modernities is basically a concept of cultural diversity or 
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multiplicity that disputes a universal approach to modernity biased by Western 
experience, whereas postmodernism poses critical questions for overcoming 
modernity altogether. For this reason, the implications of multiple modernities 
are not explicitly critical of modernity as a metanarrative, but rather as a vehicle 
of Western domination. Hence, this new concept can be regarded as an 
outcome of globalization issues, focusing on the spread of modernity by 
challenging the assumption that it is equivalent to the West, but not arguing its 
demise.96  
Furthermore, while the idea of multiple modernities recognizes a new complex 
condition of worldwide modernity, the possibility of other modernities cannot 
be accounted for by postmodern theorists, because postmodernism does not 
engage with questions concerning the global spread of modernity and its 
mutation into multiple forms; rather, it focuses exclusively on propounding the 
end of modernity.97 
To summarize, each concept – we deal with ‘re-modernities’ separately below 
– connotes a particular response to modernism and postmodernism, and 
represents a different vision and stage of what modernity as a whole entails. 
Reflexive, liquid and multiple modernities are, however, neither replicates of 
modernism, nor the inheritance of postmodernism. 
Reflexive modernization represents an attempt to reconstruct the foundation 
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of the first modernity. Liquid modernity offers a view of modernity with a fluid 
rather than a solid foundation. The idea of multiple modernities suggests the 
unlimited interconnecting of the modern and the traditional, the local and the 
global, under the condition of variability. Although these new approaches do 
not necessarily suggest a convergence of views with regard to reformulating 
the modern discourse, new empirical studies may possibly demonstrate the 
varying levels to which these concepts operate as checks and balances in 
contemporary processes of modern development, such as labour, migration, 
consumerism, technology transfer and class/ethnic formation. From this 
comparative exploration it can at least be said that these new approaches to 
modernity, whatever nomenclature is used, attest to the possibility of re-
conceptualizing the foundation of modernity that has been undermined by 
postmodern scepticism, and may indicate a way to represent various 
paradigms of what modernity entails in the contemporary world. 
As has been seen, these new approaches suggest that modernity is unlikely 
to return to a singular vision of world-mastery, and it is futile to return to another 
round of postmodern deconstruction. More importantly, reflexivity, liquidity and 
diversity, the perspectives informed by the new concepts, place modernity on 
a multidimensional path that leads not to a single destiny but to a variety of 
outcomes yet to be systematically studied. Nevertheless, there remains the 
need to push each of the three concepts further, and to being out their 
complementarity. If we can reformulate modernity in the light of how reflexivity, 
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fluidity and diversity will contribute to new social patterns, this is likely to 
provide a better picture of the direction modernity is taking in different social 
contexts. 
The fact that post-postmodern discourse has been posited in various fields 
means that while we still live in a time of postmodern habits of thought, the 
momentum is building for us to break out from the postmodern paradigm. Post-
postmodernism is a dialectic attempt to challenge the pervading postmodern 
worldview. 
2.1.3. Reformulating Re-modernities as a Complementary Concept 
of the Post-postmodern in a Multiple Modernities Context and in a 
Globalizing Age  
If we need a further developed theoretical framework with which to embrace 
all these gyrations of modern and postmodern thinking, as a tool 
complementary to the three concepts, how can we conceptualize this? How 
can we best explicate its basic assumption instilled by the change in 
contemporary society after modernity and postmodernity?  
 
This dissertation deploys the concept of “re-modernities” for the new 
challenges that have arisen in the epistemological paradigm shift beyond 
modernity and postmodernity, and attempts to reformulate the concept as an 
appropriate theoretical framework, complementary to the comments on 
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“reflexive/second modernity”, “liquid modernity”, and “multiple modernities” in 
philosophy and social theory.  
“Re-modernities” was originally developed by Markus Vinzent.98 His approach 
shows how the concept is complementarily relevant to a reinterpretation of the 
major assumptions held by reflexive, liquid, or multiple modernities. Although 
re-modernities bears a likeness to all three, it also recognizes some limitations 
to them.99 For example, the re-modern idea attempts to overcome the fact that 
reflexive modernity and liquid modernity are biased to the postmodern, and 
that multiple modernities, in the postcolonial perspective, negates the so-
called modern, insofar as multiple modernities hold on to opposite stance 
against the general modern development. In this respect, the foremost 
assumption of re-modernities is that modernity is not dead but has entered a 
new phase, one that has not detached itself from the principles of modernity, 
but is manifesting critical transformations. As Vinzent argues: 
The new, second, liquid or re-modernities are not replicates of modernity, nor 
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Journal of Beliefs & Values, Vol. 32. 2 (August 2011): 143–160. Bruno Latour suggested that the tongue-twisting 
‘reflexive modernization’ might be shortened to ‘re-modernization’: See Bruno Latour, “Is Re-modernization 
Occurring – And If so, How to Prove It?”, Theory, Culture & Society, Vol.20.2 (2003):35-48. 
99 Markus Vinzent first termed the post-postmodern as “re-modernity”, and then two years later re-termed it as “re-
modernities” in consideration of the contemporary nature of “multiple modernities”. Here I will employ “re-
modernities”. Markus Vinzent is sceptical of naming our contemporary discourse “second modernity” as the child 
of reflexive modernity because he believes the term “second modernity” rather clouds the continuing importance 
of postmodernity and deconstructivism, as their contributions are not limited to the “historical achievement of 
breaking out of a modernity that had become orthodox – blind, stubborn and unproductive – and the retrieval of the 
medium”, or other elements of first modernity. Postmodernity, although an enrichment in debate and literature, was 
simultaneously an enhancement of theory in its claim of “reductionism” in the sense of an overload of theory that 
truncates artistic freedom, and similar “centrism”, for example the “insistence on a ‘strong thought’ or a grand 
narrative that aimed for unity, self-identity and inner systematic”. 
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do they provide a synthesis of modernity and post-modernity. While 
modernity worked as a ‘semantic reduction’, constraining and proving truth 
with ‘a desire to cloak its own legitimate creative choices with a sort of 
scientific and therefore moral justification’ by uncovering the reality of society 
and life, either evolutionally or structurally, a replacement of the earlier 
revelation of ultimate being, re-modern approaches go beyond an integration 
of post-modern elements into an outdated modern frame, and rather project 
unprecedented, ‘possible identities.100 
For Vinzent, the notion of “re-modernities” denotes a certain view of the 
contemporary world that goes against the classic theories of the modern that 
were so long prevalent, and the postmodern discourses that succeeded them; 
it is, rather, a transformative discipline, a sort of combination “between the 
return to grammar, to the frame, to coordinates and the unstable, free, creative 
power”. In the re-modern viewpoint, postmodernity and modernity are no 
longer seen as directionally opposite; rather, both tendencies coexist side by 
side with mutual influence in the transformation of modern history.101 His re-
modern approach attempts “to integrate the critical core questions and 
suggestions made by postmodern and deconstructive thinkers without 
                                           
100  Markus Vinzent, “Re-Modernities: or the Volcanic Landscapes of Religion”, p.149. The concept of “re-
modernities” exactly represents the feature of Markus Vinzent’s approach to theology as a fundamentally 
transformational discipline which by its very nature bridges the concepts of “core” and “periphery”. 
101 Non-Western societies, especially those in Asian countries, that have imported postmodernity simultaneously 
with other modern trends developed in the West, do not recognize the inherent antagonism between the 
postmodern and the modern. In those societies, the two tendencies have developed alongside each other. Jin Woo 
Lee, Philosophical Understanding of Postmodernism (Seoul: Seokwangsa, 1993)  
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remaining within their antagonistic frameworks”.102 
 
What then, is the unique contribution of the re-modern concept? To help 
answer this question Table 1 sets out distinctions between modernity, 
postmodernity and re-modernities in order to capture the ways in which the re-
modern might be portrayed as a reaction to both the modern and the 
postmodern. In the table, I draw on Ihab Hassan for differences between 
modernism and postmodernism (1985), 103  and Sven Kesselring for 
differences between first and second modernity (2008),104 while following the 
analysis of my teacher, Markus Vinzent (2012), 105  for further distinctions 
between modernity, postmodernity and re-modernities. To the terms provided 
by Hassan, Kesselring, and more significantly, Vinzent, I add a few of my own 
for good measure. I say that the re-modern might be portrayed as a reaction 
to the modern and the postmodern because I consider it dangerous and ill-
founded to depict complex relations as simple classification and essentialist, 
when almost certainly the true state of sensibility, the real “structure of feeling” 
in the modern, the postmodern, and the re-modern, lies in the manner in which 
these stylistic distinctions are synthesized or reformulated. Nevertheless, I 
                                           
102  Markus Vinzent, “‘Re-modernity’: Overcoming the Divide of Denominations, Religions and Ideological 
Categories”, p.635. 
103 Ihab Hassan, “The Culture of Postmodernism”, Theory, Culture and Society, Vol.2.3 (1985): 119-32, pp.123-124. 
104 Seven Kesselring, “The Mobile Risk Society”, in  Weert Canzler, Vincent Kaufmann, and Sven Kesselring (eds.), 
Tracing Mobilities: Towards a Cosmopolitan Perspective (Farnham: Ashgate, 2008), p.91. 
105 Markus Vinzent, “Re-Modernities: or the Volcanic Landscapes of Religion”, p.153. 
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think this tabular schema provides a useful starting point that captures a sense 
of what the differences might be. 
<Table 1-1> Distinction between Modernity, Postmodernity and Re-modernities 
In contrast to Hassan and Kesselring’s comparison, shown 
in austere counterpoint between the first and the second column, the re-
Modern Postmodern Re-modern (Post-postmodern) 
Rationality  Irrationality  Rationality + Irrationality 
Ultimate truth /  Relativism of truth / Eventual reconstruction of truth  
Critique of ambivalence /  
Certainty 
Ambivalence as core concept / 
Uncertainty 
Ambivalence as part of rationality / 
Certainty and Uncertainty 
Cause and Effect Traces  Inter-disciplinary Reflection   
Thesis, Synthesis Antithesis Hypothesis 
Purpose / Semantics   Play / Rhetoric Purpose + Play   
Subject The Death of Subject  Emerging Subject, not as Being 
Descriptive/ perfunctory individualism Expressive/ Atomic individualism Reflexive Individualism 





Balancing Universality and 
Particularity 
Structure and Rule 
 
Fragmentation and Floating 
 
Rule-based Creativity /  
Network and Flows 
Stability De-stability Growing Liquidity 
Authoritarian state / Dictatorship Anarchies Democracies 
Order / Hierarchy Disorder / Anarchy Parallelism of Order and Disorder 
Grand Narrative Mini Narratives Strategic Narratives 
Directional Mobility / 
Target-oriented 
Non-directional / 
Dispersal without orientation 
Multiple-directional Mobility / 
Process-oriented 
Design  Chance   Design-based Creativity and Chance 
Expectation 
Determinism / Determinacy 
Unexpected Contingency 
Indeterminism / Indeterminacy 
Expected Contingency 
Determinism + Indeterminism 
Continuity and Evolution Discontinuity and Disruption Development 
Construction /  
Innovative Avant-gardism 
Destruction /  
Self-oriented Inventiveness 
Re-construction /  
Refurbishment 
Uniformity Differences as Relativism Co-operation of Differences 
Form / Type Anti-form / Mutant, Poly-morphology Multiplicities of form 
Unambiguous and Solid Boundary / 
Institutionally guaranteed boundaries The Dissolution of Boundaries  
Multiplicities of Boundaries / 
Contextually determined boundaries 
Constancy / Constant  Volatility   Managed Fluidity 
Unique Culture Multiculturalism Entanglement of Multiple Cultures 
Hypo taxis Para taxis Multi-dimensional taxis 
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modern approach goes beyond fixed binary polarities.106 While postmodernity 
and second modernity take an opposite stance to the prototypes in classic 
modernity and first modernity respectively, re-modernities takes partly 
synthetic prototypes, part co-existence, partly transformative types. 
Most importantly, re-modernities represents a new recognition and program 
that goes beyond the modern and the postmodern. Re-modernities accepts 
and underlines the importance of what modernity stood for and postmodernism 
defied: structure, form, grammar, history, and truth; while it equally embraces 
the achievements of postmodernity, the contradictory discourses fragmented 
by de-constructivism.107 
Markus Vinzent has summed up that aspect of the theory of “re-modernities” 
as follows: 
The new epistemology does no longer avoid ontological or generic structures, 
rational rules, natural and traditional settings, but can embrace and make use 
of even incomplete, imperfect and disarticulated types of cognizance and 
transform them into new, surprising and complex inventions. Anonymous and 
distinct, weak and strong, liquid and stable, continuous and ephemeral, 
natural and supra-natural, science and humanities are no longer opposites 
or evolutionary stages as in Modernity, neither do they have to avoid or 
disregard their natures as in Post-modernity, but they can relate to each other 
                                           
106 See Hassan and Kesselring’s Table. 
107 Markus Vinzent, “Re-Modernities: or the Volcanic Landscapes of Religion”. 
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in prism-like manners to form links and powerful networks.108  
Here it is clear that the project to understand the nature of this tendency 
requires recognition of its double-sided aspects, and that it is necessary to 
integrate reflection on the world as well as to reconstruct what has been 
dismantled by the postmodern. In this respect, we can understand re-
modernities as a re-modelling and refurbishment of modernity, where the 
original, unique, structure and form for which it was valued are conceived 
again, not for the sake of preserving fossilized tracks in modern history, but to 
put to further use in response to changed demands and requirements.  
Such distinctions may run the risk of caricature, but there is scarcely an arena 
of present intellectual practice where we cannot spot some of them at work. In 
what follows I attempt to take up a few elements of the re-modern in the richer 
detail they deserve, and to demonstrate their mutually reinforcing character. 
First, perhaps the most important concept of re-modernities is the restoration 
of reflexivity that the postmodern defied, but a reflexivity that sets itself apart 
from modern self-centred rationality, as emphasized in the concept of 
“reflexive modernization”. Reflexivity is a possibility of revisiting or rethinking 
the very essence of what human being creates, and the initiative point for full 
responsibility for that. In this vein, re-modernities is committed to the guiding 
principle of truth, and this self-commitment is much more serious than the 
emphatic truth-claims in classical modernity and the avant-garde that 
                                           
108 Ibid. p.7. 
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postmodernity expressly discarded. 
On the other hand, re-modernities takes into account that post-industrial 
society necessitates “the recognition of ambivalence”. 109  The simple 
modernization followed a logic of ordering and acting that drew sharp 
distinctions between categories of human beings, religions, things and 
activities, spheres of action and forms of life that facilitated the unambiguous 
ascription of competence and responsibilities. Today, however, “the question 
of system formations that are multivalent, permitting and marking possible 
ambivalence and transcending borders is now becoming central”. 110  The 
institutionalized dualities and coordinates of national and international, we and 
others, are dissolved and recast. The logic of non-ambiguity is now being 
replaced by the logic of ambiguity, which has also become integrated into the 
objects of thought. Markus Vinzent grasps this as follows: 
Ambivalence is not only critiqued, nor venerated, but recognized as part of 
human rationality and therefore embedded in any epistemology. 
Ambivalence as a marker of our world will continue and overshadow any 
attempt to develop simple solutions, coherent narratives, logical arguments 
and global ethics.111 
In this respect, as Beck claims with regard to reflexive modernization, re-
modernities “essentially means a rationality reform which does justice to the 
                                           
109 Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and Ambivalence (Cambridge: Polity, 1991); Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens and 
Scott Lash, Reflexive Modernization, p.10. 
110 Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens and Scott Lash, Reflexive Modernization, p.29. 
111 Markus Vinzent, “Re-Modernities: or the Volcanic Landscapes of Religion”, p.154. 
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historical a priori of ambivalence in a modernity which is abolishing its own 
ordering categories”.112 
Secondly, re-modern appreciation of reflexive rationality indicates the 
emergence of “the subject” as a reflexive agent, as modernity is presented as 
“the result of a dialogue between Reason and Subject” by Touraine.113 The 
early modern subject can be defined by the subject’s struggles against 
irrational authority, especially, the sacred order, religion in which the subject 
and rationalism were allies. And then, the alliance between the subject and 
rationality was renounced after defeating the common foe. From that time, the 
inherited subjectivity and order gave way to the authority and the organization 
of productive apparatuses approved by rational mechanism. 114  That is, 
rationalism reinforces the logic of social integration and therefore, increases 
an enlightened power’s hold over members of society, who are in that sense 
the subjects of new princes or new ruling forces. This issue right is the point 
that Foucault highlights. As a result, the postmodern subject transits from the 
modern procedural subject to the subject to struggle against rationalizing 
models. In this process, the subject sometimes falls back upon a self-
                                           
112 Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens and Scott Lash, Reflexive Modernization, p.33. 
113 Alain Touraine, Critique of Modernity, trans. David Macey, (Cambridge, MA and Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), p.6. 
In its introduction, he analyses the relationship of the subject to rationality as follows: “the Critique of modernity 
presented here is intended to extricate modernity from a historical tradition which has reduced it to rationalization, 
and to introduce the theme of the personal subject and subjectivation. (…) Without Reason, the Subject is trapped 
in to an obsession with identity; without the Subject, Reason becomes an instrument of might. In this century, we 
have seen both the dictatorship of Reason and totalitarian perversions of the Subject. Is it at last possible for both 
figures of modernity, which have either fought or ignored one another, to begin to speak to one another and to learn 
to live together?”   
114 Touraine, Critique of Modernity, pp.235, 296-297.  
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expressive subject without undertaking social roles and responsibility and can 
manifest itself to the individual only if one possesses exclusively the value, 
meaning, and even the truth, with distancing themselves from commitment.115 
In re-modern thinking, the subject reconfigures oneself by escaping the 
subject subordinated to powerful authority or monothetic logic approved by 
rational mechanism and the self-expressive and atomic subject without 
commitment, and more significantly by reflecting on one’s own actions and 
situation, to see and experience modes of behaviour as components in a 
personal life history and by struggling to re-connect the individual to 
community as an actor. Here, however, the subject does not exist as itself, but 
emerges through the event.  
In this vein, modern individualization can be defined as the procedural/ formal 
individualization; postmodern individualization as expressive/ atomic 
individualization; re-modern individualization as reflexive/ community-oriented 
individualization.  
In re-modernities, as multiple boundaries, ambivalence, ambiguity and 
uncertainty expand, there arises the decisive question of how the new 
ambivalence can be made acceptable and capable of forming a consensus. 
The answer in the ongoing process is through communicative process and 
networks. In the re-modern perspective, the structural presence is maintained, 
but now the differences are communicative space within and between religions, 
                                           
115 Touraine, Critique of Modernity, pp.282-289.  
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and within and between denominations. Re-modernization implies the advent 
of the network society, and the re-modernities concept is called upon to define 
new boundaries through communicative process. Jürgen Habermas 
demonstrates its importance as follows: 
Normally, members of a life world draw solidarity from inherited values and 
norms, and form established and standardized communicative patterns. In 
the course of the rationalization of the life world, however, this ascriptive 
background consensus shrinks or shatters. It has to be replaced by the 
interpretative accomplishments of communication participants themselves…. 
in the sphere of the life world, ‘rationalization’ does not plug the wellsprings 
of solidarity; rather, it discovers new ones as the old ones run dry. This 
productive force of communication is also significant for the challenge of 
‘reflexive modernization’.116 
Re-modernities makes one alert to the importance of giving up self-centred 
scholarship and of stretching out to a cross-disciplinary creative discourse. As 
Vinzent puts it: “Re-modernity advocates that religious studies can no longer 
be done without appreciating the inter-connectedness of the economic, the 
political, the scientific and the environment as well as the ritual, ethnic, 
linguistic and reflexive levels of human existence.” 117  In this respect, 
communicative process provides ample opportunities for innovation, thus 
                                           
116 Jürgen Habermas, The Postnational Constellation, trans. Max Pensky (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001), pp.154-
155. 
117 Markus Vinzent, “Re-Modernities: or the Volcanic Landscapes of Religion”. 
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undermining all efforts to establish firm bases in collective projects. Beck 
regards this process as inter-systemic mediating institutions.118  
Thirdly, the re-modern “decision-making process becomes formulated by both 
the expectation of unexpected effects” 119  and the expected effect, which 
means that the epistemological frame shifts from target-oriented directional 
mobility and non-directional mobility to process-oriented multiple-directional 
mobility; from determined expectation and unexpected contingency to 
expected contingency; from continual evolution and discontinued disruption; 
from development by design and development by chance to design-based 
creativity and chance; and finally from grand narrative and mini narratives to 
strategic narratives. 
The juxtaposition of the expected and the unexpected reverberate throughout 
the whole of society in such a way that they have become intractable. Beck 
defines the expectation of the unexpected consequence in terms of the 
negative side-effects, as the “risk society”.120  The theorem of unintended 
consequences and uncertainty becomes, in practice, inseparable from the 
meaning of initial facts. It envisages that creative development springs from a 
maze of unexpected associations between heterogeneous elements in 
multiple dimensions. In this respect, another way of stating what is common to 
                                           
118 Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens and Scott Lash, Reflexive Modernization, p.28. 
119 Ulrich Beck, Wolfgang Bonss and Christoph Lau, “The Theory of Reflexive Modernization”, 21.  
120 Ibid. pp.1-33. 
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re-modernities is to use the astronomers’ notion of deviation.121 Deviations 
are produced by any calculation as whatever cannot be taken into account; 
they can be positive or negative. Put simply, the re-modern is the expected of 
the modern plus the unexpected of the postmodern: the law generates laws 
and something else, and everything that had been put aside as irrelevant or 
impossible to calculate is back in. Vinzent calls the chaotic element deviation, 
which we could also call creation. He points out that creativity is a chaotic 
element inherent in the cosmos, referring to whatever deviates from the 
straight path of reason and control to trace a labyrinth. Without deviation, there 
would be no plurality, no cosmos. Thus, we become conscious that 
consciousness does not mean full control, and the theory of re-modernities 
opens the way for a productive critique of the theories of modernity and 
postmodernity; indeed, it necessitates such critiques. 
                                           
121 I owe my development of the theory of Re-modernities to my teacher, Markus Vinzent. He introduced me to a 
one of the world's most eminent astrophysicists and cosmologists, Martin Rees, and his notion of deviation. In his 
book, Just Six Numbers: The Deep Forces That Shape the Universe, Rees explains that the evolution (both 
physical and biological) of our universe is remarkably sensitive to the values of six numbers. If any of their values 
were to be ‘untuned,” there would be no stars or life as we know it in our current universe. He states that during 
the expansion of the universe after the big bang, if there had been no deviation from the natural laws, nothing would 
have happened at all. Small deviations from the uniform field of energy precipitated the formation of galaxies and 
stars, which created the possibility for anything to happen. He says, therefore, that our cosmos came to exist due 
to the unsharpness of natural laws that would have been. “There are strong reasons for believing that space goes 
on beyond the limits of our observational horizon. There are strong reasons because if you look in opposite 
directions, conditions are the same to within one part in 100,000. So if we are part of some finite structure then, if 
the gradient is so shallow, it is likely to go on much further.” See Martin Rees, Just Six Numbers: The Deep Forces 
That Shape the Universe (NY: Basic Books, 1999); From Here to Infinity: A Vision for the Future of Science (NY: 
W. W. Norton, 2012). 
In a social science perspective, this interpretation can be applied to the notion of “contingency”, in a re-modern 
framework. It can be described as the following equation: One + One is not an exact Two, but 2.00000000….1; that 
is to say, One + One are Two + something else, which is something that cannot be expected. See Markus Vinzent, 
“Re-Modernities: or the Volcanic Landscapes of Religion”, Journal of Beliefs & Values, Vol. 32.2 (August, 2011): 
143-160; Hans Joas, “The Age of Contingency”, in Faith as an Option: Possible Futures for Christianity, trans. by 
Alex Skinner (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2012), pp.63-77. Bruno Latour explains the same idea with the economist’s 
notion of externalities; Bruno Latour, “Is Re-modernization Occurring and If so, How to Prove It?”, 35-48. 
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Fourthly, the central argument of “re-modernities” revolves around multiplicity 
and diversity in the context of multidimensional globalization. 122  The re-
modernities theory embraces cultural multiplicity and diversity; indeed, it is 
impossible to discuss the multifaceted topography without referring to 
variations in the cultural patterns across our cosmopolitan and global 
horizon.123 Rather than the dissolution of boundaries asserted by sceptical 
postmodernism, or the typical and unambiguous boundary of the modern, re-
modernities conceptualizes a multiplicity of contextually determined 
boundaries, since in its current phase modernity is no longer considered to be 
an exclusively Western phenomenon, but is undeniably global, and cannot be 
isolated from the multiple dimensions of the contemporary world. Beck 
explains that “what we have to explore is precisely the law governing the 
pluralization of religion with its tendency to abolish old boundaries and redraw 
new ones”. 124  In the same way, unlike modern attempts, re-modernities 
recognizes that considerations of a complex nature will not necessarily lead to 
a grand narrative of an all-encompassing theory of time, but rather demand 
that we overcome categorical thinking.125  
To summarize, if simple modernization means the “disembedding” of traditional 
social forms followed by the “re-embedding” of industrial social forms, then re-
                                           
122 Markus Vinzent, “Re-modernities”; Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens and Scott Lash, Reflexive Modernization. 
123 Globalization and Cosmopolitanization are distinct concepts, but here I use the terms as interchangeable. 
124 Ulrich Beck (2008) A God of One’s Own, p.68. 
125 Markus Vinzent, “Re-Modernities: or the Volcanic Landscapes of Religion”, p.10. 
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modernities means the “disembedding” and then “re-embedding” 126  of 
industrial social forms through reflexivity against both the modern and the 
postmodern paradigms. Its virtues as a critical theory lie in its creative 
departure from the seemingly endless debates between modernists and 
postmodernists. Moreover, in contrast to the high abstraction of both modernist 
and postmodernist versions of critical theory, it has an immediate applicability 
to social analysis, in that it constitutes a turn towards sociology to diagnose 
the times.127  
One of the most important innovations of re-modernities over and against 
postmodernity is the centrality given to finance and economy. It is the complex 
sciences that emerged from economics that have become important for the 
interpretation of the world.128 Ironically, globalization is both a process of 
recognition of multiplicity, and simultaneously a process of homogenization 
stemming from the unimpeded flow of global capital. As developments in 
science, technology and rationality, bolstered by global capital, exert 
pressures on all societies and cultures to modernize, reflexivity may be all but 
obliterated by the juggernaut that sets out to crush boundaries and difference. 
Scott Lash concentrates on the growing proportion of social, cultural and 
political interaction going on outside institutions in our increasingly 
                                           
126 The terms “disembedding” and “reembedding” are from Anthony Giddens and Ulrich Beck. 
127 Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens and Scott Lash, Reflexive Modernization. 
128 Markus Vinzent, “Re-Modernities: or the Volcanic Landscapes of Religion”, p.14. 
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disorganized capitalist world. 129  Thus, in re-modern frameworks, global 
economics represents a crucial agenda for all disciplines, one that requires 
critical reflection for the future of the global community.  
2.1.4. Revisiting Christianity in the Re-modernities Context  
How can we re-locate Christianity and theology in our contemporary discourse? 
Can we bring in a Christian faith that will once again inspire and impact on the 
formation of the human being as reflexive agent?  
Certainly, Christianity and Christian thinking have struggled with the disturbing 
ideas created by both the modern theorem and the postmodern 
deconstruction, but in different ways. The essentials of the argument are set 
out in Table 2. Its contents must, however, be approached with caution, 
bearing in mind that the distinctions illustrated are essentially fluid, and do not 
postulate a set of necessary relationships.  
In the case of classical modernity, secular certainty was in complete antithesis 
to religious faith; for example: scientific rationalism vs religious exclusive truth; 
subjectivity vs religious authority; human progress vs God’s providence. On 
the other hand, postmodern approaches to Christian faith undermine universal 
truth itself, whether religious or secular, and the postmodern doubt about 
grand narratives rebuts the modern God as the ultimate other, omnipotent and 
omniscient. Ironically, however, postmodernism is also averse to an atheism 
                                           
129 Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens and Scott Lash, Reflexive Modernization. 
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that makes absolute, totalistic claims. In this sense, conviction or confidence 
itself is condemned as dogmatic. As a result, the postmodern deconstruction 
of truth and subject made it move from substantive grounds of how to live well, 
to a non-committed aesthetic style of life.  
<Table 2> Distinction of Religion between Modernity, Postmodernity and Re-
modernities.130 
Nevertheless, the perception that Christianity and its faith are undergoing 
continual transformations and epistemological paradigm shifts from the 
modern and the postmodern to the re-modern enables us to revisit Christianity 
as the re-discovery of religious potentiality.  
In the changing contemporary circumstances when post-postmodern thinking 
                                           
130 Table 2 is adapted from two schematic analyses: Grace Davie, “New Approaches in the Sociology of Religion: 
A Western Perspective”, Social Compass, Vol. 51.1 (2004): 73–84, p.76; Markus Vinzent, “Re-modernities”, p.153. 
Modern Postmodern Re-modern (Post-postmodern) 
Religion or Religious Institution Religiosities and Spirituality Reflexive religions 
Monopoly on truth / 
Exclusive truth narratives 
Relative truth 
Denial of universal truth 
Re-construction of truth from the 
events 
Institutional churches /  
Morphological fundamentalism  
Varied forms of the sacred 
Morphological deconstruction  
Institutional religion + 
Individualized religion 
Political religion + 
Privatized religion 
Cultural religion + Political religion 
Privatized religion 




Industrialization of religion /  
Culturification of religious industry 
Religious responsibility 
 
Progress Healing, Well-being Well-doing 
Secularization Secularities Post-secular 
Anti-religious /  
 
De-centring of the religious 
narratives, but also of the secular 




Polytheism / Agnosticism 
 
Reflexive theism or reflexive 
atheism 
Religion vs Scientific rationalism 
 
Denial of universal value 
 
One resource of life’s intrinsic 
worth 
As socially redundant As a recreation  As responsible partner 
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is being keenly called upon, it is also increasingly clear that reflection on the 
role of religion and religious issues is being cast, not as a re-interpretation of 
idiosyncratic theology or the return to pre-modern and modern dogmatic 
design, but as the continuation of search and re-discovery to unleash the 
potential for individuals and the global community to live well.  
As a case in point, Marius C. Felderhof’s recent book, Revisiting Christianity: 
Theological Reflection, draws on his long experience of teaching theology to 
university students in extra-religious and multi-religious settings to present a 
reflection on Christianity and Christian thinking.131 The book had its beginning 
in “a common starting point that all people have”: “everyone’s interest in living 
well, in effect, in living life to the full”, as a teaching method for a diverse 
audience with different backgrounds.132 Thus, his revisiting of Christianity is 
not to defend it from the point of view of a Christian insider, nor to attack it from 
the perspective of an outsider, but to communicate between the insider and 
the outsider, and more importantly to abstract from Christian faith and its 
commitment new insights on how to live well.  On this point, Felderhof argues 
that it is characteristic of religion to provide the overarching frame to “life’s 
intrinsic worth”. Consequently, “religious practice is designed to give one the 
                                           
131 Marius C. Felderhof, Revisiting Christianity: Theological Reflections (Surrey and Burlington: Ashgate, 2011). As 
he mentions in the Preface, this book is born of his experience teaching Christian theology in higher education to 
students of diverse background, religious and non-religious, Christian and non-Christian faiths, including Muslims, 
Jews, Sikhs and Hindus, amongst others.  
132 Felderhof, Revisiting Christianity, p. ⅶ; See also William S. Campbell, “Marius Felderhof’s Contribution to the 
World of Religious Education”, Journal of Beliefs & Values, Vol.32.2 (2011):119-123. 
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confidence to live from it and for it”.133  
As sketched in Table 2, such value-driven theological thinking goes against 
the postmodern mood that is allergic to the idea of certainty and denies the 
existence of universal values in the name of cultural difference. Some of those 
who dislike religion do so because they are suspicious of conviction per se. 
The line between holding certain noxious beliefs, and holding strong beliefs at 
all, then becomes dangerously unclear. Certainties may indeed destroy. But 
they may also liberate.134 
Moreover, “we cannot keep our mind open forever; we have to start forming 
an option somewhere”.135 Although we face “significant disagreements on 
what really matters and no assured methods of gaining agreement”, and “a 
challenge to understand how we can incorporate the valued insights of other 
traditions”, we must choose “which form of life is it to be”, and doubtless it is 
better to take a reflective and self-conscious way rather than be pushed 
unwittingly into a mould. According to Felderhof, “the purpose of good theology 
is to help with the examination of our life and to enable us to live more 
confidently”.136 In this context, the re-modern approach to religious studies 
entails the confident finalities and underpinning beyond the postmodern 
thinking. In his answer to the introductory question, “what is the point of 
                                           
133 Felderhof, Revisiting Christianity, p. ⅶ. 
134 Jacques Derrida, with his quasi-pathological distaste for certainty and foundation, never seemed capable of 
grasping that point. 
135 Mary Midgley, Science as Salvation: A Modern Myth and its Meaning (London: Routledge, 1992), p.50. 
136 Felderhof, Revisiting Christianity, p. ⅷ. 
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revisiting generally?”, Felderhof presents the new challenge of Christianity as 
being bound up with the re-modern intellect’s striving for groundings and 
finalities:  
For those who take an aesthetic approach137  to life, the challenge is to 
maximize what life has to offer and always to do and to experience something 
new and different. In such a case ‘revisiting’ will be seen as going over the 
same old ground and just a waste of valuable time. 
Another position might be to see that the world in which we live is always 
changing whether we like it or not. As one of the ancient Greeks observed, 
one cannot step into the same river twice. There are no genuine constants. 
Even when we think we have a firm intellectual grip on something, we know 
that the meaning of the object of our attention is held fast by what surrounds 
it. As the surroundings change so does the object itself. In fact Christianity is, 
and has been, profoundly changed by the world which surrounds it, i.e. by 
the culture in which it is located. Its sense never remains exactly the same 
even when we seek to be faithful to its original vision and impetus.138 
In this communicative narrative, we find that Christianity can be postulated as 
a challenge going over the same old ground, and simultaneously, as 
committed thinking and praxis overcoming “the implicit disengagement from 
life found in reflective theorizing and in the sheer provisionality of all intellectual 
conclusions”, although Felderhof finished the answer without transparent 
                                           
137 For the meaning of the aesthetic life as set out by Kierkegaard, See Søren Kierkegaard, Either–or, Part 1 and 2, 
trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987). 
138 Felderhof, Revisiting Christianity, p. 1. 
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expression. We can regard his thinking as a re-modern moulding of the search 
for finiteness. 
In this respect, Vinzent’s concluding comments on his searching of the 
volcanic landscape of religion through the critical reading of re-modernities are 
full of suggestion: 
Confidence, the opening mood of a re-modern theology, is bound together 
with responsibility, engagement and involvement, with honesty and the 
struggle for it. It is not a recipe book for likes and dislikes, but is to be 
measured against the transformative power that opens futures, not for 
particular interests or groups, not in accordance with particular beliefs and 
dogmatic positions, not in random selections, but in an austere and academic 
process of critical self-reflection and scepticism towards modern and 
postmodern concepts.139 
He demonstrates that a re-modern approach to religious studies enables us to 
revisit Christianity as a frame of confident reference for responsibility, 
engagement and involvement. Here, confidence has neither the monothetic 
determination based on absolute truth, nor the antagonism of the postmodern. 
What is important now, according with his proposition, is the “need to 
differentiate between final certainties and orthodox dogmatism”.140 While the 
latter is a pre-modern or modern concept based on the premise that religion 
claims exclusive truth and a monopoly on rightness, the former is an honest 
                                           
139 Markus Vinzent, “Re-modernities”, pp.157-158. 
140 Ibid. p.155. 
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response to historical events and residual risks through life-embracing 
reflection. It is based on a principled openness inherited from postmodern 
thinking, but does not deploy the openness itself as a closed concept, which 
could become self-destructive.  
In this sense, re-modern thinking invites theological thinking to take part in 
cross-disciplinary academic reflection, because when religious studies or 
theology appreciate the inter-connectedness of the economic, the political, the 
scientific and the environmental, as well as the ritual, ethnic, linguistic and 
reflexive levels of human existence, then religion combined with theology as 
reflexive religion can become an ally of critical thinking against illusions. A re-
modern approach to the study of Christianity leads to confidence in taking 
responsibility for the potential of living well, for individuals and for the global 
community. 
2.2. From Secularization to Post-secularization  
In order to stipulate the specific concept of the post-secular used in this 
research, we will look briefly into the development of secularization theory, and 
then examine the growing variety of meanings attributed to the “post-secular”. 
It would be impossible to locate all the meanings on a single map, but the need 
to manage the sheer variety has become pressing. The range of meanings 
draws on many academic disciplines, but here the post-secular concept is 
concerned with sociological religious studies, social philosophy, and theology. 
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2.2.1. The Historical Current on Secularization  
The classic secularization thesis was proffered around 1900 by Weber and 
Durkheim, 141  while the modern form emerged in the 1960s, 142  when we 
notice a decisive turning point through the pioneering work of sociologists such 
as Peter Berger143 and Bryan Wilson.144 They argued that “modernization” 
would inevitably led to a reduced significance of religion at both the societal 
and individual levels. The social dislocation, differentiation, specialization and 
socialization caused by the onset of economic and social modernization would 
necessarily lead to the eventual collapse of organized religion and the 
disappearance of Christianity from the public domain. The historical 
experiences of Europe have been regarded as clear evidence for the validity 
of “the secularization theory” proposed in the 1950s and 1960s by many 
sociologists of religion, who were greatly exercised by the collation and 
                                           
141 See B.R . Wilson, Religion in Secular Society: A Sociological Comment (Harmondsworth : Penguin, 1969); Max 
Weber, The Sociology of Religion (London: Methuen, [1922] 1966); The Theology of Social and Economic 
Organization (New York: The  Free Press, 1947); Émile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life: A 
Study in Religious Sociology, trans. Carol Cosman (New York: Oxford UP, [1915] 2001). 
142 Hugh McLeod has emphasized the importance of the 1960s as follows: “In the first half of the twentieth century 
a fine balance between the forces of religion and secularity remained characteristic of Western Europe and this 
continued until the 1960s. Only then did the balance tip more decisively in a secular direction.” Callum Brown 
maintains that secularization has indeed happened on a drastic scale only since the 1960s, in spite of the decline 
in church-going since about 1890; Hugh McLeod, The Religious Crisis of 1960s (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2007), p.17; Callum G. Brown, The Death of Christian Britain: Understanding Secularization 1800-2000 (London: 
Routledge, 2001). To understand the whole atmosphere of the 1960s, it is necessary to take account of specific 
changes in terms of religion. This period saw major efforts at church reform and theological modernization. Of these 
by far the most important was the Second Vatican Council, which took place in Rome from 1962 to 1965. Influential 
books of liberal theology, such as John Robinson’s Honest to God (1963), Harvey Cox’s Secular City (1965), and 
Joseph Fletcher’s Situation Ethics (1996) cast doubt on the traditional image and reality of God, causing 
widespread furore and deep personal anguish to thousands of Christians. There was also the rediscovery of 
Bonhoeffer.  
143 Peter L. Berger, The Social Reality of Religion (London: Faber&Faber, 1967). 
144 Bryan R. Wilson, Religion in Secular Society (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969); Bryan R. Wilson (ed.), Religion: 
Contemporary Issues: The All Souls Seminars in the Sociology of Religion (London: Bellew, 1992). 
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measurement of religiosity, particularly institutional membership and 
practice.145  Steve Bruce, a British sociologist of religion who vociferously 
advocates this quantitative approach and predictive measurement, argues that 
“this process has accelerated over the last century”, and that “in so far as we 
can measure any aspect of religious interest, belief or action and can compare 
1995 with 1895, the only description for the change between the two points is 
decline”.146 With regard to this assumption, some ardent advocates of the 
secularist narrative have focused on the impact of industrialization and 
urbanization in the nineteenth century, others have highlighted the significance 
of the Enlightenment and the rise of modern science, while yet others have 
pointed to the French Revolution and the complex of economic, social and 
political changes that came about in the years around 1900. In spite of these 
differences, they agree that secularization was the central theme in the 
religious history of the modern West, and that the roots of this secularization 
lay deep in the nineteenth, or even the eighteenth, century. The advocates of 
this secularization theory draw a conclusion based on two assumptions: first, 
although emerging out of the European context, modernization has become 
universal, and irresistibly brings about similar social evolution all over the world; 
                                           
145 Apparently, there remain problematic issues with regard to the secularist’s statistic and census data. Taking an 
example, the data used in the argument about the secularization thesis were selectively chosen and interpreted. 
Contestation turns on what conclusions can be drawn, and predictions made, from data on falling church 
membership, Sunday attendance, and use of church-based rites of passage. To scrutinize appropriately the 
phenomenon of Christian decline, careful consideration is needed, even with regard to the statistics themselves. 
For example, despite predictions of decay, when the British were asked in the 2001 census “What is your religion?”, 
over 70% identified themselves as Christian. See Hugh McLeod, “Introduction”, The Religious Crisis of 1960s, p.1. 
146 Steve Bruce, God is Dead: Secularization in the West (Oxford, Blackwell, 2002). 
103 
and second, due to modernization a long-term historical decline in the social 
significance of religion is inevitable. 
However, by the 1990s it had become apparent that religion was not going 
away, and critics of secularization, who had previously been largely ignored, 
moved centre-stage in critical social theory and theology. The return of religion 
in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century defied the conventional 
theory that had prevailed for two hundred years, and as a result, secularization 
theory has become the subject of critical discussion among doubters, sceptics 
and open adversaries. Among the most surprising of reassessments and 
reversals has been that of Peter Berger, one of the most thoughtful advocates 
of secularization theory in the 1960s, who in 1999 stated that the “whole body 
of literature by historians and social scientists loosely labelled secularization 
theory is essentially mistaken”.147  
Remarkably, the accumulation of a wide range of research has shown that 
modernization does not always lead to the disappearance of Christianity from 
the public domain. Indeed, the negative trend seems actually to have been 
reversed. Furthermore, the fact that Christianity in the United States of 
America still displays strong vitality and dynamic power tackles the scholars 
who support secularization theory. A number of researches of religious 
resurgence in the late twentieth century regarded “American exceptionalism” 
                                           
147 Peter L. Berger, “The Desecularization of the World: A Global Overview”, in Peter L. Berger (ed.), The 
Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1999). 
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as replacing “European exceptionalism” as the exceptional case of 
secularization theory.148 However, as a historian Philip Jenkins points out in 
his book, The Coming of Global Christianity, the revitalization of the 
Evangelical movement, including Pentecostal charismatic enthusiasm, has 
expanded not just in the US, but also to an extraordinary degree in Africa, Asia 
and Latin America.149 Jenkins’ analysis focuses on the non-Western world, 
especially “southern Christianity”, and rejects the assumptions of the 
secularization thesis. 150  In order to make his point, Jenkins puts great 
emphasis on statistical data, and reflects in some detail on the sociological 
task, as well as providing various examples. With this in mind, Jenkins is 
critical of Bruce’s implicit teleology. Thus, historians and sociologists of the 
late twentieth century have challenged the theory of secularization because of 
its illogicality in assuming secularization as an inevitable consequence of 
modernization. This new global vitalization of Christianity has been studied by 
a number of scholars, notably David Martin (1990, 1999, 2002, 2004), Harvey 
Cox (1996), Paul Freston (2001), Grace Davie (2002) and Philip Jenkins (2002, 
2006).151  
When we go beyond the statistics to examine the change in institutional 
                                           
148 Grace Davie, Europe: The Exceptional case: Parameters of Faith in the Modern World (London: Darton, 
Longman and Todd, 2002). 
149 See Philip Jenkins, The Next Christendom: The Coming of Global Christianity (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2002). 
150 See Jenkins, Ibid. 
151 See Bibliography. 
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topography, what is considered more important is the cultural trend towards 
overcoming the division between what have been labelled as secular and 
religious. Callum Brown, the prominent historian who challenged a statistically 
and institutionally focused approach, forcefully stated that although 
churchgoing had been in decline in Britain since at least the 1890s, until 
around 1960 Britain entirely retained its Christian culture and discourse, which 
shaped individual life-narratives, inculcated moral norms and a sense of sin 
and guilt, imposed notions of respectability and, in particular, defined concepts 
of femininity.152 Moreover, this was leading to a revaluation of the religious 
history of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth, with more 
emphasis on the central social role of Christianity and the churches and less 
on secularization. Brown’s overarching category of “discursive Christianity” 
incorporates various elements, such as ritual, economic activity, dress and 
speech.153 Similarly, Gordon Lynch speaks not of crisis of faith or churches, 
but of a cultural trend.154 Moreover, Grace Davie, in her sociological research, 
advocates an examination of the persistence of “the beliefs of ordinary British 
people and the significance of these beliefs in everyday life”.155 Those who 
have no involvement in the church still continue to believe in God, to pray, and 
to call themselves Christians. It is useful to recall Davie’s famous aphorism, 
                                           
152 Callum G. Brown, The Death of Christian Britain: Understanding Secularization 1800-2000 (London: Routledge, 
2001), pp.16-34. 
153 Hugh McLeod, “Introduction”, The Religious Crisis of 1960s, p.4. 
154 See Gordon Lynch, Generation X (London: Darton, 2002). 
155 Grace Davie, Religion in Britain Since 1945: Believing without Belonging (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), p.5. 
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“believing without belonging”, which acknowledges the persistence of the 
sacred memory, despite an undeniable decline in church activity. 156 
Reinterpreting census data and analysis of rites of passage, and drawing on 
anthropological insights, she contends that while many Britons have ceased 
to directly connect with or belong to their religious institutions in a formal and 
active sense, they have not abandoned “their deep-seated religious 
aspirations or latent sense of belonging”, and as the institutional disciplines 
decline, "belief not only persists, but becomes increasingly personal, detached 
and heterogeneous".157 The movement away from regular church attendance 
and institutional practice is linked by Davie to broader social movements, such 
as changes in the use of leisure time, and rejection of institutional authority 
and associational culture, rather than being seen as a proof of 
secularization.158  
At the interpretative level, during the 1990s commentators such as Jeffrey 
Cox,159 David Martin and Werner Ustorf160 led a more radical attack that 
questioned the whole concept of secularization thesis.161 They identified a 
                                           
156 Ibid pp.93-116.  
157 Grace Davie, Europe: The Exceptional Case - Parameters of Faith in the Modern World (London: Darton 
Longman & Todd, 2002), pp.2-8. 
158 Grace Davie, “Praying Alone? Church-going in Britain and Social Capital: A Reply to Steve Bruce“, Journal of 
Contemporary Religion”, Vol.17.3 (2002): 329-334. 
159 Jeffrey Cox, “Secularization and other master-narratives of religion in modern Europe”, Kirchliche Zeitgeschichte, 
Vol.14. 1 (2001): 24-35. 
160 Werner Ustorf, “Global Christianity, New Empire and Old Europe”, in Frans Wijsen and Robert Schreiter (eds.), 
Global Christianity Contested Claims (Amsterdam and New York: Rodopi B. V., 2007). 
161 This comprehensive understanding and insight came from my teacher Hugh McLeod’s Lecture. Hugh McLeod, 
“CIHEC and The Development of Modern Church History since 1950”. The paper was presented at conference on 
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need to escape the confines of the all-too pervasive master narratives, which 
are not only “teleological, Eurocentric, deterministic and deceptively value-
laden”,162 but their narration of the rise and fall of religion is inadequate, since 
it reflects only their secularist ideological conceptions, without allowing for the 
possibility of transformation.163  
This discussion begins with the following radical questions: What is the central 
social role of Christianity and the churches in contemporary modernization? 
What is the difference between statistical change and the transformation of 
religious consciousness? Are we facing “a religious crisis” or “a new possibility”? 
Are the modern culture and social structure essentially incompatible with the 
organized religious institutions, or the whole of Christianity? These questions 
lead to a revaluation of the Christian history of the latter half of the twentieth 
century, with more emphasis on the central social role of Christianity and the 
churches, and less on secularization. 
2.2.2. A Critical Reflection on the Secularization Theories, and Re-
defining Secularization 
Unfortunately, the term “secularization” has long been used in so many 
different ways that there is a great danger of misunderstanding. We must 
                                           
162 Jeffrey Cox, “Master Narratives of Long-Term Religious Change”, in Hugh McLeod and Werner Ustorf, The 
Decline of Christendom in Western Europe, 1750-2000 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p.205. 
163 David Martin, “Secularization and the Future of Christianity”, Journal of Contemporary Religion, Vol. 20.2 (2005): 
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distinguish between the diverse philosophical, political, social, and theological 
uses of the term, because the claims in the secularization debate very much 
depend on one’s definition of secularization. The Spanish-American 
sociologist of religion, José Casanova, rearticulates the concept of 
secularization by making clear distinctions between three different uses of the 
term: 1) the decline in the importance of religion, 2) the privatization of religion, 
and 3) the liberation of the socio-political spheres.164  
First, the term refers to a decline in the importance of religion. However, as 
Hans Joas points out, it is not clear whether this means a decline in the 
significance of religious practices, a fall in the number of those belonging to 
churches and religious communities, or the fact that fewer people adhere to 
certain articles of faith. Habermas maintains that the reason for these 
phenomena is that “scientifically enlightened minds cannot be easily 
reconciled with theocentric and metaphysical worldviews”.165 In this respect, 
it is useful to consider Simon Green’s point: “conventional wisdom and 
common sense suggest that the people stopped going to church because they 
no longer believed what the churches taught them. Perhaps the causal 
mechanism was really closer to the opposite: they stopped believing because 
they stopped going.”166 
                                           
164 José Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994). 
165 Jürgen Habermas, "Secularism's Crisis of Faith: Notes on Post-Secular Society", p.17 
166 Simon J.D. Green, Religion in the Age of Decline: Organization and Experience in Industrial Yorkshire,1870-
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The second usage of the term refers to the privatization of religion, with 
functional differentiation of social subsystems. The churches and other 
religious institutions lose their control over law, politics, public welfare, 
education and science; they restrict themselves to their proper function of 
administering the means of salvation, withdraw into the private sphere, and in 
general lose public influence and relevance. 
Finally, secularization can refer to the emancipation of societal spheres from 
direct religious control, which means that the exercise of legitimate state power 
takes place in secular terms, while all citizens can freely exercise their religious 
freedom and worship one God, another God or no God at all, and the churches 
and state are neatly separated. This is political secularism in the sense 
captured by the French term “laïcité”: “religious neutrality”.  
It is evident that any or all of the three dimensions outlined by Casanova make 
the broad secularization theories considerably more precise as well as more 
empirically manageable, and these distinctions offer valuable assistance to 
any evaluation of whether secularization has in fact occurred in any given 
context, albeit that there remain important disagreements. However, these 
distinct articulations can be regarded only as a first step towards fathoming the 
concept, as further uncertainties immediately arise. There are, for example, 
other ways in which secularization could be conceptualized: as a weakening 
in the authority of the faith that is still embraced or as the re-symbolization of 
ancient creeds in ways that accommodate the modern world. Further, each 
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one of these sub theses should be empirically and separately studied in the 
context of concrete historical cases.  
Nevertheless, Casanova’s clarification enables scholars writing on the topic 
today to begin with the premise that secularism is not simply the absence of 
religion, but rather an intellectual and political category that must itself be 
understood as a historical construction. It also tends to render the place of 
religion in public life more accessible to modification by means of law and 
public policy, without doing much to mute the significance of the deeper 
currents of religion. Historians and sociologists who claim they no longer 
accept the classic secularization theory, at least in its modern form, have 
created a valuable body of alternative scholarship. Now, secularization, 
understood as the expectation that religious conduct would first confine itself 
within private walls and subsequently would disappear from modernized 
societies, has given way to a “post-secular” appreciation of the persistence 
and increased visibility of religion.  
2.2.3. Notes on the “Post-secular”  
Why are we beginning to use the term “post-secular”?167 It is because it is 
                                           
167 The notion of “post-secular” has emerged to great surprise in the recent writing of Jürgen Habermas. For a 
detailed list, see footnotes 163 & 165.  
 This paper proposes a definition of the term "post-secular". It discards two possible modes of understanding: that 
the post-secular means de-secularization, and that it means post-secularity, a regime change that brings society 
back to religion. Instead, it suggests that the post-secular is a condition of co-existence of the secular and religion, 
which can be conceptualized in three dimensions: normative, sociological-political-historical, and 
phenomenological. Each of these three dimensions is characterized by a tension: Kantian vs. Hegelian tradition in 
the normative; model vs. practice in the sociological-political-historical; and individual vs. collective in the 
phenomenological post-secular. 
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increasingly apparent that the secularization theories should no longer be 
taken for granted, and we are now settling down into a new phase of 
secularism. 
In recent years the concept of the post-secular, as initiated by Jürgen 
Habermas, 168  has steadily been proliferating in the social sciences, 
philosophy and cultural criticism, in the humanities as well as theology.169 The 
issue has been contemplated at numerous conferences and seminars: 
University of Groningen, The Netherlands, International and Multidisciplinary 
Conference, Religion, Politics and the Post-secular City, 12-15 November 
2008; Yale University, Exploring the Post-secular, 3-4 April 2009; NYU 
Institute for Public Knowledge and the Social Science Research Council, 
Rethinking Secularism: Exploring the Post-Secular, 12 February 2009; 
Washington University in Saint Louis (Missouri), Religious Studies Conference, 
Debating Secularism in a Post-Secular Age, 9-10 April 2010; Åbo Akademi 
University, Finland, Exploring the Post-secular, 24 May 2010; Roskilde 
University, Department of Society and Globalization, Denmark, Post-secular 
Conditions?: Challenges to Citizenship, Democracy, Law and Social Cohesion, 
8-10 December 2010; The University of Bologna, Faenza, in the Centre for the 
Study and Documentation of Religion and Political Institutions in Post-secular 
                                           
168 Jürgen Habermas, "Secularism's Crisis of Faith: Notes on Post-Secular Society". 
169 For a helpful overview of various uses of the term “post-secular”, see James A. Beckford, “Public Religions and 
the Postsecular: Critical Reflections”, Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, Vol. 51.1 (2012):1–19. See also 
Joh D. Boy, “What we talk about when we talk about the postsecular”, The Immanent Frame, 15 March, 2011, 
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Society, Politics, Culture and Religion in the Post-secular Society, 12-13 May 
2011. 
Furthermore, the list of book titles containing the term “post-secular” is 
continually lengthening. It includes, for instance, Post-Secular Philosophy: 
Between Philosophy and Theology; Political Theologies: Public Religions in a 
Post-Secular World; The Politics of Postsecular Religion; Milton and the Post-
Secular Present: Ethics, Politics, Terrorism; and The Post-Secular in Question: 
Religion in Contemporary Society.170 
In that case, what exactly do we mean when we refer to the post-secular? 
Although we cannot easily reach a point of agreement on the meaning of post-
secular, it can certainly be said that the piling up of references to it signals an 
important epistemic change in thinking about religion and secularism, and a 
willingness among scholars to go beyond classic secularization theory in their 
academic endeavour.  
The purpose here is first to assess the variety of meanings attributed to the 
term, to articulate theoretically what it means in the description of 
contemporary modern societies, and then to raise questions about the extent 
to which the meanings attributed to the post-secular are coherent and 
                                           
170 Phillip Blond (ed.), Post-Secular Philosophy: Between Philosophy and Theology (London and NY: Routledge, 
1997); Hent de Vries and Lawrence E. Sullivan (eds.), Political Theologies: Public Religions in a Post-Secular 
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consistent, because the widespread fashion of distinguishing all kinds of new 
phenomena from familiar phenomena merely by adding the preposition “post” 
has the disadvantage of indeterminacy.  
Let us begin with Jürgen Habermas, who is usually credited with developing a 
“post-secular” perspective. Since his 2001 lecture on Faith and Knowledge,171 
Habermas has included post-secular perspectives in his diagnoses of current 
problems in politics, social life and morality, and thus the term can no longer 
be ignored. Habermas’s notion of a post-secular constellation has appeared 
in a number of his English language publications,172 but the clearest statement 
of his thinking about the relation between secularization and post-secularity is 
his article “Notes on a Post-Secular Society”.173 Habermas refers to a post-
secular turn as “a change in consciousness” arising from three phenomena in 
recent modern society:  
First, contrary to a long belief that the disappearance of religion is inevitable, 
a widespread recognition that religious communities still play an important 
public role in very many regions of the world, and awareness of the global 
religious conflicts arising from the increasing influence of religion in public life, 
                                           
171 The term first appeared in his German Peace Prize lecture under the title, “Glauben und Wissen” in October 
2001. Habermas characterizes a post-secular society as one in which “religious communities persist in a 
secularized environment”; a constellation which in his opinion refutes earlier and stricter formulations of the 
secularization thesis. 
172 Jürgen Habermas, The Future of Human Nature (Cambridge: Polity, 2003); “Equal Treatment of Cultures and 
the Limits of Postmodern Liberalism”, Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol.13.1 (2005):1-28; “Religion in the Public 
Sphere”, European Journal of Philosophy, Vol.14.1 (2006):1-25; Jürgen Habermas (et al.), An Awareness of What 
is Missing: Faith and Reason in a Post-secular Age (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011). 
173 Jürgen Habermas, "Secularism's Crisis of Faith: Notes on Post-Secular Society". 
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change public consciousness. As Jürgen Habermas argues, “the awareness 
of living in a secular society is no longer bound up with the certainty that 
cultural and social modernization can advance only at the cost of the public 
influence and personal relevance of religion”.174  
Secondly, religion is gaining influence not only internationally but also locally. 
Habermas argues that churches and religious organizations are increasingly 
assuming the role of “communities of interpretation” in the public arena of 
secular societies.175 For many people religion functions as a source of values 
and norms, and in many societies today religion has social and political 
implications. Therefore, Habermas argues, post-secular culture must openly 
recognize religion not just as a set of private beliefs but as an all-embracing 
source of energy for the devout, and, in fact, for the wider society.  
Thirdly, the growing numbers of immigrants from “traditional cultural 
backgrounds”, and the presence of their communities within a disparate 
society, bring about changes in public consciousness, raising questions of how 
such immigrant cultures can be integrated into the wider society and how 
different religious communities can coexist amicably. New immigrant 
communities shape the individual practical attitudes of human beings in a 
variety of cultural ways; they influence cultural life, and they are part of public 
discourses and political processes.176 
                                           
174 Ibid. p.20. 
175 Ibid. p.19. 
176 Jürgen Habermas, “Faith and Knowledge”, in The Future of Human Nature (Cambridge: Polity, 2003). 
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Based on a new perception of these changes, Habermas uses the post-
secular concept to signal the persistence of religion in contemporary society 
and its renewed visibility in the public sphere, to denote religious potential as 
a new ethical and political resource, and to imply a new global context in which 
we face the question of how we can incorporate the relativity and diversity of 
the valued insight offered by religion under the circumstance of its increasing 
influence in public life. 
As Habermas notes, the post-secular as primarily a matter of consciousness 
also gives us pivotal pause to rethink the secularist conviction that religion will 
eventually disappear in the continuing process of modernization. What he is 
promoting is a post-secular self-understanding of society as a whole, in which 
the vigorous continuation of religion in a continually secularizing environment 
must be reckoned with.  
More significantly, his post-secular concept implies the corresponding need to 
rethink the relationship between faith and politics by reflecting upon political-
philosophical convictions that were taken for granted in earlier discussions, 
notably those associated with the liberal-secular nation state. Taking a 
normative stance, this poses a challenging question about how to participate 
in a post-secular society. Habermas asks: 
How should we see ourselves as members of a post-secular society and what 
must we reciprocally expect from one another in order to ensure that in firmly 
entrenched nation states, social relations remain civil despite the growth of a 
116 
plurality of cultures and religious world views?177 
Habermas’s proposal that the key task is to get deeply religious people and 
naturalistically inclined minds to take a more consciously charitable attitude 
towards one another is unpromising. 178 The agenda has now changed, with 
new questions being raised about tolerance and the development of effective 
and ethical social relations.  
Habermas remains firmly committed to a number of residual secularist beliefs, 
both in the descriptive guise of European modernization-as-secularization and 
in the normative guise that a successful modernization should result in a polity 
based on secularist principles. 
However, Habermas’s assertion of the post-secular has some problematic 
factors, not least the conceptual vagueness of the “post” in the term 
postmodern: is it to be taken as a signal of anti-secularism, does it mean what 
comes after secularization, or does it imply a new phenomenon beyond 
secularism? Above all, by mixing up empirical and normative assumptions, his 
post-secular argument raises doubt as to whether the post-secular is an 
empirical concept, a normative ideal, or a mere catchphrase not backed by 
any substantial philosophical argument or analysis.  
More specifically, from an empirical standpoint, one can question the extent to 
which we have had a secular era, and if so, whether we have indeed passed 
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through a secular period to emerge into something beyond the secular. Have 
we really entered into a post-secular age? In particular, I wonder whether 
Habermas believes that phenomena implying “the return of religion” in the 
public sphere signify an increase in religious thought, feeling and action, or 
merely an increase in the salience of questions about religion in political circles, 
in the media, and among the public. 
In the same vein, the chronology of the “post-secular” remains unclear: how 
are we to demarcate before and after? Again, one can question whether we 
are dealing just with a change in cultural current, or with a new era in terms of 
social structure.  
Another problematic point concerns the normative aspect of his post-secular 
concept. Indeed, his post-secular constellation is closer to a normative notion 
than to the empirical or historical. That is, his primary concern is how we use 
the potential value of religion for sound morality and politics in the public 
sphere, rather than how religion has transformed in the late modern period; he 
is interested only in the functional value of religion, without respecting its 
intrinsic substantial value. 179  This recognition that religious and spiritual 
arguments have a right to be heard in civil society is probably why he felt the 
need to use the term “post-secular”. His standpoint is deeply rooted in 
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secularist and modernist assumptions rather than a neutral analytical category. 
As a result, his examination of the process of religious transformation is 
necessarily limited; from his secular viewpoint, it is not possible to gain the 
deep understanding of the religious that is required to truly comprehend 
religious possibility.  
Nonetheless, his framing continues to have widespread impact on the 
discussion regarding the relationship between the secular and the religious 
and the location and role of religion in the public sphere. Of course, the 
discussion of the ‘post-secular’ ranges beyond Habermas, where perhaps 
more nuanced variations on the theme, capable of promoting a better 
understanding of the secular, are being developed. 
 
Now, let us move on to the growing variety of concepts attributed to the post-
secular. This term has often been employed in two interconnected ways, 
blending the empirical and the normative, as Habermas did. However, as 
aforementioned, such usages of the term introduce confusion and 
misconceptions, hindering our understanding of both the religious and the 
secular. Thus, to clarify the concept, we need to analyse the different stances 
of post-secular ideas according to the way of approaching religion and its 
phenomena.  
First, in empirical description, particularly in studies that undertake global 
comparative observation and wide analytical overview, the post-secular 
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concept has been used to explain the return of religion in the modern world, 
and the persistence of religious influence in the public sphere. Once again, this 
observation is divided into two different phenomena, but these overlap one 
another. On the one hand, the post-secular provides a conceptual framework 
that can account for the unexpected resilience and development of religion 
beyond the paradigmatic assumptions of the secularization theory. In this case, 
secularization theory is seen as an unreliable guide to processes of religious 
change and as nothing more than an ideological obfuscation or a self-serving 
ploy implemented by rationalist intellectuals, while the post-secular position is 
seen as an abandonment of or a corrective to secularization.180 On the other 
hand, the post-secular turn derives from a new visibility of religion in the public 
sphere, and the relevance of religious views to socio-political issues. This 
conceptual core of post-secularity is closely related to the persistent location 
and role of religion in civil society, as described in José Casanova’s terms 
“public religion” and “de-privatization” as opposed to the “privatization of 
religion”.181 Extending this argument, Justin Beaumont notes that the post-
secular involves more than the persistence of religious influence in the public 
sphere; it also means the interplay of diverse religious actors and 
organizations, humanists and secularists, within “the secularized social 
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181 José Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World. 
120 
structures of modern late capitalism”.182 
Concomitantly, the post-secular refers to the change of epistemological 
horizon in the understanding of religion. A closely related view of the post-
secular is that it amounts merely to a “revision of a previously overconfidently 
secularist outlook rather than a ‘return’ of religion to a stage on which it had 
once been absent”. 183  This sense of the post-secular is similar to that 
attributed to Hans Joas:  
After all, the term post-secular, if it is to be meaningful, must refer to a change 
vis-à-vis an earlier phase. But it is not clear when this earlier secular society 
is supposed to have existed and what one can actually mean by the term. . . . 
[Secularization] might refer to religion’s loss of significance but also to the 
emergence of modern, religiously neutralized statehood. By no means do 
these two always coincide. From a global perspective, it would be quite wrong 
to say that religion is declining in importance. Despite the further spread of 
industrialization, urbanization, and education of the past few decades, all 
world religions have retained or increased their vitality. . . . 
But if the assumption that modernization necessarily leads to the retreat of 
religions is losing its plausibility, the term post-secular, together with the 
notion that Islam is out of sync with technological advances, is also beginning 
to look shaky. Post-secular now expresses not a sudden increase in 
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religiosity following its epoch-making decline - but rather a shift in the 
consciousness of those who had felt justified in regarding religions as 
moribund. For Habermas, a society that “adapts to the fact that religious 
communities continue to exist in a context of ongoing secularization” is post-
secular. But who exactly had failed to adapt to this continued existence? It 
would perhaps have been better to admit in self-critical fashion that one had 
underestimated religion - rather than dressing one’s mistake up in a term 
redolent of epochal change. 
The second possible meaning of secularization comes into play here. This 
spotlights not the decline of religion but the restrictions put on its potential 
impact in a secularized, that is, religiously neutralized, state. Here, post-
secular does not mean that religion is becoming increasingly important or that 
people have begun to pay it more attention but that the secular state or the 
public has changed its attitude toward the continued existence of religious 
communities and the ideas generated by them. Once again, though, the 
question is whether post-secular is the right word for such a transformation. 
It is not the secular state that is being overcome but merely a secularist self-
image.184 
According to Joas’ argument, the concept of the post-secular does not imply 
that we now live in a radically different age compared with the mid-1960s, 
when Harvey Cox’s The Secular City first appeared; people are no more or 
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less religious than they were before, it is just the cognition of religion that has 
transformed. In this sense, even Europe can be regarded as post-secular. The 
errors of secularization theories have supposedly been corrected and 
assimilated into scholarly knowledge; and scholars have been sensitized to 
the flourishing of predominantly individualized and highly diverse forms of 
religiosity. In this vein, some thinkers prefer to see it as a progressive 
development that builds on the achievements of both religion and secularism. 
Kim Knott, for example, argues that “religious, secular, but also postsecular 
positions were coproduced and contested”.185 This leads her to the view that 
British cities can be “simultaneously more religious, more secular (or 
secularist), and postsecular”.186  
The second concept of the post-secular is a normative stance, which has 
emerged as a form of radical theorizing and critique prompted by 
contemporary socio-political questions of what the relationship between the 
religious and civil society should be; how political secularism should be applied, 
and how generally we are best advised to live under the coexisting 
circumstances of the religious and the secular. These questions are not 
concerned with the trajectories of phenomenological transition of religion itself, 
but rather with the socio-political context encountered with the changes of 
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religious landscape. Such a post-secular position casts doubt upon whether 
values such as democracy, freedom, equality, inclusion, and justice are 
necessarily best pursued within an exclusively unreflective secular framework. 
These ideas are at the centre of the recent writings of Habermas.  
In the same vein, but as a useful complement to Habermas’ conception, 
Charles Taylor specifies three types of secularity: the first comprises the 
separation of church and state, where the religious is removed from the explicit 
state; the second type of secularity is one where religious practice and belief 
decline, while in the third faith is “one human possibility among others”. Taylor 
calls this last mode, ‘Secularity 3’. Here, he describes a secularity that is 
flexible and responsive, a phenomenological transformation of the experience 
of believing, not the death of religion (Christianity). In other words, the root of 
the notion of the secular is a contrast not to religion, but to transcendence. In 
his book A Secular Age,187 Taylor argues that we are living in a world in which 
the intrinsically secularizing "immanent frame" 188  has become a perfectly 
reasonable option, and perhaps even the "default setting" for many people. 
What matters is that the subjective experience of believing has changed 
entirely; people have come to see this immanent frame as the normal, natural, 
tacit context for much or all of their action, and this changes both religious 
belief and religious engagement. That experience has undergone a 
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transformation from being the unquestioned framework shared by everybody 
in a natural, unreflective way, to being one among many options available, 
none of which can be seen as having a privileged status within society. People 
may continue to believe, not any longer in the unreflective and naïve way that 
characterizes societies that are not secularized, but with consciousness of and 
experience from and within what Taylor calls the prevailing immanent frame, 
that is, a whole cultural horizon that identifies the good life with human 
flourishing, and accepts no allegiance or obligation to anything beyond human 
flourishing.  
More radically, the renewed interest in the role of religion in social life can also 
be traced to a post-secular turn in social philosophy, for instance Marion’s God 
without Being or religion as a saturated phenomenon; Gauchet’s Christianity 
as the religion at the end of religion or of the exit from religion; Blond’s set of 
alternatives to relativism and nihilism; Derrida’s religion without religion.189 
In summary, the meanings associated with the “post-secular” are so varied 
and shot through with uncertainty as to whether it refers to a concept or a 
reality, and in some cases mutually incompatible, that it is impossible to 
articulate a general concept implied by the term. In a very general sense, post-
secular discourse derives from perception of the limits of the classic 
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secularization theory in its conceits and ontological assumptions, particularly 
the very possibility of a clear-cut distinction between religious and secular in a 
broader context of identity formation and ethical engagement with deep-
seated sensitivities. However, here we need to be sure that to speak of the 
post-secular does not necessarily lead to a stance opposite to the secular, one 
driven largely by anti-secular rhetoric. The distinctiveness of this approach to 
secularism rests neither upon a sweeping condemnation of the hegemony of 
the secular outlook, nor upon a simplistic multicultural appeal for peaceful 
coexistence between secular and religious perspectives. Rather, the post-
secular thinking represents a refinement - or a more productive phase - of 
secularity.  
In order to help resolve any long-running debates or questions in the scientific 
study of religion, we need to draw distinctions between and assess the 
relevance of the different usages of the term post-secular: empirical or 
normative, albeit that the possibility of a questionable conflation between the 
concept and the things to which it is supposed to refer cannot be denied. 
Therefore, the question of the post-secular should be posed in a new way, not 
in an approach that mixes up the empirical and the normative, but separately, 
with appropriate methods applied to each. 
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2.2.4. Redefining Post-secular: not as anti-secular, but as 
infra/ultra-secular beyond Habermas’s Post-secular190 
What points of the post-secular discussion can we set as an appropriate and 
relevant method to this research? Does the establishment of a useful new 
approach to the study of religion imply a shift towards social philosophy or 
“post-secular social science”? What implications, if any, does this have for the 
social sciences? 
In this research, in pursuit of a proper understanding of the current 
transformation of Christianity and the potential value of Christianity as a 
reflexive agent in the public sphere, rather than stating a general definition of 
the post-secular, I will seek to establish a specific post-secular concept 
through two different ways of approaching it, namely, the empirical and the 
normative.  
Here, the post-secular idea is not concerned with turning back the clock or 
simply opening ourselves up anew to the all-embracing joys of the religious 
life and spiritually driven enquiry. Rather, it is a matter of applying to 
secularism the sort of probing and sceptical analysis previously meted out to 
religious apologetics, whenever the latter was thought excessively to govern 
empirical or philosophical understanding. This research takes the post-secular 
to signal at least a reflexive stance towards secularism/secularity.  
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From an empirical-sociological point of view, it would be self-supportive to 
interpret a worldwide resurgence of “global religions” as the “return of religion” 
or “God is back”; and claims that we are now living in a “post-secular age” or 
a “post-secular society”, implying the dominance of religion over the secular, 
could only be based on a false assumption, derived from antagonistic 
perspectives between the religious and the secular. Statistics of rise and fall 
in mainstream religious institutions simply illustrate disparities according to 
particular social contexts, rather than the relative merits of religiosity and 
modern secularity. Hence, it would make little sense to try to assess whether 
any particular country or region had actually entered a post-secular age, or 
whether any one period was more or less religious than any other. 
Furthermore, it is unclear whether the resurgence of religious phenomena in 
a global comparative perspective is a return to traditional institutionalized 
forms of religion that feature enchantment and religious authority, or a 
movement towards newly emerging non-dogmatic or “spiritual” forms of 
religion. Although reflexive exploration on both the religious and the secular 
weakens the notion of an automatically advancing process of secularization, 
and certainly opens up opportunities to faith, today’s religious resurgence 
cannot and should not be equated with de-secularization of the world. 
Therefore, the post-secular may signify “at most a revision of a previously 
over-confidently secularist outlook, rather than a return of religion to a stage 
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on which it had once been absent”.191 
With regard to the sociological phenomena of the growing visibility and 
influence of religion in the public sphere, there is a widespread perception that 
religious voice and action are still sustainable and valuable, especially in social 
service delivery, irrespective of the type of religious institution or other type of 
religious group, such as faith based organizations or individual actors. Here, 
the post-secular concept is used to explain how religion interacts with modern 
societies on the basis of structural independence from the state but in reaction 
to requests from the civil society.192 Thus, it is much more acceptable and 
relevant to see the post-secular concept, with regard to the new visibility of 
religion in the public sphere, as a change in the way that religion engages with 
the civil society: “from dominance to movement”, rather than “de-privatization” 
or “resurgent status of public religion”.193  
With regard to the normative aspect of the post-secular, the copious literature 
on the topic is shot through with the normative orientation that refers to a 
concept rather than a reality, which means that concern with empirical 
evidence and analysis may remain relatively underdeveloped, just theoretical 
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and speculative. Nevertheless, in normative terms the post-secular idea still 
poses the significant challenge of how we should incorporate relativity and 
diversity in a multi-dimensional society, and where we should find alternative 
inspiration when all the norms have evaporated. From a normative stance, 
Habermas argues that the post-secular idea must openly recognize religion 
not as a set of private beliefs but as an all-embracing source of energy, not 
only for the devout but for the whole society.194 In this vein, a post-secular 
approach to religious studies allows the possibility of subject, truth, and 
universal value, poses the question of how to live well in the non-committed 
and non-directional condition dismantled by postmodernism, and offers the 
potential value of Christianity as a reflexive agent in the public sphere.  
We have to note here, however, that the post-secular idea of this research lies 
on the line of the post-postmodern approach established earlier in the study. 
The re-modern post-secularity differs from the post-secular concepts 
developed by postmodernism. Indeed, as Eagleton points out, a vitriolic attack 
by the postmodern on modern secularism was in part responsible for launching 
the post-secular stance at both the empirical-sociological and the normative 
levels. The continuing realization of radically plural societies in terms of 
religions, faiths and beliefs within diverse urban societies appeals for peaceful 
coexistence. Postmodern theology challenges the assumption that secularism 
is irreversible; some have suggested that we are now entering a post-secular 
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age, but have also made it clear that the religion that is being revitalized must 
be different from modern faith. Let me exemplify this claim by examining one 
“postmodernist” expression of post-secularism, noting first that several 
prominent figures within poststructuralist social theory have pointed to new 
forms of “re-enchantment” in the world, or highlighted the sacred forms of “bare 
life”, or insisted that the received view of modernity itself as being thoroughly 
disenchanted is plain mistaken.195 On this account, the post-secular idea of 
the postmodern simply comes from anti-sympathy to secular reason and 
aversion to an atheism that makes absolute, totalistic claims, that is, an anti-
secular stance rather than revision or renovation of rigid classic secularization. 
Such phenomena could indicate a postmodern post-secular turn. 
In contrast, here, when we speak of “post-secular”, this means a reconstructive 
refurbished potential and possibility of religion, as an attempt to defend the 
modern project against the danger of its own secularist derailment, not 
involvement in re-enchantment phenomena while abandoning the possibility 
of modern reflexivity on religion.196  
In conclusion, with regard to empirical-sociological diagnoses, despite the ill-
defined delineation, if the post-secular is taken not as another attempt at 
religious reformulation from an anti-secular perspective nor as historical 
                                           
195 Jacques Derrida, Acts of Religion, edited with an introduction by Gil Anidjar (London: Routledge, 2001); Jacques 
Derrida and Gianni Vattimo(eds.), Religion, trans. David Webb (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998); Jane 
Bennett, The Enchantment of Modern Life (Princeton: Princeton UP, 2001). 
196 See Jürgen Habermas, Between Naturalism and Religion, trans. Ciaran Cronin (Cambridge and Malden: Polity, 
2008), Chapter 4. 
131 
periodization, but rather as a project to shift perception and a marker for a 
timely theoretical and pragmatic problem, this opens up a new vantage point 
on its interpretation and potential uses, one that might allow new forms of 
engagement with religion as an ambiguous and abiding phenomenon in the 
global public domain. In that sense, post-secular questioning surpasses the 
antinomy between faith and reason, between the immanent and the 
transcendent, and between the private and the public. It seems to me that a 
more productive way forward is to look for alternative, less problematic ways 
of understanding transformation and continuity in religion - without necessarily 
implying a radical antagonism between the religious and the secular, or 
referring to a certain era or area. Consequently, the thesis of secularization 
has yet to be replaced with plausible scenarios of a religious future related to 
the transformation of Christianity, not the death of God, or the return of God. 
This will be dealt with empirically and hermeneutically in Chapter 3 of this 
research.  
From the normative perspective, the salient point of the post-secular is 
that religion retains its significance. The insights and praxis commitments of 
religion should be appreciated in the public sphere. Thus, it can be said that 
religion in a post-secular context offers a world view and principles of life in the 
form of reasoning rather than obligation.197  
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In conclusion, in this research, post-secular discourse can be best understood 
as a change in the spectrum of consciousness and possibilities, 
“epistemologically attuned” to re-modernities by a thoroughly reflexive infra-
secularity, not as a clear position driven by a strong anti-secular thrust.198   
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Chapter 3. The Transformation of Christianity  
Contrary to the most recent arguments of the secularization theory, that at long 
last religion is beginning to disappear, it is becoming increasingly evident that 
Christianity is still a feature of our world, and has been transforming itself into 
new forms with new characteristics and new religiosity. In addition, its current 
visibility is arousing renewed interest in the place and role of religion in the 
public sphere. We need to note here that such an undeniable social fact will 
have far-reaching effects upon the faith, practice, and study of religion.199 
Therefore, it is reasonable to suppose that, instead of focusing on trends of 
growth or decline in religious belief and practices throughout the world, study 
should be directed towards the changing morphology of Christianity and its 
religiosity. This approach is based on the post-secular perspective discussed 
in the previous chapters. Here, “post-secular” does not denote any generalized 
definition or meaning, but refers to the specific concept applied in this research. 
It means neither the secular nor the non-secular, neither the death of the 
religious nor the triumph of the religious over modernity, but rather a 
transformation of religion that entails new forms, religiosity, features, locations, 
and roles of religion, and a new consciousness according to those changes.200  
How then, is Christianity transforming itself in the world today? What are the 
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typologies of the most recent stages of Christianity? How can we best 
explicate the transformation of Christianity and understand it in a post-secular 
perspective? What is the place of Christianity in contemporary society? 
 
It is generally agreed that it is impossible to denote one single, uniform, and 
all embracing pattern in Christian church transformation, and none of the many 
possible definitions of Christian faith seem to describe any one of the churches 
or Christian modes of living analysed in this study.201 The multiplicities and 
differences run deep below the surface, and the typologies of contemporary 
Christianity are diverse, depending on historical process, socio-political 
environment, cultural patterns, and denominational position. The tighter the 
description, the more contradictions surface, and the more ambiguous and 
elusive becomes the notion of one of the early core notions of Christianity, ‘the’ 
church. The more one is engaged in the events shaping the history of 
Christianity, the more one is aware of the fluidity of that history, and how trying 
to sketch its portrait is like trying to paint on a flowing stream.  
In such circumstances, rather than taking a one-sided approach, such as 
revisionist or secularist, to the changeable landscapes of Christianity, or 
articulating a clear delineation between churches, sects and cults, it is much 
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more important and valid to describe the various trends and characteristics of 
the transformation of Christianity in our global age, and to scrutinize the key 
controversial issues of such transformation phenomena, locating their 
“religious and social mobilizations” as energetic points of the transformation of 
Christianity, 202  and then trying to discern just where those changes are 
leading.203  
This chapter examines the trajectory of the morphological transformation of 
Christianity and developments in the relations between Christianity and 
secular belief and institutions. Reflection on such changes in religious milieus 
is closely related to exploring the place of religion in contemporary society, as 
well as the rethinking of boundaries between the religious and the non-
religious, between the orthodox and the heretical, and between denominations. 
3.1. The Changes of Religious Milieus  
In order to elucidate the morphological transformation of Christianity as it 
relates to the place of Christian faith in the contemporary age, an intellectual 
understanding of how religious milieus change is a pivotal foundation. Such 
changes may be categorized under three main headings, in terms of the major 
                                           
202 Charles Taylor, “Religious Mobilizations”, Public Culture, Vol. 18.2 (2006): 281-300. 
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aspects and tendencies of religious transformation. These are: 1) the 
inextricable link between the secular and the religious, 2) the dissolution of 
denominational milieus and intra-religious boundaries, and 3) the 
reinvigoration of global religious denominationalism and trans-denominational 
boundaries.  
3.1.1. The Inextricable Link between the Secular and the Religious 
Fundamental to the ongoing changes of religious milieus are the 
deconstruction of the paradigmatic epistemological framework in which the 
religious is assumed to be a residual category, the other of the secular, and 
the blurring and dissolution of the boundaries between the secular and the 
religious.204 Indeed, we can grasp a new, more profound awareness of the 
inextricable link between the secular and the religious by contemplating 
secularization and religious revitalization as “ongoing mutually constituted 
global process rather than as mutually exclusive developments”, 205  and 
further by reflecting the integrating process of religiosity through the 
transformation of religion into secular religiosity or religious secularity.206 The 
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latest researches, especially of sociologists of religion such as David Martin 
and Grace Davie in Great Britain, Detlef Pollack, Hans Joas, and Ulrich Beck 
in Germany, Danièle Hervieu-Léger in France, and José Casanova in Canada, 
have demonstrated both theoretically and empirically that the religious and the 
secular are inextricably linked.207 This recognition is evident in the pervasive 
discussion of the term “post-secular”. 
On the one hand, we acknowledge and have to concede that loss of social 
significance of religion (the process of secularization), marked by the decline 
of traditional religious thinking, practice and institution, especially church-
linked religion, is indeed in progress at the individual, social, and institutional 
level.208 On the other hand, taking a global comparative perspective,209 it is 
also clear that there exists a countervailing intensification of religion, as well 
as much reflection upon the internal transformation of Christianity in high 
modern society. 210  In this respect, loss of religious significance and 
                                           
207  David Martin, The Future of Christianity; Detlef Pollack and Gert Pickel, “Religious Individualization or 
Secularization?: Testing Hypotheses of Religious Change – The Case of Eastern and Western Germany”, British 
Journal of Sociology, Vol. 58. 4 (2008): 603-32; Detlef Pollack and Daniel V.A. Olson (eds.), The Role of Religion 
in Modern Societies (New York and Abingdon: Routledge, 2008); Ulrich Beck, A God of One’s Own (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 2008), pp.39-40; Danièle Hervieu-Léger, “In Search of Certainties”; Grace Davie, “New Approaches 
in the Sociology of Religion: A Western Perspective”, Social Compass, Vol. 51.1 (2004): 73–84; José Casanova, 
“The Secular, Secularization, Secularisms”, in Craig Calhoun, Mark Juergensmeyer and Joanathan Van Antwerpen 
(eds.), Rethinking Secularism (Oxford and NY: Oxford University Press, 2011); Hans Joas, Faith as an Option: 
Possible Futures for Christianity, trans. Alex Skinner (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2012). 
208 Even if the debate on the interpretation of the observable processes of change in the area of religion is still in 
full swing, researchers are agreed in one respect. It is undisputed that the observable religious change in western 
Europe is characterized by a general de-churchification, i.e. an abandonment of the traditional churches by large 
numbers of the population. This assertion is supported by numerous empirical studies (see for example, 
Jagodzinski and Dobbelaere [1995], Davie [1994, 2000, 2002], Bruce [1996, 2002], McLeod and Ustorf [2003], 
Pickel and Müller [2009], Pollack [2009]).  
209 José Casanova, “Rethinking Secularization: A Global Comparative Perspective”, The Hedgehog Review, Vol. 8 
(Spring & Summer, 2006): 7-22. 
210 Detlef Pollack and Gert Pickel, “Religious Individualization or Secularization?”; Detlef Pollack and Daniel V.A. 
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reawakening of religious vitality can coincide, and are not mutually exclusive. 
The trend toward the decline of religious significance has been documented 
by so many researchers that it is hardly necessary to re-articulate it here. We 
need to balance the decline of religion with revitalization in order to understand 
the developments in both of them, not losing sight of any of the multiple 
aspects of either. 
First, from a global comparative and quantitative perspective, it is a notable 
fact that a new global vitality of Christianity has been spreading rapidly in the 
non-western world, so that many people are now talking about a “comeback 
of the gods” or “revival of religion”. Some scholars, especially religious 
protectionists, regard such numerical growth of global Christianity by 
conservative rallying as a triumph of religious authenticity over modernization, 
maintaining that religious institutions have survived and even flourished 
insofar as they have not tried to adapt themselves to the alleged requirements 
of a secularized world.211 However, it is self-deceptive and self-contradictory 
to interpret a new global vitality of Christianity in simple terms as the success 
of religiosity over the secular. It is also wrong to assume that religion 
disappeared in the past and returned again only recently. Rather, the varieties 
of religious vitalities at the global level have brought into question the classical 
secularization expectation that the more modern a society is, the more secular 
                                           
Olson (eds.), The Role of Religion in Modern Societies. 
211  Peter L. Berger, “The Desecularization of the World: A Global Overview”, in Peter L. Berger (ed.), The 
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and the less religious it will be. Furthermore, it can be argued that the decline 
of the institutional churches is not the result of modern development, and does 
not presage the demise of religion.  
Secondly, in the qualitative aspect, the secular frame by no means expels the 
religious entirely from the public sphere. Rather, as allegiance to the traditional 
religious institutions declines, we are witnessing nevertheless the persistence 
of religious beliefs and the vitalization of new individualized forms of 
religiosity.212 This is not a return of the religion that disappeared in the past, 
nor a reinstatement of the previous status of religious dominance, but involves 
the emergence of very different types of religious dynamics. Hervieu-Léger 
argues that secularization allows the re-composition of religion through the 
whole process of decomposition, rather than the extinction of religion.213 Such 
religious (re-)vitalization is above all linked with a transformation of religion 
that entails new modes of believing and religiosity, and different institutional 
structures of religious communities.214 In this vein, Casanova argues that 
sociology of religion should be more attuned to the new religious forms, the 
product of diverse and manifold transformations, rather than the exaggerated 
triumph of religious revival or an obsession with the decline of religion.215 A 
                                           
212 Ronald Inglehart and Wayne E. Baker, “Modernization, Cultural Change and the Persistence of Traditional 
Values”, American Sociological Review, Vol.65.1 (February, 2000):19-51; Robert Wuthnow, After Heaven: 
Spirituality in America since the 1950s (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998). 
213 Grace Davie and Danièle Hervieu-Léger, Identités Religieuses en Europe (Paris: La Découverte, 1996), pp.18-
19.  
214 José Casanova, “The Religious Situation in Europe”, pp.206-228. 
215 José Casanova, Rethinking Secularization: A Global Comparative Perspective”, The Hedgehog Review, Vol. 8, 
(Spring & Summer, 2006): 7-22, p.17; “Rethinking Secularization”.  
140 
novel epistemic internal change followed by recognition of such religious 
change will serve to shape and encode the new public interest in religion and 
diverse global secular practices with the socio-political relevance of religion. 
Moreover, a wider assessment of the transformation of religion will discourage 
the drawing of a fixed binary divide and the mutual “othering” of faith and the 
secular.  
Consequently, it can be said that contemporary religious changes go beyond 
dichotomous phenomena between the religious and the secular; indeed, it 
may become difficult to draw proper boundaries between the two. As an 
important recognition of ambivalence between the religious and the secular, 
we need to bear in mind that the decline of traditional religious institutions does 
not always mean “the death of Christianity”. The churches as an organizational 
structure are not dying; they are merely losing their previous function and form. 
Their life force is in the people, irrespective of whether they are within or 
outside the institutionalized church. It is not the Church with a capital C that 
dies, that is, not Christianity itself, but the churches, as inherited social forms 
of Christian institution. In this vein, it is appropriate to begin a discussion of 
global religious and secular trends with the recognition of a paradox, rather 
than vague and over-used habits of classification.216 Werner Ustorf contends 
that words like “secular” and “religious” have increasingly become language 
fossils, “terminological survivals of the power games of previously dominant 
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groups: the established churches and the culture of agnostic liberalism”, which 
are both currently losing their power to control minds.217 In this sense, the 
religious research paradigm of binary classification such as “religious/secular” 
and “sacred/profane” is not helpful in trying to understand contemporary 
religious change.218 Furthermore, characterizing the religious in simple terms 
is no longer tenable. Rather, the process of secularization and the persistence 
or new visibility of religion may be viewed as complementary developments 
constituted through mutual reciprocal infusion rather than as necessarily 
mutually exclusive processes.219  
 
In conclusion, we need a better and more appropriate understanding of the 
changes of religious milieus in this global age, one that goes beyond 
dichotomous approaches. To achieve this we must revisit the diverse patterns 
of secularization, the varieties of religious re-visibilities, the reciprocal infusion 
of the religious and the secular and their mutual constitution throughout the 
world. A new understanding based on these changes can open up new vistas 
to interpret the current location and role of Christianity, not only in terms of the 
statistical contours of religious change or superficial crisis, but also in terms of 
religious quality. 
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In this respect, there are three important points to be considered in our 
revisiting of the transformation of Christianity. First, from a global comparative 
perspective, it is clear that there has been a numerical growth in non-western 
Christianity.220 The other two points are the transformative phenomena of 
Christian morphology with regard to internal qualitative aspects: the 
mushrooming of implicit Christianity 221  and the more radical shift from 
religious Christianity to an exteriorization of Christian faith distinct from 
historical and doctrinal inertias.222 
3.1.2. The Dissolution of Denominational Milieus and Intra-
Religious Boundaries  
Another notable change of the current religious landscape is the dissolution of 
traditional denominational milieus. Until the 1960s, denomination was a very 
large part of what it meant to be Christian. People were Catholics, Orthodox, 
or Protestants, and in the reformed churches they were Baptists, Methodists, 
or Presbyterians as much as they were Christians. In other words, their 
Christian identity was inseparable from these denominational traditions.223  
However, denominational boundaries between intra-religious entities have 
diminished and have frequently become rather blurred in the minds of 
                                           
220 See section 3.2.1.  
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believers.224 The change in confessional milieus is indicated by the statistics 
on marriage patterns, which show that the majority of new marriages are now 
“interfaith”.225 Moreover, fewer people remain in the denominations in which 
they were raised, fewer families are successful in passing on their traditional 
faith, fewer people think that their own denomination has a better grasp on the 
truth than other denominations, and fewer denominations impose creedal tests 
that people must meet in order to become members or participate. In brief, 
today, the role of religious denominations is indeed in decline at both the 
individual and the religious-societal level, and the dissolution of 
denominational milieus impedes the success of religious transmission and 
generation. As a result, Christianity can become at odds with itself, especially 
when leaps into the hyper-real are made from very different theological and 
denominational platforms. Thus, growing numbers of churches might be 
characterized as open systems, attempting to embrace everyone while 
imposing little on anyone. 
However, we should note that the dissolution of denominational milieus does 
not necessarily lead to the weakening of intensity of confessional faith, nor to 
the atrophying of religious communities. Rather, paradoxically, these changes 
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paved “the fascinating byways of religion” for the emergence of new Christian 
churches, implicit religious communities based on Christian faith, and new 
Christian social movements that cannot be assigned to any major traditional 
denomination.226  
In addition, we have to note the other side of the same coin, whereby the 
dissolution of denominational milieus and intra-religious boundaries has 
coincided with “the reinvigoration of global religious denominationalism”.227 
While some intra-religious boundaries are being dissolved, others are being 
reinforced. Such a new mode of mapping allows for the representation of 
transnational Christian communities. In certain aspects, this tendency implies 
an increasing division between Christians and non-Christians, sustained by 
people of faith who focus on differences between themselves and the “other” 
traditions around them.  
The discursive landscape of religion has become an undisputable global social 
fact, and the emerging diverse expressions of faith are ever more widespread. 
We should, therefore, exercise caution before rushing to condemn, remaining 
open to the potential of individualism to help vitalize religious life.228 In this 
respect, the questions must be how the validity of the category of religion 
should be re-configured,229 how values can be passed on in new ways amid 
                                           
226 These three phenomena will be discussed in section 3.2 
227 See section 3.1.3 below. 
228 Hans Joas, Do We Need Religion?: On the Experience of Self-Transcendence (Boulder and London: Paradigm 
Publisher, 2008). 
229 Peter Beyer, Religions in Global Society (London: Routledge, 2006); Richard Madsen, “What Is Religion?: 
145 
such a changing landscape, and how they can arise anew through new 
experiences.  
3.1.3. The Reinvigoration of Global Religious Denominationalism 
and Trans-Denominational Boundaries  
As mentioned above, we are currently witnessing a dissolution of traditional 
denominational milieus between intra-religious entities at both societal and 
individual level; yet simultaneously the “globalization of Christianity” continues, 
and a “global trans-denominational Christian milieu” is beginning to emerge.230 
As a result, parallel to the dissolution of intra-religious boundaries, new 
boundaries are being formulated. As such, the invigoration of a global religious 
system can be construed as “global denominationalism”.231 
In fact, the development of modern transportation and communications allows 
for interactive process and coordination of activities regardless of geographical 
distance, thus facilitating a global system of religions; more directly, through 
world-wide migrations, world religions like Christianity, Islam and Buddhism 
are undergoing global transformations, with an interplay of influence between 
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the traditional home indigenous religious culture, and the diaspora. This 
phenomenon of global denominationalism is different from the globalization 
brought about through European colonial expansion in that it is an “interrelated 
reciprocal process of particularistic differentiation, universalistic claims and 
mutual recognition”. In other words, the present global denominationalism of 
Christianity can no longer be viewed simply as the transplantation of western 
Christianity. 
Rather, the truly novel aspect of the present-day Christian milieus is their 
characterization not by the denominational platforms and spatial concentration 
of the past, but more by the development of global trans-denominational 
Christianity. As Casanova has noted, the newly emerging religious 
phenomena demonstrate that “all world religions can be reconstituted for the 
first time truly as de-territorialized global imagined communities, detached 
from the civilizational settings in which they were traditionally embedded”.232 
He specifies this proliferation of de-territorialized, de-centred, transnational, 
global imagined communities as “a challenge of emerging global 
denominationalism” to “the patterns of European secularization as well as the 
patterns of confessional territorialization”.233 
An obvious manifestation of an “emerging global denominationalism” of 
Christianity may be found in the global trans-denominational milieus of 
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Catholicism, which have been reconstituted as new transnational and de-
territorialized religious forms since the Catholic aggiornamento of the Second 
Vatican Council.234 Until the mid-20th century Catholicism had been viewed 
primarily as a transplanted European institution with characteristics of 
medieval or pre-modern Christendom. However, by embracing 
disestablishment and imposing transnational and trans-denominational 
ecumenical dialogue and interrelationships, the aggiornamento led to a 
fundamental relocation of the Catholic Church from Christendom-oriented 
medieval transnational regime to a new intercommunal-based transnational 
church; from a highly centralized structure to a relatively open global system 
of religion.235 
The worldwide expansion of evangelical Christianity and, more particularly, of 
its potent Pentecostal mutation and charismatic movement, may also serve to 
illustrate equally favourable examples of the reinvigoration of the global trans-
denominational Christian milieu, which is closely related to the emergence of 
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a global society, as Martin, Joas and Casanova have noted.236 Such newly 
emerging global Christianity has no particular territorial roots or identity, no 
historical links to tradition or centralized religious regime, and can therefore 
“make itself at home anywhere in the globe where the Spirit moves”.237  
In the same way, other branches of Christianity, other world religions, and 
even the many new forms of hybrid globalized religions, could be seen against 
a similar landscape of global trans-denominational and transnational milieus 
as a response to the same global processes, but with their own peculiar 
transformations. Particularism, even localism, on the one side, and 
cosmopolitism and universalism on the other, not only coexist but very often 
progress side-by-side in the development of trans-denominational milieus and 
supra-denominational boundaries. 
However, we need to bear in mind that “global denominationalism” comprises 
two distinctly contrasting movements. There is, on the one hand, a reinforcing 
of inter-religious boundaries between those who talk of Christian faith, 
irrespective of traditional denominational settings, and those who talk of 
general spirituality, of other religious faith and of no religious faith. Thus, the 
divide between Christians and non-Christians becomes wider and deeper. 
This is being seen as global denominational Christianity linked to a modern 
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understanding of Christianity, sustained by people of faith who focus on 
differences between “we” and “others”. On the other hand, there are 
increasingly diverse ecumenical journeys into global Christianity, allowing the 
churches to deepen their commitment to visible unity by sharing in the variety 
of spiritual experience of churches around the world, respecting each other’s 
traditions and cultures, and inspiring and being inspired to renew their 
commitments to justice and peace by promoting in-depth discussion on issues 
of common concern. Such attitudes are enshrined primarily in public 
statements of the World Council of Churches (WCC).238 Casanova critically 
reflects upon this contrasting tendency of “global denominationalism”: 
Actually, one finds practically everywhere similar tensions between the 
protectionist impulse to claim religious monopoly over national and 
civilizational territories, and the ecumenical impulse to present one’s own 
particular religion as the response to the universal needs of global humanity. 
Transnational migrations and the emergence of Diasporas of all world 
religions beyond their civilizational territories make this tension visible 
everywhere.239  
As he reminds us, “global denominationalism” displays a dual process of anti-
modern fundamentalism resisting a global secular modernization, and 
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ecumenical trans-denominational movements as a response to the 
emergence of a global society. These come to compete with one another in 
the new global system of religion. However, the two distinctly contrasting 
processes are not confined to certain denominations, but operate according to 
trans-denominational boundaries. Thus, it is becoming harder to draw lines 
between the differences. 
Therefore, we need to improve our understanding of the emerging global 
denominationalism of multiple modernities, and to manage it carefully. In the 
normative sense, we must begin to set out the more desirable way of global 
denominationalism, no matter how difficult this might be, especially in a 
postmodern context in which distinguishing between right and wrong, the 
proper and the improper, is itself considered another kind of totalitarianism that 
runs counter to the general request for tolerance. Consequently, it is 
necessary to revise the conception of a global secularism that brands all forms 
of global denominational Christianity as modern fundamentalism odds with 
modernity, and, instead, to scrutinize the dual process against a more 
multidimensional and reflexive classification. More importantly, all world 
religion of global denominationalism that responds to the global expansion of 
modernity should be re-examined as to whether it represents an exclusive 
reinvigoration of banding together against what is other-religious or non-
religious, or an inclusive intensification of mutual and reciprocal process to 
refurbish traditions in response to the global challenge, and we should 
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contemplate how to contain the global denominationalism of religion as a 
reflexive agent within acceptable limits, so that it does not present a major 
threat to the democratic structures of global civil society. 
3.2. Types of Morphological Transformation of Christianity  
The recent empirical-sociological remarks on the morphological 
transformation of Christianity, in a context where large numbers of people have 
no religion, are reflected in three major trends: 1) the new global vitalization of 
more conservative forms of Christianity: re-invention of explicit Christianity, 2) 
the proliferation of individual spiritual forms of new Christian faith communities 
and movements: the mushrooming of implicit Christianity connected loosely to 
traditional Christian institutions and religiosity, and 3) the social presence of 
faith-based social organization (FBSO) as a civil agent: integrating of 
institutionalized Christian religiosity into new forms of faith-based social 
actions. This research first explores the three types of morphological 
transformation of Christianity and their characteristics, and then discusses 
controversial points in terms of both empirical and normative aspects. 
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3.2.1. The New Global Vitalization of Christianity: Re-invention of 
Explicit Christianity 
3.2.1.1. The Changing Contours of the New Global Vitalization of 
Christianity240 and its Characteristics 
In contraposition to the secularization [Ⅱ] thesis,241 i.e. the decline of religion, 
the most notable phenomenon of the changing landscape of religion is that 
from a global comparative perspective, new vitalized forms of Christianity have 
undergone sizable numerical growth,242 and are becoming widespread at a 
global level.243 Even those contemporary social scientists who continue to 
adhere to the notion of the secularizing effects of modernization, such as 
Ronald Inglehart, a prominent researcher on religious value change, now 
make different kinds of predictions about the global religious situation, taking 
greater account of demographic aspects.244  
A number of scholars, notably theologians such as Brian Stanley (2004), 
Andrew Walls (2004), Harvey Cox (1996), Wilbert Shenk (1995) and Paul 
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remarks on a new religious trend in his article, “The Future of Christianity”. 
244 Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011). 
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Freston (2001); sociologists such as Grace Davie (2002), David Martin (1990, 
1999, 2002, 2004) and Hans Joas (2009, 2011); Gilles Kepel (1994) and 
anthropologist Philip Jenkins (2002, 2006),245 are observing and noting a new 
vitalization of religious belief in connection with the global development of 
Christianity, however they might construe such "globalization of Christianity". 
Hans Joas presents a clear summary of this phenomenon:  
From a global perspective, then, there is absolutely no reason to take a 
despairing view of Christianity’s prospects of survival. In fact, it appears that 
we are witnessing one of the most intensive periods of the dissemination of 
Christianity in its entire history.246 
To explore the most recent changes in the global Christian landscape, we can 
look for instance at the figures for demographic changes in the world Christian 
population and its distribution by region, as reported by the World Christian 
Encyclopedia (see Tables 3-1, 3-2, and 3-3). 
<Table 3-1> Demographic Changes of Global Christianity, 1970-2020 
Adherents (%) 1970 1980 2000 2020 
World population 3,610,034,            4,373,917,            6,259,642,            7,656,531,   
Global Christianity 1,216,579,           (33.7)   1,432,686,           (32.8)   2,019,921,           (32.3) 2,550,714, (33.3) 
Source: David B. Barrett and Todd M. Johnson, World Christian Trends AD30-AD2200: Interpreting the 
Annual Christian Megacensus (Pasadena: William Carey Library, 2001); Center for the Study of Global 
Christianity, Christianity in its Global Context, 1970–2020: Society, Religion, and Mission (South 
Hamilton: Gordon-Conwell Theological Seminary, 2013) / Numbers are given in thousands. 
Overall, a body of data indicates the continuing vitalization of Christianity, 
                                           
245 See Bibliography. 
246 Hans Joas, Faith as an Option, p.122. 
154 
which seems to disprove secularization [Ⅱ].247 In fact, the vitalization of global 
Christianity is central to a present observation of religious landscapes with a 
global perspective. 
<Table 3-2> Distribution of the World’s Christian Population, by Continent and Region 
Continent 1970 1980 2000 2020 
Africa 142,962, 11.8 203,490, 14.2 393,326, 19.5 630,644, 24.7 
Asia 90,792, 7.5 128,078, 8.9 224,601, 11.1 420,390, 16.4 
Europe 491,144, 40.3 512,327, 35.7 549,504, 27.2 580,305, 22.7 
L. America 267,383, 22.0 348,658, 24.3 571,157, 28.3 600,553, 23.5 
N. America 206,443, 17.0 219,833, 15.3 253,589, 12.6 288,005, 11.2 
Oceania 17,851, 1.5 20,298, 1.4 27,741, 1.4 30,818, 1.2 
Global Christianity      1,216,579, 100      1,432,686,   100 2,019,921, 100 2,550,714, 100 
Source: David B. Barrett, George T. Kurian, and Todd M. Johnson, World Christian Encyclopedia, 2nd 
ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001). / Numbers are given in thousands. 
The statistics also show quite clearly the numerical growth of the Christian 
church in Asia, Africa and Latin America, although the overall numbers are 
difficult to determine.248 In what is called the Global South - Africa, Asia (such 
as the Philippines, the Pacific Rim, South Korea, and China) and Latin America, 
we see the (re-)surgence of global Christianity to an extraordinary degree. 
Hans Joas describes this situation as follows: 
Current estimates say that the number of Christians in Africa is increasing by 
23,000 people per day. While this includes births, conversions account for 
more than one-sixth of this figure. The proportion of Christians among the 
                                           
247 See Chapter 2. 
248 See David B. Barrett, George T. Kurian, and Todd M. Johnson, World Christian Encyclopedia, 2nd ed.; Sandra 
Stencel (et al.), Global Christianity: A Report on the Size and Distribution of the World’s Christian Population 
(Washington D.C.: Pew Research Center, 2011), also available at http://pewforum.org/Christian/Global-
Christianity-worlds-christian-population.aspx.; Center for the Study of Global Christianity, Christianity in its Global 
Context, 1970–2020: Society, Religion, and Mission (South Hamilton: Gordon-Conwell Theological Seminary, 
2013), also available at www.globalchristianity.org/globalcontext.; Philip Jenkins, The Next Christendom: The 
Coming of Global Christianity. The data come primarily from an analysis of the two largest collections of religious 
demographic data. 
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African population rose from 25 to 46 per cent from 1965 to 2001. While it is 
certainly the case that statistics on religion are not extremely reliable, what 
they say about trends appears to be undeniable. In Asia, too, Christianity has 
had some amazing success stories, probably most spectacularly in South 
Korea. …In Latin America, the triumphant success of Pentecostalism and of 
Protestant sects is evidently more than a short-term phenomenon. These 
play a large role, particularly for women, who hope they will bring about 
a "reformation des machismo" . Thus, from a global perspective, there is no 
reason at all to question Christianity's chances of survival. On the contrary, it 
appears that we are witnessing one of the most intensive phases of 
Christianity's dissemination in its entire history.249 
From the accumulated research on this recent current, we can intimate the 
characteristics of the new global vitalization of Christianity.  
<Table 3-3> The Demographic Changes of Christianity by Traditional Denominations 
and New Movements 
 Annual change, 1990-2000 2000 2025 2050  
Denomination N C Total R A % A % A % Cn 
All Christians 22 2 25 1.36 1,999 33 2,616 33.4 3,051 34.3 238 
Roman 
Catholics 
13 -355 12 1.29 1,057 17.5 1,361 17.4 1,564 17.6 235 
Independents 4 3 8 2.49 385 6.4 581 7.4 752 8.5 221 
Protestants 4 0.3 4 1.44 342 5.6 468 6 574 6.4 233 
Orthodox 0.7 0.3 1  0.54 215 3.6 252 3.2 266 3 135 
Anglicans 1 0.7 1 1.56 79 1.3 113 1.5 145 1.6 166 
Marginal 
Christians 
0.2 0.1 0.4 1.79 26 0.4 45 0.6 62 0.7 215 
Trans-Megabloc Groups    
Evangelicals 2 0.8 0.3  1.97 210 3.5 327 4.2 448 5 5 
Pentecostals/ 
Charismatics 
7 2 0.9  2.1 523 8.7 811 10.4 1,066 12 238 
Global 
population 
78 0 78 1 6,055 100 7,823 100 8,909 100 238 
(N= Natural / C= Conversion / R= Rate / A= Adherents / Cn= Countries / Numbers are given in Millions) 
Source: David B. Barrett and Todd M. Johnson, World Christian Trends AD30-AD2200: Interpreting the 
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Annual Christian Megacensus (Pasadena: William Carey Library, 2001) 
From Table 3-3, it is clear that evangelical Christianity, its potent Pentecostal 
mutation, and charismatic movements, are growing dramatically in countries 
where this type of religion was previously unknown or very marginal. The 
worldwide expansion of such Christian movements has been of major 
significance over the last three or four decades.250  
This type of religious movement is also the liveliest sector even in the 
developed western world, whether we speak of Britain, Holland, the United 
States, or Australia. It is also notable in parts of Eastern Europe, notably 
Romania.251  
However, as Martin describes, the persistence and revitalization of Christianity 
refers not to the older, more staid evangelicalism that adhered to traditional 
sources of religious authority, but to movements offering what are called the 
“gift of the Spirit”, such as healing, prophecy, and speaking in tongues; or to 
myriad versions of the older mainstream churches in renewal, which 
unambiguously represent a spill-over of spirituality, great religious passion, 
individual heart work, inward feeling, and ecstatic religiosity. There is an 
abundance of quite local small churches, as well as thriving mega-churches, 
                                           
250 David Martin, “The Evangelical Upsurge and Its Political Implication”, in Peter L. Berger (ed.), Desecularization 
of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1999); Peter L. Berger, 
Desecularization of the World: a Global Overview, in Peter L. Berger (ed.), Desecularization of the World: 
Resurgent Religion and World Politics, p.9. 
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often with a neo-Pentecostal emphasis on health and wealth.252  
Moreover, the Christian groups that have seen steady growth on the global 
stage over the last three or four decades, notably the evangelical and 
Pentecostal movements, are morally and theologically conservative. These 
groups are precisely those that rejected an aggiornamento with modernity, 
rather than adapting to the Zeitgeist defined by progressive intellectuals. Peter 
Berger makes the point that the vitality of conservative religious groups is 
cognate with the relative decline of liberal groups that have attempted to 
conform to modernity as defined by progressive intellectuals, taking the United 
States as an example.253 Won-kyu Lee also indicates, in empirical research 
on Korea, that theological conservatism is closely related to socio-political 
conservatism and ethical conservatism.254 The results of his research reveal 
the intimate correlation between religious consciousness and social 
consciousness. Therefore, although we cannot say that all evangelicals take 
a conservative socio-political stance, certainly all socio-political conservative 
institutions and churches in Protestantism clearly belong to evangelical 
                                           
252 David Martin, “The Evangelical Upsurge and Its Political Implication”. 
253 Peter Berger describes their character as follows: “On the international religious scene, it is conservative or 
orthodox or traditional movements that are on the rise almost everywhere. These movements are precisely the 
ones that rejected an aggiornamento with modernity as defined by progressive intellectuals. Conversely, religious 
movements and institutions that have made great efforts to conform to a perceived modernity are almost 
everywhere on the decline. In the US this has been a much commented upon fact, exemplified by the decline of 
so-called mainline Protestantism and the concomitant rise of Evangelicalism; but the United States is by no means 
unusual in this.” Peter L. Berger, “The Desecularization of the World: A Global Overview”, p.6; David Martin, “The 
Evangelical Upsurge and Its Political Implication”, p.37.  
254 See Won-kyu Lee, “Jongkyoseonggwa Sahoegyecheungui Gwangyee Daehan Gyeongheomjeok Yungu” [An 




Another characteristic of evangelical and Pentecostal Christianity is its 
substantial political presence. Indeed, the groups that have advocated the 
separation of religion and state no longer reject politics as an unspiritual 
business, but rather embrace political activism as a sacred calling.256 They 
have effectively invented new ideologies and forms of religiously inspired 
political engagement. For examples of the evangelical impact on politics, this 
research relies on a variety of sources, but in particular on the work of Paul 
Freston on Asia, Africa and Latin America.257  
The statistics indicating a dramatic and sustained growth in Christianity, 
especially in the non-western world, are undeniable, as is the fact that the 
emerging Christianity is largely rooted in a religiously conservative stance that 
adheres to a religious structure and system. These developments may mark 
a turning point in attitudes toward and recognition of religion, affecting 
Christians in Europe in a wide variety of ways. A number of recent works in 
the sociology of religion, notably in France, Britain, and Scandinavia, have 
questioned the term “secularization”, as applied to these developments.258  
                                           
255 It is incorrect, or even dangerous, to mix the theological level directly with the socio-political in classifying the 
progressive-conservative attitude. For example, a progressive theological sect emphasizing the need for social 
participation and responsibility is not always liberal, and fundamentalists do not intend to turn to political 
progressiveness, even though they affirmed the need for social participation some time ago.   
256 Monica Duffy Toft, Daniel Philpott, and Timothy Samuel Shah, God’s Century: Resurgent Religion and Global 
Politics (New York and London: Norton & Company, 2011), p.13; David Martin, “The Evangelical Upsurge and Its 
Political Implication”, p.39. 
257 Paul Freston, Evangelicals and Politics in Asia, Africa and Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001). 
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While these facts are not in dispute, however, there are a variety of 
explanations offered for the numerical expansion of global Christianity in 
particular forms of denominations, faith characteristics, and their socio-political 
implications. Moreover, there is no consensus as to the accompanying 
attitudes on socio-political issues, nor on the impact on global Christianity and 
its future shape. In order to examine this further, the basic method is to analyse 
and interpret the historical sources and sociological materials in each 
particular socio-political context.  
3.2.1.2. The Key Controversial Points and a Critical Reflection on the New 
Global Vitalization of Christianity 
The new global vitalization of Christianity raises a number of important 
questions. First: “Has secularization gone into reverse?” On the one hand, 
secularists contend that religion continues to decline. They claim that the 
phenomenon of religious revitalization occurred late in modern society, and 
that religion’s very activism and ferocity are signs of weakness, not revival.259 
If the “declinists” are right, we might as well end this study here. Religion does 
not require our attention if it is on the verge of dying. At most, its vigorous 
vitality makes it a temporary and occasionally destructive nuisance, not a 
subject for systematic inquiry.  On the other hand, however, other scholars 
and commentators argue that “revival” or “comeback” is the salient empirical 
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fact about religion today. Religious protectionist demographers have 
themselves devised schemes based on successive waves of Christian 
expansion and recession. Such views are represented most strikingly in, for 
example, Gilles Kepel’s The Revenge of God: Resurgence of Islam, 
Christianity and Judaism in the Modern World (1994) and God is Back by 
Economist editors, John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge, published in 
2009.260 Gilles Kepel grasps this situation as follows: 
Around 1975 the whole process [of secularization] went into reverse. A new 
religious approach took shape, aimed not only at adapting to secular values 
but at recovering a sacred foundation for the organization of society—by 
changing society if necessary. Expressed in a multitude of ways, this 
approach advocated moving on from a modernism that had failed, attributing 
its setbacks and dead ends to separation from God. The theme was no longer 
aggiornamento but a ‘second evangelization of Europe’.261 
Kepel and others maintain that what has in fact occurred is that, by and large, 
religious institutions have survived and even flourished insofar as they have 
not tried to adapt themselves to the alleged requirements of a secularized 
world. They interpret the temporary numerical success of the conservative rally 
of Protestantism as a triumph of religious authenticity over modernization.  
Indeed, despite the clear resurgence and resilience of religion, the thriving 
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Christianity in many parts of Asia, Africa, and Latin America does not 
automatically falsify the secularization thesis. It simply means that the 
constellation of causal factors that produced secularization in the West is not 
present in many Asian, African, and Latin American societies. The different 
kinds of church organization and theology are bound up in different historical 
and socio-cultural contexts depending on spatial-temporal condition, just as 
the secularization process was in Europe. Moreover, there is no consensus as 
to the associated attitudes towards socio-political issues, nor on the impact on 
the shape of global Christianity, its religious characteristics, its social 
consequences or its future. Taking the historical context of far eastern Asia as 
an example, a lot depends, just as in the West or indeed anywhere, on the 
relation of Christianity to nationalism. In Korea, Christianity, particularly 
evangelical Presbyterianism, lay at the heart of Korean national revival in the 
context of Japanese and Chinese domination, whereas in Japan Christianity 
was seen as foreign and threatening. At the beginning of Korea’s era of 
modernization, Scottish and Canadian Presbyterians helped create the 
education system.262 In Taiwan Christianity was held severely in check by an 
oppressive nationalist government, and in Singapore it was tightly controlled 
                                           
262 Christianity has been praised as having led the movement toward democracy, nationalism, and human rights in 
Korea. Protestant Christianity was in the vanguard of the movement for independence from Japanese occupation, 
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by a government that wanted all religions to provide order and cohesion. In all 
these societies Christianity was associated with modern welfare and education, 
even when it was only a small minority religion as in Japan. The various 
manifestations of resurgent Christianity cannot be defined as one formation, a 
particular denomination, but rather as a much more fragmented Christian 
culture, and the transformation of Christianity is a historically conditioned 
phenomenon that varies from country to country. 
To conclude, both assumptions are incorrect. It cannot be said that 
secularization is a universal and general process, while at the same time, new 
global vitalizations of Christianity can be presented as evidence either for or 
against secularization. It is self-deceptive and self-contradictory to describe 
these developments of conservative Christianity as triumphalism of religion 
over modernization. José Casanova prudently warns against any wholesale 
abandonment of the secularization thesis.263 Therefore, sociologists should 
be careful not to commit the opposite mistake of assuming that every form of 
religious renewal is automatically evidence of re-sacralization.  If we are to 
understand more fully the possible place of Christianity in the 21st century, the 
problem must be pursued further. 
The second question is: “Might the global vitalization of Christianity be a re-
invention of traditional Christianity as a manifestation of the post-secular, or a 
revelation of religious fundamentalism, or a new religious phenomenon that 
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can be termed a “syncretistic movement”?  In fact, consideration of this 
question may provide an intimation of the possible future of the “global 
vitalization of Christianity” and of the social niches and meaning it occupies in 
the whole society, rather than an exhaustive and comprehensive assessment 
of it. As aforementioned, the most demographically significant example of the 
global vitalization of Christianity is the expansion of evangelical Christianity 
and its potent mutation, Pentecostalism, and the charismatic movements.264 
Therefore, here we will trace how it has been developed, focusing on the 
recent global expansion of such evangelical mutations, and then discuss 
further whether it is likely to endure, or whether it is just a temporary 
phenomenon of late modernity. Parenthetically, with respect to comparisons 
between Evangelicalism, Pentecostalism, and charismatic movements 
(Ev+Pen+Ch), they are, of course, not entirely self-contained entities, but are 
intermingled, sometimes overlapping, yet not the same things.265 Their global 
development is not simple, but so complicated and discursive that it would 
perhaps seem far-fetched to say that the global vitalization of Christianity is a 
similar consequence of comprehensive historical process. 
The major characteristic of the globally expanding Ev+Pen+Ch is one of 
paradox. First of all, we notice the paradox of religiosity, whereby Ev+Pen+Ch 
neither detaches itself from an ‘explicit’ institutionalized form of the churches, 
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nor attaches itself to any particular form of them. Whereas traditional 
ecclesiologists of the established church emphasized its denominational 
institutional character, in many cases Ev+Pen+Ch do not describe themselves 
as such. Here, one clear fact is that global Christianity is accelerating the 
dissolution of denominational milieus on the one hand, and concurrently 
reinvigorating global religious denominationalism and trans-denominational 
boundaries on the other, as discussed in sections 3.1.2 and 3.1.3. Taking one 
example, “The Pietist and evangelical impulse, particularly in the 
contemporary forms of Pentecostalism, then became indigenized in Latin 
America. There, it created a hybrid and pluralistic Catholic-evangelical pattern 
very different from either western Europe or North America. Eventually it 
became the most expansive form of Christianity in the world.”266 At the same 
time, there are abundant examples of the older mainstream churches in 
renewal, representing a spill-over of the Pentecostal spirit. In this respect, it 
can be read that such changes of Ev+Pen+Ch will occur covertly within the old 
forms, parallel to the kind of changes overtly present in the new ones but within 
a different frame of meaning.  
Another feature of the current global vitalization of Christianity is that it has 
forged a new synthesis between institutionalized religious power and the 
individualization of religion.267 As the self is released from the constraints of 
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extended kin, the continuities of local community, and religious authority, so 
there comes about a heightened sense of individuality.268 For many people, 
the significance of doctrinal and institutional claims, fixed religious truths 
anchored within religious institutions, has undoubtedly diminished in favour of 
the aspiration to be guided by one’s own spiritual experience in matters of faith. 
The sort of Ev+Pen+Ch that is ignited by individual charismatic figures and 
offered by the religiously ardent seems contrary to this individualization of 
religion. However, in contrast to authoritarianism, it is exercised in an 
organization that is lay and participatory, and is interested in emotional and 
empirical impulse rather than dogmatic lesson. In fact, religious 
individualization and committed churchgoing are not mutually exclusive, but 
paradoxically may reinforce each other. In addition, their religiosity combines 
individual spirituality and explicit expectations with rigid moral codes and a 
literal interpretation of the Bible,269 but cuts loose from western professional 
theology as it enables lay people to feed at will on the biblical text. The result 
is a competitive and often highly subjective faith that rivals the assumptions of 
the secular mainstream culture, declares its own religious convictions as 
biblical and, moreover, as “biblical facts”, thus as an alternative to the world of 
the sciences, and aimed at universal dominance. Martin construes this 
tendency of Ev+Pen+Ch as follows: 
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In spite of the reservations of those who regard Pentecostalism as a 
reconstitution of folk religiosity, there is massive evidence to hand to sustain 
the argument that Pentecostalism, in company with evangelicalism and its 
charismatic penumbra, within as well as outside the mainstream churches, 
mobilizes against the horizon of modernity and offers one of the major options 
before contemporary global society.270 
In this perspective, the evangelical mutations as seen in Ev+Pen+Ch can be 
understood as a particular kind of global religious expansion formed by 
varieties of fusion: the church and the non-church forms of Christianity; 
western orthodox theology and indigenous cultural theology (in Martin’s 
expression popular and populist religion that rejects the sponsorship and 
agenda of the post-Protestant and post-Catholic intelligentsias of sometime 
Christendom); the process of individualization and that of institutionalization.  
In summary, the kinds of vitalization of Christianity that are occurring across 
national and ethnic boundaries correspond to a motley assortment of hybrid 
religious forms, pointing to the rise of individualized and spiritual forms of 
religion beyond traditional Christianity. 271  Thus, there is no discernible 
unifying principle. These developments are not directly indicative of the growth 
of fundamentalism, although they include elements of fundamentalist 
orientation and of the irrelevance of intellectualism. Conversely, they do not 
denote a re-invention of explicit Christianity as a manifestation of the post-
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secular. As evangelical mutation, Ev+Pen+Ch bears the paradoxical trait in its 
generative process, so that each stage of development necessarily takes on 
paradoxical aspects, and observers hold contrasting views on the expansion 
of this new kind of Christianity in global society: as worrying or welcome.272 
Consequently, it could be that it represents an interim phenomenon before the 
setting in of real secularity, or it might refresh its location and role in the whole 
society, so long as it does not give up on relating to society in a relevant way. 
“The future of Christianity depends not on what scientific advance may show, 
but on whether the Christian drama continues to make sense.”273 
 
The third question is: “Might the new global vitalization of Christianity, including 
evangelical, Pentecostal, and charismatic movements, be looked upon as a 
modern religiosity, a postmodern religiosity, or a post-postmodern religiosity?”  
Certainly, this vitalization developed in the wake of the postmodern thinking, 
which disapproved of the absolute atheism that characterizes modern secular 
thought and offered a novel incubator for individual spiritual forms of religion 
beyond rigid secular thinking and subordination to the institutionalized 
structure. To cite one example, Derrida argued that a fixed and final denial of 
God on metaphysical grounds is as culpable as any dogmatic religious 
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theology.274 Postmodern thinking challenged the assumption that secularism 
is irreversible. The American philosopher John D. Caputo himself suggests as 
much:275 
If modern atheism is the rejection of a modern God, then the delimitation of 
modernity opens up another possibility, less the resuscitation of pre-modern 
theism than the chance of something beyond both the theism and the atheism 
of modernity.276 
Under these circumstances, the most notable (re-)surgence was Ev+Pen+Ch, 
which “took some elements of the expressive individualism of 
postmodernity”.277  
On the other hand, in the forms of newly vitalized Christianity we can identify 
an anti-modern culture and a considerable suspicion of the modern secular 
challenge, while at the same time they are building up subcultures that are 
positively related to modernity. 278  Their churches encourage values and 
behaviour patterns that contributed to modernization: literacy to read the Bible; 
a positive attitude toward education and self-improvement; and training in 
administrative skills, including the conduct of public meetings and the keeping 
of financial accounts. As Martin points out, “the analysis now offered lies 
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athwart the conventional paradigm of secularization, because whereas that 
tends to view religion as inhibiting modernity, religion is treated here as offering 
more than one alternative route to the modern”.279 In this case, we can identify 
the construction of a modern religiosity that yet rejects modern intellectualism, 
a so-called “anti-modern religion” that nevertheless accommodates the 
modern prosperity and the post-modern individualized spiritualism. At most 
there is a straining towards neo-liberal positions and a rejection of kinds of 
intellectualism and socialism that express the anti-religious tradition of the 
Enlightenment. There is also a growing public engagement, mostly among 
what has been dubbed the “new religious right”. 
Moreover, there are more progressive neo-evangelicals among some of the 
evangelical circles, who reflect the limitations of the previously fixed 
theological ideas. Most importantly, we need to notice a tendency to 
incorporate both postmodern individualized spiritual forms of Christianity, and 
Christianity in the form of commitment to social involvement and integral 
mission. Although the initial impact of the evangelical movement was one of a 
major mutation of culture, and not brought about through overt political action, 
this phase of cultural accumulation and the establishment of autonomous 
space may yet issue in more direct political action. Everywhere it has taken 
place it has involved religious people and communities evolving from private 
devotion enclosed in family, community, and place of worship, to public 
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engagement, characterized by active efforts to influence constitutions, laws, 
and policy. 
3.2.2. The Proliferation of Individual Spiritual Forms of New 
Christian Faith Communities and Movements: The Mushrooming 
of Implicit Christianity  
3.2.2.1. The Mushrooming of Implicit Christianity and its Characteristics 
A prominent feature in the changing landscape of Christianity is 
the proliferation of individual spiritual forms of faith communities and new 
Christian movements only loosely connected to traditional Christian 
institutions and religiosity. 280  However, these are somehow different from 
evangelical, Pentecostal, or charismatic Christianity, going beyond church-
linked institutions in their morphological aspect, and beyond traditional 
religious orientation in terms of theology. In fact, the decline of church-linked 
religion is accompanied by the rise of non-church forms of new Christian 
communities and movements with spiritual concerns. This is a very 
paradoxical sounding phenomenon of secularization.281 
Robert Wuthnow argues that a traditional “spirituality of dwelling” that 
emphasizes sacred places has given way to a new “spirituality of seeking” that 
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281 Ibid. pp.22-26. 
171 
emphasizes the personal quest for new spiritual paths.282 His observation is 
universally applicable to today’s global religious landscapes. The trend of 
contemporary religiosity is one of a shift from obligation to enjoyment, from 
belonging to voluntary participation and sharing, from fixed doctrines to 
relevant and flexible disciplines.283 This style of Christian belief and practice 
is being adopted by ever more individuals, and often syncretistically combined 
with non-Christian or non-religious elements. Importantly, this kind of religious 
development grows mushroom-fashion, from the bottom up, as implied in the 
title of this subsection, rather than being organized from the top down. Such 
phenomena of religious change are occurring as “implicit forms of Christianity” 
rather than “explicit forms of Christianity”. 
Therefore, this research employs the concept of “implicit religion”, as 
developed by Edward Bailey, to refer to manifestations that differ from the 
official, formal religiosity that adheres to traditional religious institutions, 
practices and doctrines.284 Many sociologists of religion use a similar idea with 
                                           
282 Robert Wuthnow, After Heaven: Spirituality in America since the 1950s (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1998), pp.3-4. “A spirituality of dwelling emphasizes habitation: God occupies a definite place in the universe and 
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slightly different terminology, explaining various newly emerging phenomena 
in terms of “alternative spirituality”, “new age”, or “new religious movement”:285 
"non-church forms of religious orientation, new religious movements, new-age 
psycho-cults, the occult, spiritualism or cult milieus (…), the Neo-Sannyas 
[Rajneesh] movement, new Germanic paganism, Bach flower remedies, 
Qigong, Zen meditation or the ‘small world’ of bodybuilders, the unfamiliar 
world of dowsers and pendulum diviners, the self-image and worldview of 
‘post-modern’ youth or even the cult of football or the music scene", 286 
phenomena termed “invisible religion” by Luckmann and “residual religion” by 
Davies.287  
However, here “implicit Christianity” is certainly different from an all-inclusive 
so-called “implicit religion”, because “implicit Christianity” has distinctive 
Christian traits even in its non-church forms and in communities that do not 
subordinate themselves to institutional churches. Moreover, the 
transformation of Christianity toward individual spirituality tends to be played 
out “in” rather than “outside” or “against” religious communities. Typically, 
                                           
285 Christopher H. Partridge, Encyclopedia of New Religions: New Religious Movements, Sects and Alternative 
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types of so-called “implicit Christianity” can be traced in Christian pilgrimage 
sites, retreat centres and communities.  
Today, one of the world’s most distinctive Christian pilgrimage communities is 
the Taizé monastic order, an ecumenical community with a strong devotion to 
peace and justice through prayer and meditation.288 Founded in 1940, it is 
composed of more than one hundred brothers, from Protestant and Catholic 
traditions, drawn from around thirty countries across the world. Each year tens 
of thousands of young pilgrims come to the small village of Taizé in Saône-et-
Loire, Burgundy, France, to explore the community's way of life and to 
rediscover their Christian faith. Young people from every corner of the globe, 
many of them spiritual seekers, are encouraged to live out the Christian gospel 
in a spirit of joy, kindness, simplicity and reconciliation. 
Other pilgrimage sites with similar characteristics are found around the 
periphery of Europe: Lee Abbey (founded in 1946), the Iona Community 
(founded in 1938), the Scargill Movement (founded in 1961) and the Othona 
Community (founded in 1946) in the UK; the Corrymeela community in Ireland 
(founded in 1965); the Bruderhof (founded in 1920) and Klosterkirchberg - 
                                           
288 http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/christianity/priests/taize_1.shtml. 
  The Taizé Community is an ecumenical monastic order in Taizé, Saône-et-Loire, Burgundy, France. It is 
composed of more than one hundred brothers, from Protestant and Catholic traditions, who originate from about 
thirty countries across the world. It was founded in 1940 by Brother Roger Schutz, a Reformed Protestant. 
Guidelines for the community’s life are contained in The Rule of Taizé written by Brother Roger and first published 
in French in 1954. The community has become one of the world's most important sites of Christian pilgrimage. 
Over 100,000 young people from around the world make pilgrimages to Taizé each year for prayer, Bible study, 
sharing, and communal work. Through the community's ecumenical outlook, they are encouraged to live in the 
spirit of kindness, simplicity and reconciliation.  
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Berneuchener Gemeinschaften (founded in 1931) in Germany; and L'Abri 
Fellowship (founded in 1955) in Switzerland.289 
These newly mushrooming Christian pilgrimage sites range from resident 
communities, to retreat centres, to pilgrimage destinations with more footloose 
styles of religiosity; at all of them seekers mingle with more traditional kinds of 
pilgrim. In quantitative terms, the situation is ambiguous, because this kind of 
pilgrimage community is shared with others through visiting and participating 
rather than belonging. The churches’ losses are not balanced out by church 
gains elsewhere. Nevertheless, such unattached and vague forms of 
religiosity or so-called casual piety should not be considered as of no account; 
certainly they should not be ignored.290  
“Implicit Christianity” remains the major form of individualized religion 
throughout Europe, and recognition of the Church as an institution is giving 
way to a more community-oriented religiosity. This transformation of 
Christianity is likely to gain increasing global prominence.291 It might well 
make sense to see remote pilgrimage sites as outposts of resistance to the 
pressure exerted from the centres of those countries by radical secularism, 
and as a transformation of Christianity, because the shift towards 
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individualistic spirituality tends to occur within religious communities rather 
than outside of or in opposition to them. That is why these avenues ought to 
be explored.  
3.2.2.2. The Key Controversial Issues on the Mushrooming of Implicit Religion 
The term “implicit Christianity” is likely to evoke a bewildering and often 
contradictory variety of images and attitudes. We may use it to refer to 
anything that is taken very seriously with the most basic sensory evidence that 
informs our approach to the world, and there are sometimes sharply differing 
opinions as to what belongs in the category and what does not. 
The first question here is: “Is implicit Christianity a new form of church, a new 
type of Christian movement?” The basic sociological organizational types of 
Christianity as developed by Ernst Troeltsch - church, sects, mysticism – 
provide us with an empirical and methodological starting point to answer this 
question. 292  Undoubtedly, implicit Christianity is not the traditional 
institutionalized forms of church, and revolves more closely around types of 
mysticism. Thus the term is increasingly associated with aspects of religiosity 
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focused on the experiential, the interior, and generally the subjective 
dimensions of personal identity.  
Ironically, implicit Christianity is rarely accepted as religion by church-related 
institutions, especially those with a conservative religiosity, despite the fact 
that many of its adherents refer to themselves as representing an internal 
morphological transformation of Christianity. Conversely, although its 
participants do not describe themselves as religious, that description might be 
assigned to them by those who study religion and people. 
In fact, religiosity corresponding to individual mysticism is present throughout 
Christian history, yet modernity and its challenges shift the relationship 
between individual and institutional authority and present new potential for 
mysticism to break free of religious institutions. According to Troeltsch, this 
potential, without grounding in institutions, leads to religious individualization 
and a-religion.293 
Implicit Christianity draws our attention to the limitations of a “churchly” 
definition of religiosity.294 Today the boundary between religion, sects and 
mysticism is beginning to be seen as arbitrary and blurred. 295  Implicit 
Christianity offers a new trajectory, showing the heterogeneity of religious 
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practices. Thus, it can no longer be embedded in the framework of church-
sect-mysticism typology. 
Indeed, Troeltsch’s approach was designed to envisage a new religious 
element of life through the mutual interpenetration of these organizational 
types, and the reconciliation of the motives underlying them. In this respect, 
America sociologist Courtney Bender’s “entanglements”, and Swiss 
sociologist Franz-Xaver Kaufmann’s “interaction” (Wechselwirkung) enable us 
to approach contemporary religious change in a more productive way. 296 
Through these conceptions, we may perceive implicit Christianity as entailing 
multiple sites of interface for the churches, representing both opportunities and 
spiritual challenges.  
Kaufmann’s term highlights the necessity of such interfacing, but also the 
opportunities inherent in it: 
Only if we succeed in creating an interplay between the churches, which are 
entrusted with preserving and developing the explicitly Christian dimension, 
and the forms of implicit Christian practice and communication found in 
interstitial spaces, can we hope to pass on Christianity to new generations 
under present-day social conditions.297  
Of course, such attempts and proposals to build bridges between the different 
realms must not cause anybody to squander or undervalue their own traditions. 
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There will certainly be a need to uphold transcendence in the face of trends 
towards de-transcendentalization in both implicit and explicit contemporary 
religions. But whenever one finds points of contact with experiences and 
interpretations in this way, one is productively challenged to rearticulate one’s 
own tradition. If it is true that competition intensifies religious life, then both 
believers and religious institutions must rise to the occasion and meet this 
competitive challenge. Troeltsch emphasizes that “it must be maintained in its 
concrete fullness of life by churches and sects, if an entirely individualistic 
mysticism is to spiritualize at all. Thus, we are forced to this conclusion: this 
concept of Christianity…assumes the continuance of other and more concrete 
living forms of Christianity as well.”298 
The second question with regard to implicit Christianity is: “Is implicit 
Christianity different from hybrid globalized religions such as the Moonies, or 
is it a cult wearing Christian garments?” 
To explore this complex issue, academics are, as ever, keen to construct 
typologies so that some order can be given to the great variety of new religions, 
sects and alternative individual spiritualities. 299  This research follows the 
classification developed by the sociologist of religion, Roy Wallis, rather than 
a taxonomy classified by theological concerns, because such a view can 
trigger self-justification of church-related religiosity. Wallis stated that new 
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religious movements can be simply and intelligibly classified according to their 
relationship with society, as “world-affirming”, “world-accommodating”, or 
“world-renouncing”.300 In his description, world-affirming religious movements 
accept many of the values, goals and aspirations of society, but believe that 
they can offer a more effective route to attaining such goals and provide a 
better model of such values. For example, those who participate in the Taizé 
community do not want to distance themselves from the world, but rather want 
to be more meaningful and happier in it. Hence, in this sense implicit 
Christianity is a non-church form of new individual spiritual Christianity that can 
be seen as “world-affirming”. 
In most cases, the impulse to implicit Christianity with individualistic spiritual 
forms is motivated not by a will for better religiosity or from passion for 
conservation of religion, but from a desire for a better life. The individuals 
concerned are seeking a value to devote a whole life to; they are pursuing not 
religion, but the value carried and mediated by religion. In this case, what is 
being rejected is the allegedly perennial interpretation of religious values 
controlled by institutionalized Christianity, not the religious spirituality or value 
itself. What is being pursued is a better life inspired by religious challenge, not 
the manifestation of religion itself. Implicit Christianity is a religious movement 
as a way of life channelling Christian faith or spirituality. The disestablishment 
of the traditional religious forms and doctrines can offer the prospect of 
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additional avenues for an understanding of mediation that may, in turn, 
contribute to the formation of new, life-oriented models of Christian spirituality 
and mission. Implicit Christianity persists in the lives of individuals, well beyond 
their active participation in religious groups. The subject for empirical 
investigation is what kinds of form and expression such religions take – leaving 
the door open for the study of individualized and implicit possibilities. 
Moving on to the third question: “Are individual spiritual forms of new Christian 
faith communities and movements modern religiosity, postmodern, or post-
postmodern? As aforementioned, the individual spiritual forms of religiosity 
corresponding to implicit Christianity, 301  as opposed to the traditional 
institutionalized forms of church, have been present throughout Christian 
history, and thus cannot be regarded as exclusively contemporary phenomena. 
In this historical sense, implicit Christianity can be viewed as another modern 
religiosity for self-justified authenticity and satisfaction, with a stance that is 
directly opposite to the previous stream, because new religious movements, 
whether sects or mysticism, nearly always begin in protest against the “loss of 
authentic faith” of the body out of which they came.302  
Yet, with the evolution of modernity, especially to postmodernism, the latest 
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302 H. Richard Niebuhr, The Social Sources of Denominationalism (Kila: Kessinger Publishing, [1929] 2004); see 
also Rodney Stark and William Sims Bainbridge, The Future of Religion: Secularization, Revival and Cult Formation 
(Berkeley, LA, London; University of California Press, 1992); "Of Churches, Sects, and Cults: Preliminary Concepts 
for a Theory of Religious Movements", Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion Vol. 18. 2 (1979): 117-33. 
 
181 
challenges shift the relationship of individual faith to religious institutional 
authority and to society, and change the style of faith. If the previous implicit 
Christianity was “spirituality of dwelling”, narrowly holding one’s place in the 
periphery of mainstream religious institution, the new implicit Christianity 
revolves around a free-floating “spirituality of seeking”, as there is no longer 
any stigma of a cult attached to being divorced from religious institutions. The 
dominant mode of spiritual faith being adopted is “world-accommodating”, 
rather than “world-renouncing” or “world-affirming”. This change presents new 
potential to co-operate with public society but also with religious institutions, 
while at the same time breaking free of them. In this vein, the new implicit 
Christianity has characteristics quite different from those of the modern 
“spirituality of dwelling” stuck on the periphery of mainstream religious 
institutions, as well as from the modern religiosity in which one could hardly 
identify oneself as Christian without belonging to the established Church. 
Implicit Christianity beyond normal religion indeed works in a postmodern or 
post-postmodern framework. 
In the upsurge of implicit Christianity, as Christian belief and practice are being 
increasingly adapted by individuals and syncretistically combined with non-
Christian or non-religious elements, identification with any particular affiliation 
continues to be eroded, the monopolistic claims to truth that hold sway in 
traditional institutionalized Christianity are in the process of dissolution, and 
the conflicts triggered by symbolic distinctions are of no importance. Ulrich 
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Beck argues that people’s eyes have been opened to “the fluid nature” of 
traditional religious institutions with explicit religiosity, and new individual 
spiritual forms of Christian faith communities and movements with implicit 
religiosity.303 He describes the process clearly: 
In determining the limits of religion, Troeltsch’s distinction between churches 
and sects, on the one hand, and religiosity and spirituality or mysticism, on 
the other, can be taken further. If in the first case we have an either/or regime, 
in the second we have a motley assortment of ‘both this and that’.304  
Thus it becomes possible to recognize what is involved in the interaction 
between the explicit institutionalized Christianity and implicit Christianity. As 
Beck expresses it, “it is nothing less than ‘a religious reformation on a world 
scale’”.305  
 
Yet, here, in a socio-political perspective, it is clear that implicit Christianity 
displays two disparate facets. 306  One is an inclination toward finding a 
postmodern spiritual place, like New Age religion, as a refuge from the world, 
while the other has a re-modern proposition as a counterpart for a more 
reflexive faith through an entanglement process.  
On the one hand, the individual spiritual forms of Christianity, in spite of all 
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their depth and spirituality, display a form of religious life isolated from the 
public sphere; in its depreciation of history, social ethics, and public 
engagement, this form is constitutive of implicit Christianity. This type of 
Christianity emerges from noetic individual experience, a point of origin that 
makes it difficult to organize in robust social forms. Eagleton’s description of 
New Age religion as “one place where so-called spiritual values, driven from 
the face of a brutally pragmatic capitalism, have taken refuge” may be 
applicable to such implicit Christianity.307 Eagleton criticized that, “it offers a 
refuge from the world, not a mission to transform it. The sigh of the opposed 
creature, as opposed to its cry of anger, is merely a pathological symptom of 
what is awry with us.”308 In this sense, just as Christian fundamentalism is 
anti-political, so implicit Christianity is apolitical. As such it can almost certainly 
be characterized as postmodern. 
On the other hand, insofar as we can summarize diverse movements under 
the heading "implicit Christianity", the term relates to the diverse values and 
practices that are of "ultimate and utmost relevance" for those concerned.309 
Implicit Christianity alerts people to the importance of the fact that the world 
religions can no longer rely on their own traditions. Historically, different forms 
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of Christianity that have operated in isolation from one another are now forced 
to compete and communicate in the boundless space of the mass media. In 
consequence, they are forced to make their symbols accessible in a process 
of mutual exchange for the benefit of all concerned. 
In terms of the possibility of individualized religion, Ulrich Beck notes that: 
Communication with one’s chosen God who has escaped from the controlling 
hand of church authority thus radicalizes the subjective basis of experience, 
activity and sense of responsibility. (...) Many seekers believe that exploring 
their own consciousness in line with the demands of subjective spirituality 
can lead to a direct, unmediatized contact with the sacred in all its forms.310 
According to his perception, implicit Christianity as individualized religion can 
bring “a subjectivization of utopia and revolution”, by transforming religion into 
“competing religions of the true self”.311 In this respect, implicit Christianity can 
be construed not only as a postmodern “implicit religion”, but as transformation 
of Christianity in a re-modern paradigm.  
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3.2.3. The Social Presence of Faith-Based Social Organizations 
(FBSOs) as a Civil Agent: Integrating Christian Faith into New 
Forms of Faith-based Social Action  
3.2.3.1. The Emergence of New Faith-based Praxis Forms of FBSOs and 
Their Social Participation 
Another phenomenon of the recent religious landscape, noted by many 
researchers, is that Christianity continues to make a significant imprint on 
social changes and developments in civil society and in modern international 
relations, through Christian FBSOs312 involved in faith-based social action.313 
In fact, although formal adherence to religious institutions, practices and 
doctrines has declined sharply in a number of western countries, various 
Christian communities, groups, and individuals have built up new types of 
organizations for faith-based social action as welfare providers and/or as 
political actors. The various Christian FBSOs are placed as an empirically 
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visible phenomenon of religion squarely in opposition to the “subtraction theory” 
of modernism and secularism during the latter half of the twentieth century, 
which assumed that religion is and ought to remain an exclusively private 
affair.314 Most tellingly, there are very few voices today, even in Europe, that 
will defend “subtraction theory” or “the privatization of religion”, in its most 
straightforward form. Rather, the public presence of Christianity is in some 
cases too politically consequential to ignore, and operates as a contentious 
challenge to the public sphere. This recognition has brought about a noticeable 
change in attitude and attention to religion throughout the world. 
Many scholars have observed the continuing manifestation of religious faith in 
public engagement of religion or public faith outside religious institutions. 
Representatively, José Casanova argues that religious social action within 
what is conceptualized as “public religion” is one of the defining features of the 
public presence of religion today.315 For example, Adam Dinham and his 
colleagues have been involved in various projects regarding the social 
engagement of faith. 316  In 21 cities across 7 European countries, the 
European research project “Faith-based Organizations and Social Exclusion 
in European Cities” (FACIT) addressed the question of the changing and 
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present role of FBSOs in matters of poverty and other forms of social exclusion 
such as social isolation, homelessness or undocumented persons, through 
local case studies of faith-based organizations.317 
This trend cannot be well-described using demographic evidence, but as the 
studies suggest, it can be traced to wider cultural phenomena within which 
new forms of religious organization are acting as a reflexive civil agent involved 
in faith-based social action and movements. Empirical observation of the 
emergence of new forms of faith-based organizations has to be re-analysed 
and re-visited in relation to new forms of religiosity. Of course, this kind of 
movement does not necessarily detach itself from traditional Christian 
institutions and the churches, and sometimes overlaps with the existing 
religious groups as types of participation, co-operation, and solidarity. 
However, it is clear that such mobilization is now shifting from religious 
agendas and traditional theological themes to how to live well, dissolving 
religious values and practices into life-oriented social agendas rather than the 
allegedly timeless religious doctrines controlled by institutionalized Christianity.  
Gordon Lynch, a prominent British cultural sociologist, gives a comprehensive 
and authoritative account of the burgeoning of such progressive religious 
movements in his book The New Spirituality: An Introduction to progressive 
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Dierckx, Jan Vranken, Wendy Kerstens (eds.), Faith-based Organizations and Social Exclusion in European Cities: 
National Context Reports (Leuven and The Hague: Acco, 2009); Maarten Davelaar, Jessica van den Toorn, Nynke 
de Witte, Justin Beaumont, and Corien Kuiper, Faith-based Organizations and Social Exclusion in the Netherlands 
(Leuven and The Hague: Acco, 2011); The Netherlands report provides an integrated overview of the Dutch case-
studies conducted within the project, exploring faith-based activities in Tilburg, Rotterdam and Amsterdam.  
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belief beyond religion, which offers a clear and engaging analysis of the 
emergence of a generation of progressive religious thinkers and organizational 
structures of this new faith, assessing its significance in the changing religious 
landscape of contemporary western society. 
According to him, the Christian progressive movement is a new religious 
typology, which reveres the natural world and the religious right, and can 
engage in constructive deliberation with the secular, demonstrating ideas that 
contribute to an increasing importance of religion in the public sphere.318  
The institutional transfer of religious functions (such as marriage, burials) and 
of entire structures relating to the delivery of education, health, social care, 
and radical campaigning, to the state (be it secular or non-secular) and public 
authorities, loosens the formerly tightly held institutional power and dominance, 
and allows for the dissemination of religious authority and ritual authenticity – 
previously regulated and authenticated by church institutions – among a 
democratic populace of individuals. Christian Smith characterized such 
phenomena as “disruptive religion”.319 
Consideration of these phenomena advances the discussion of the 
organizational possibility that the religious forces of the present might come 
together in new ways through their mutual interpenetration of the basic 
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sociological organizational types of Christianity: church, sects, and mysticism. 
In his essay, “The Possible Futures of Christianity”,320 Ernst Troeltsch asked 
whether Europe faced the imminent emergence of new, as yet unknown 
religious phenomena, which would prove capable of forming a new religious 
element of life. The western world has not seen a wholesale shift towards a 
secular society in which religious faith has died out. In certain aspects, radical 
faith-based praxis and its social presence through FBSOs point to what this 
can mean in practice, in a way that moves beyond the stereotypes of religious 
actors as either slavering theocrats or servile service providers making up the 
deficiencies of the welfare state.  
In spite of political secularization, the separation of religion from politics and 
public policy, religion still has politically assertive power. Many formally secular 
humanitarian workers and aid agencies are demonstrably motivated by a great 
deal of faith and drive to connect with the transcendent. A key similarity is their 
value-driven motivation.321 This is a typology of integrating Christianity into 
social engagement in the public sphere.  
3.2.3.2. Debates about Faith-Based Social Organizations (FBSOs) as New 
Forms of Religious Organization as a Civil Agent 
Do we need to consider FBSOs as a new type of reformulated religion?  
                                           
320 Ernst Troeltsch, “Die Zukunftsmöglichkeiten des Christentums,” Logos 1 (1910– 11): 165-85; Die Soziallehren 
der Christlichen Kirchen und Gruppen (Tübingen, 1912).  
321 Rachael Chapman “Faith and the voluntary sector in urban governance: Distinctive yet similar?”, in Adam 
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From the modern perspective, the answer is simple. They are neither already 
by themselves religion, nor do they operate socially as religion. Moreover, they 
are not perceived as a religious category by the traditional ecclesiology that 
emphasizes the institutional character of the established church, nor by the 
social scientists who study it.322  
However, what is more important than the concept itself, is the fact that FBSOs 
are emerging with various forms and motivation, and play a dynamic and 
influential role in the public sphere, in contrast to the withdrawal of religion into 
privatized areas. In certain respects, the renewed vitalization of religion based 
on public engagement is more crucial to the place and role of religion in the 
public sphere than the resurgence of institutionalized religion and religiosity.  
In this regard, Michael Barnett intimates a novel theoretical approach that 
would reflect integration of the religious into practical life and the social realm, 
not the disappearance of religion from the public sphere, through asking not 
“what is religion?”, but rather “where is the religion?”, and thematising a more 
transformative process of religiosity beyond the limitations of “churchly” 
definitions.323 More broadly, sometimes these changes are premised on the 
increasing importance given by Christians to witnessing by deed rather than 
word. FBSOs incorporate themes and semantics from particular religions as 
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part of their vision of society, and as concreate aspects of their mobilizing of 
events. It can be said that faith-based social action is channelling the unique 
value of religion. These movements therefore profile religion, give it social 
visibility, without themselves being primarily religious movements, which is to 
say, without generating amounts of core religious communication. They are 
closer to “centrifugal religiosity” than “centripetal religiosity”, in the extension 
of Hoekendijk’s concept, “scattered church”.324 On this point, Robert Wuthnow 
offered the memorable aphorism, “religion as an embedded practice”.325 At 
least, they must be observed as a type of religion, denoting categories in which 
an emphasis on practice turns out to be more relevant to understanding social 
practices than to political secularization. 
The outcome of these considerations is that religion is embedded within what 
has been called civil society, through the integration of religious faith and 
values into social agendas without particular religious forms. “Embedded 
Christianity” can also be construed as an unconventional anomalous 
transformation of Christianity. 
 
If so, why is this phenomenon now considered as an important transformation 
of Christianity? In fact, FBSOs and charities have a long history of social action, 
particularly in the most deprived areas. Since the 1960s many Christian 
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movements have transformed into civil society movements. A greater role for 
faith-based organizations has also emerged, particularly from the 1990s 
onwards, as areas of civil society have begun to be extended after the collapse 
of the era of conflicting ideologies at the global level.326 Whereas historically, 
FBSOs were established by religious institutions, now they are set up 
independently by individuals and groups focusing on specific issues. As a 
result, existing religious institutions participate in the projects and movements 
already launched by FBSOs, or co-operate with them. That is, the initiative has 
shifted from religious institutions to individualized religious groups, from 
participation in religion per se, to social action. 
3.3. Testing the Theory of Morphological Transformation 
of Christianity within the Sociology of Religion: The 
Individualization of Religion327 
The most notable phenomenon that can be observed in the contemporary 
ecclesiastical transformation may be the development and massive 
dissemination of a religiosity that is based increasingly on “individualization”, 
whereby people are persuaded or pushed into new forms of social 
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association.328 The relevance of individualization to religion or religiosity was 
examined early on by Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, and more recently 
by Danièle Hervieu-Léger, Paul Heelas, Ronald Inglehart and W.C. Roof in the 
framework of the sociology of religion, and has been further clarified by Ulrich 
Beck in his book, A God of One’s Own.329 Beck designates one important 
aspect of reflexive modernization as the “individualization” that opens up the 
inner aspect of religious transformation, in juxtaposition to the 
“cosmopolitization” of the outer aspect.330 Certainly, from the standpoint of the 
sociology of religion, deploying the theory of re-modernization, 
“individualization of religion” is a basic feature of any diagnosis of the religious 
signature of the age, as well as the central motif of contemporary religious 
transformation.  
The thesis of religious individualization proceeds from the assumption that 
“with increasing modernization, the religious do not disappear, but change 
their appearance”.331 If so, how can we best explicate and understand “the 
individualization of religion”? We can do so through comparison with social 
individualization, such as the individualization of family and social classes, 
which brings about profound changes in the aggregate situation, the quality of 
society as a whole. The process of individualization lucidly represents two 
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radical aspects of social transformation: 1) de-traditionalization, the loosening 
of all the ties based on family, class, status-groups, ethnicity and milieu, 
including national identity and political identity, and the dissolution of old 
institutional stereotypes, certainties and dominant ideas, and 2) a radical 
individual essence and self-fulfilment, the necessity and possibility of 
individual decision-making. 332  In those societies that have adopted the 
autonomy of individuals as a principle, we see a new kind of inner diversity, 
contradictoriness and unpredictability, and the emergence of symbolic 
resources of varying quality. 
On these assumptions it can also be said that while the individualization of 
religion or faith undermines the religious classes and the institutionalized 
churches of modernity, it opens up the opportunity for free religious choice, 
placing individual choice at the forefront in religious matters.333 Hervieu-Leger 
points out that: “Legitimization of belief is moving from religious authorities, 
guarantors of the truth of belief, to individuals themselves, who are responsible 
for the authenticity of their own spiritual approach.”334 Seen from this angle, 
individualization of religion means the individualized dissemination of 
convictions and the collapse of the religious codes that organized shared 
certainties within believing communities. However, it must be noted that 
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individualization does not imply Bellah’s individual, 335  nor egoistic and 
conscious choice or individual preference, nor is it Enlightenment 
autonomy.336 Rather, the individualization of religion has been imposed on 
individuals as a consequence of the long historical process of modern 
institutions. Furthermore, it should be noted that we are not dealing with a 
postmodern concept. I assume that the themes of post-postmodern transition 
and ecclesiastical identity come together in a newly changing Christianity in 
the contemporary modern world. In the process of religious individualization, 
the four basic features are sufficiently complex to require more careful 
examination.  
First, the individualization of religion highlights both “institutionalized dis-
embedding and re-embedding of the individual”.337 The dissolution of religious 
ties of belonging and the pre-existing collectivity of religious group identities 
may be said to coincide with the creation of faith narratives for oneself adapted 
to one’s own experiential horizon and self-knowledge. Indeed, nowadays the 
individual human being becomes increasingly adept at writing one’s own faith 
narratives with the aid of words and symbols that have abandoned their fixed 
orbit in the institutionalized coordinates of sovereign world religions in which a 
particular tradition had held them fast for centuries. At the same time, it is a 
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fact that individuals form their competences as spiritual and religious ‘do-it-
yourselves’ in their dealings with religious symbols that are almost always 
detached from the context that had previously guaranteed their legibility. More 
precisely, this means that individuals have been dissolving the pre-existing 
frameworks, yet from the beginning they did not intend just to dismantle pre-
existing models, or one’s own life or faith grounds, but instead they engaged 
in constructing their own biographical lives and social and religious identities 
through the prism of one’s own existence. In this respect, as Beck intimates, 
the process of religious individualization may be the reflexive re-modern, 
rather than the recent product of an assumed “post-modernity”.338  
Secondly, the individualization of religion does not refer to the privatization of 
religion that means a withdrawal into the family and circle of friends, or into the 
inner life of the individual. It tends to be misunderstood as such privatization 
of religion, that is to say, the demise of the significance of religion in the public 
arena. Whereas “privatization of religion” degenerates into self-obsession and 
anomic segments, and gives rise to an unfettered narcissism, the 
individualization of religion evolves into the resurgence of a new kind of 
subjective religiosity which leads to an increasing loosening of monopoly, 
religious ties and the dogmatic framework provided by the institutionalized 
religions. Although it may bring about the privatization of religion, it also paves 
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the way for an innovated function and role in the public sphere.339 The result 
of these processes is that at the birth of the twenty-first century, we are 
experiencing the paradox that religion is both declining and on the rise. It is a 
mistake to attribute the waning influence of religion to its individualization. The 
opposite is also true. 
Thirdly, individualization of faith raises a pivotal question: can faith exist 
without shared common belief? In other words, do the multiplicities of personal 
religious structures imply the mechanical atomization of both society and 
religion without a common space that binds individuals together? The answer 
in the re-modern perspective is no. Apart from our general conjecture, as 
Hervieu-Leger claims, “the greater the individualization of belief, the greater is 
its degree of homogenization”.340 To put it another way, highly individualized 
faith cultures function in a completely standardized manner. According to Beck, 
the rejection of institutional approval of belief and the broadening of the stock 
of references and symbols made available for use and reuse by individuals 
does not signify only the fragmentation of small systems of belief. At the same 
time, the liberalization of the symbol market gives room to a paradoxical 
tendency towards the standardization of the respective narratives: a 
standardization that makes possible their arrangement into networks on a 
worldwide scale. 341  The individualization of religion then, obeys the 
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mechanisms of the symbolic economy of religion, which is increasingly 
penetrated by the laws of the marketplace. 342  A good indicator is the 
empirically demonstrable adherence to a “minimum creed”: 
This can be summed up as follows: ‘God loves you, Jesus saves and you 
can be healed.’ Theological clarification of this creed is not required and its 
practical effectiveness is meant to be experienced personally by each 
believer. This doctrinal reduction is linked to the expansion within this 
movement of an emotional religiosity that explicitly preaches putting the 
intellectual mind on the back burner and promotes the value of emotional 
experience of the presence of the Spirit.343 
Hence we may say that the pattern of individualized faith is in fact the standard 
collective consciousness that I am unable to see for what it is because it thinks 
of itself as individual.  
Fourthly, in order to achieve a comprehensive understanding of 
individualization of religion, it is necessary to grasp the complex and decisively 
important point that this encompasses paradoxical situations: the horizon of 
possibilities that become opened up can apply to both institutionalized religion 
and non-institutionalized individual religion. In other words, individualization of 
religion can enrich and empower both the individual and the institutional, and 
can thus fall within both the contemporary proliferation of “cults”, and the 
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strengthening of traditionalist and fundamentalist trends within the great 
religious traditions. The individualization of religion challenges the authority of 
established ecclesial beliefs and practices, yet it has not necessarily been 
inimical to all religious institutions. Religious individualization and committed 
churchgoing are not mutually exclusive, but may well reinforce each other. We 
have experienced “individual church-ism”, 344  the declining significance of 
denominationalism, the growth of special purpose groups, and de-facto 
congregationalism. The changes to which these several phrases point are 
profoundly de-traditionalizing in their effects. The paradoxical unintended 
consequence that we find in this religious trend makes up two sides of the 
same development coin in the re-modern context, however different those 
sides might appear at first glance. 
From the above discussion of religious individualization, we can set out the 
two outstanding trends of the new religious currents unfurling inside and 
outside the churches: “resurgent Christianity” as the transformation of 
institutionalized Christianity, and “disestablished Christianity” 345  as an 
anomalous transformation. With regard to the former, the paradigmatic 
example is that the thesis of individualization of religion applies to 
institutionalized religion in terms of the rise of contemporary evangelical 
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Christianity, including the Pentecostal charismatic movement that represents 
the new changing Christian mode. Here, the distinguishing feature is an 
individualized religiosity that is ignited by individual charismatic figures. One 
further tendency present in global society and relevant to evangelical 
expansion is a heightened sense of individuality as the self, where individual 
feeling is released from the constraints of extended kin and the continuities of 
local community, but is balanced and checked by religious disciplines and 
moral priorities. The modern revivalist, evangelical and missionary movements 
have forged a new synthesis between the institutionalized religious power and 
the individualization of religion in a re-modern paradigm. The result is a 
competitive and often highly subjective faith that rivals the assumptions of both 
the secular mainstream culture and anti-modern fundamentalism.  
The second trend of ecclesiastical transformation is movement beyond the 
institutionalized. It is true that ties to organized religious communities are being 
loosened, just as the authority of the religious guard on existential questions 
is being weakened. However, this should not be taken to mean that religious 
experience and issues are of declining importance for individuals. On the 
contrary, the decline of established religious institutions goes hand in hand 
with a rise in individual religiosity.346 With the individualization of religion, the 
assumption that one cannot identify oneself as Christian without belonging to 
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the established Church began to be eroded, and this process of disassociation 
continued through the rise of science, technology, communications, and travel, 
until today more and more people are open to seeing themselves as Christian 
in view of some sort of “Christianness” rather than of any particular affiliation. 
The dominant form of individual religion may be “invisible religion” and this is 
likely to gain increasing global prominence. 347  The disestablishment of 
traditional Christianity can offer the prospect of additional avenues for an 
understanding of mediation that may, in turn, contribute to the formation of 
new, life-oriented models of Christian spirituality and mission. That is why 
these avenues ought to be explored. 
To summarize, we must answer the questions: “Must we conclude that the 
individualization of religion is a third broad alternative between the death of 
religion and its antithesis in the ongoing modernization process? How do the 
traditional churches and individualized new religious communities relate to 
each other at quantitative and qualitative level, and what social structures do 
they have? The individualization of religion dissolves inherited religious and 
cultural identities, then leads, as the other side of the coin, to the constitution, 
activation, and even invention of communities and systems of belief that fit 
individuals’ own aspirations and experiences, based on the principle of 
individual autonomy, irrespective of whether the new formations are 
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institutionalized or non-institutionalized communities. This dual tendency 
corresponds to a rational concept of privatizing access to symbol goods, which 
are being progressively substituted for a collective or semi-collective rationale, 
which corresponds to the institutional and family transmission of religious 
identities. It requires the specific empirical study of the structural changes in 
the religious sphere. 
3.4. Conclusion 
The secularization thesis that predicted the inevitable gradual disappearance 
of religion in modernizing societies remained, until a few decades ago, 
unchallenged in academia and society. However, it has become clear through 
socio-empirical observation that Christianity has not disappeared, but remains 
persistent and resilient. Furthermore, the prediction is unlikely to be realized 
in the future. As a result, it has lost much of its plausibility, and now needs to 
be mediated phenomenologically through another framework, rather than 
merely that of an absence of religion. By the same token, post-secularism can 
hardly mean “after secularism”, although it might signal an end to taking it for 
granted that a clear, stable, and consistent demarcation has been established 
between secular and religious dimensions of life. 
 
In this context, it is evident that along with the changes of religious milieus,348 
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Christianity has transformed and is continually transforming; its condition is 
neither one of decline nor one of simple survival. Here, the transformation of 
Christianity presents in the various forms and manifestations of Christian 
religiosity that differ from traditional church-linked forms. The logic of 
transformation does not necessarily contradict the theories of secularization. 
Paradoxically, transformation of Christianity can be compatible with both 
secularization and the sense of a renewed vitalization of religion.  
 
Above all, the changes of religious milieus around the world and the 
transformation of Christianity can be best explicated by the process of 
“individualization of religious belief”. Here, religiosity is formulated less by 
dogmatic discipline and ritual service of religious institution and the church, 
and more by individualized religious faith and spirituality. 349  The 
individualization of religion undermines religious authority and the sense of 
obligation. This can also be observed in the degradation of the status and 
number of clerics, and in the rarefaction of rituals. The most important 
consequence of the process of individualization of religion is the radical switch 
from a religion conceived as a heteronomous principle to a religion conceived 
as an autonomous identity and a support for individuals in an uncertain modern 
society. For many people, the significance of static religious truths, which are 
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anchored structurally within a religious institution, has incontrovertibly been 
decreasing in favour of “the aspiration to be guided by one’s own spiritual 
experience” in matters of faith, and they measure all doctrinal and institutional 
claims in this light.350  
 
Such individualization of religion in an age of globalization has an important 
impact on the changes of traditional religious milieus originated from religious 
institutions. The dichotomous distinction between the secular and the religious 
is becoming blurred, and denominational and intra-religious boundaries are 
dissolving, while at the same time we see the emergence of different levels of 
intensity of religious practice based on individualized religiosity. 
In the course of such shifts in religious milieus, changes of Christian religiosity 
go hand in hand with transformation of the dominant forms of Christianity. The 
recent empirical-sociological remarks on a newly emerging global Christianity 
illustrate a transformation made possible by the burgeoning of new 
individualized forms of Christian religiosity. These phenomena can be traced 
in three major trends. First, a new and increasing global vitalization of 
conservative forms of Christianity presents a re-invention of explicit 
Christianity combined with individualized religiosity. Secondly, we witness 
a proliferation of individual spiritual forms of new Christian faith communities 
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and movements. The mushrooming of implicit Christianity is connected only 
loosely to traditional Christian institutions and religiosity, and more closely to 
an individualization of Christianity in terms of religiosity and morphological 
aspects. Finally, we see a rise in the social presence of faith-based social 
organizations (FBSOs) as civil agents. Hence, institutionalized Christian 
religiosity is becoming integrated into new individualized forms of faith-based 
social action.  
These phenomena indicate a transformation of Christianity from church-
oriented religiosity towards more individualized forms of religiosity. 351 
Although not all of them are entirely recent, together they represent a new 
phase in the history of Christianity. 
 
What is the likely future course of this renewed vitalization of Christianity? 
What is the position of church-related Christianity in today’s world? More 
specifically, what is the direction or trajectory of religion? Is it one of revival? 
Or is the recent revitalization a “last-ditch” 352  phenomenon of an interim 
situation before real secularity sets in?  
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It is extremely difficult to predict the future from the trends of recent decades. 
Thus, any discussion of religion in the contemporary global age should begin 
with the recognition of a paradox: On the one hand, church-related religiosity 
is being diminished by the continuing loss of control of religious institutions 
over the belief systems and religious practices of individuals. On the other, 
those churches or religious institutions that integrate the individualized forms 
of religiosity into their own faith and religious projects exhibit a renewed vitality. 
In this sense, in fact, the trajectory of church-related Christianity has been far 
more discursive and complicated than secularization theory expected, even in 
secularism’s western European strongholds.353  
More importantly, individualized forms of Christianity, which are only loosely 
connected with or even exist outside religious institutions, are more 
widespread in the public sphere, and appear in a wider variety of forms, than 
ever before. Furthermore, their modes and interplay with a changed world are 
continually being transformed into new forms with new characteristics. In this 
context, scholars of religion should question the validity of the category of 
religion. Crucially, individualized forms of Christianity continue to play a 
significant role in the public sphere by engaging in society in new ways, not 
through dominance, 354  a development that unleashes the potential of 
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Christianity as a reflexive agent for individuals, society, and the global 
community, as long as it is not withdrawn into the private sphere.355 
 
In conclusion, the current transformation of Christianity overcomes the 
dichotomy between the religious and the secular, and the different versions of 
Christian transformation are inextricably linked with the modes of believing and 
different institutional structures of Christianity or communities. The new 
visibility of Christianity and related institutional arrangements will serve to 
shape and encode diverse global secular practices in new ways.356  
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Chapter 4. Reconfiguration of the Place and Role of 
Christianity in the Public Sphere 
As the claim of “a general rejection”357 of religion is increasingly questioned 
and disproved by the visible presence of multiple and multifaceted 
manifestations of religion in society, the theory is being replaced by a series 
of other hypotheses. Meanwhile, many of those speaking from a secularization 
perspective continue to hold to an alternative claim: instead of speaking of an 
imminent extinction of religion, they deploy the notion of “privatization of 
religion”.358 According to the privatization thesis, religion has retreated from 
the public to the private sphere, while at the same time losing social 
significance with regard to public rhetoric, legislation, debate and policy.359 
Advocates of this thesis argue that in terms of empirical aspects, the 
differentiation, rationalization and diversification of religion have set it on a 
direct road to privatization, while in normative terms, religion ought to be 
relegated to the private realm because it no longer has any reasonable 
process or relevance to our lives. This privatization thesis is “a major 
component in revised secularization”.360 
                                           
357 Charles Taylor has criticized as “subtraction theories” the epistemic attitude of a general rejection, as argued in 
the following representative works: Bryan R. Wilson, Religion in Secular Society (London: Watts, 1966); Religion 
in Sociological Perspective (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1982); Ray Wallis and Steve Bruce, “Secularization: The Orthodox 
Model”, in Steve Bruce (ed.), Religion and Modernization (Oxford: Oxford University Press,1992), pp.8-30; Steve 
Bruce, God is Dead: Secularization in the West (Oxford and Malden: Blackwell Publishers, 2002). 
358 For a more detailed account of “privatization of religion”, see section 4.1.1. 
359 Steve Bruce, while continuing to accept the privatization of religion, has at the same time argued that religion 
matters politically. Steve Bruce, Secularization: In Defence of an Unfashionable Theory (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2011); 
Politics and Religion (Cambridge: Polity, 2003). 
360 David Martin, On Secularization: Toward a Revised General Theory (Aldershot and Burlington: Ashgate, 2005), 
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Hence, in recent decades, debates over the place and role of religion in the 
public sphere have been strongly contested, leading to a critical reflection on 
the privatization theory. On the one hand, the public significance of religion is 
dwindling, while on the other, the visibility and contribution of religion in civil 
society are increasing. This paradoxical situation implies that we cannot grasp 
the location and role of religion in the public sphere on the basis of either 
“privatization theory” or “the countervailing trend against privatization”. The 
contradictory claims revolve around conflicts that resonate across the spectra 
of public feeling, and have come to be among the central and defining areas 
of political life in the 21st century. As we enter a new phase of the religious as 
well as the secular, prominent scholars such as José Casanova, Craig 
Calhoun, Jürgen Habermas, and Charles Taylor speculate about the new 
visibilities and public contributions of the religious in the public sphere. Even 
the socio-political role of religion is being re-appreciated by so-called secular 
intellectuals who were formerly rather critical of religion.  
In this situation, in order to understand how Christianity continues to occupy a 
substantial position and to play an irreducible role in the public sphere, it is not 
sufficient simply to explore the privatization of Christianity or the resilience of 
Christian institution; rather, it is necessary to revisit the visibility of Christianity 
through its faith-based praxis in society. Furthermore, such investigation 
should be carried out not through theological discourse specific to the religious 
                                           
p.20.  
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field, but through interdisciplinary reflection.  
This chapter seeks to reconfigure the place and role of Christianity in the public 
sphere, focusing not on the quantitative erosion or eruption of the 
institutionalized forms of Christianity, but on its qualitative transformation, 
particularly in relation to the public contribution and presence of Christianity 
through its social engagement, participation, and entanglement, and more 
radically, its potential as reflexive agency in the present modern society. In this 
research, the crux of discussion concerning the place and role of Christianity 
is located in the following important discussions, which combine the theoretical, 
the empirical and the normative. 
First of all, we need to articulate some ambiguous and confusing notions 
regarding the privatization of religion. In this regard we will examine whether 
“the privatization of religion” is an adequate conceptualization for either an 
empirical-sociological understanding of the public location of religion, or a 
normative approach. In particular, in section 4.1, the thesis will engage in an 
analytical-theoretical consideration of the privatization of religion in terms of its 
relationship to “de-privatization”, “differentiation”, and “individualization”. 
Next, in section 4.2, we will explore the trend of privatization and the renewed 
visibility of Christianity in terms of empirical aspects. Here, we address the 
questions: Have religious faith and practice in the modern world really 
remained an exclusively private affair? If not, what types of dramatic and 
worldwide increase in the socio-political influence of religion has occurred?  
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In section 4.3 we take a normative approach to the privatization of religion and 
the renewed visibility of religion. The question addressed here is whether the 
renewed visibility of Christianity in the public sphere is worrying or welcome; 
that is, whether religious faith ought to be relegated to exclusively private 
matters and marginalized into the private sphere, or whether we need to 
embrace religion (Christianity) for the development of civil society.  
Finally, in section 4.4 this study will re-illuminate the potential of Christianity as 
reflexive agent in a re-modern paradigm. In particular, we will look at the social 
meaning, value, and challenge presented by the transformation of Christian 
religiosity to today’s radical socio-political discussion, by examining a 
remarkable reconsideration and renewed theological reflection among many 
leading European intellectuals who are normally associated with irreligious or 
areligious currents. 
Crucially, these accounts of the place and role of religion in the public sphere, 
considered at three different but intricately interwoven levels, need to 
overcome theoretical difficulties, with all of the baggage associated with 
ambiguous terminology, as well as deep seated assumptions concerning 
empirical observations, and the problems caused by the presence of two 
opposing preconceived ideas.  
4.1. Theoretical Considerations on a Secularization Sub-
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thesis: Privatization  
4.1.1. Privatization & De-privatization  
The privatization thesis holds that religion in the modern world became and 
ought to remain an exclusively private matter, lacking the social significance it 
had previously had in the public sphere, in rhetoric, debate, legislation and 
policy, since religious belief is regarded as outdated and irrelevant to our lives, 
and as intellectually unable to be a proper subject of public discourse. The 
privatization of religion has been taken for granted both as a general modern 
historical and empirical trend and as the normative precondition for modern 
and liberal democratic politics, especially in modern secular societies. The 
theory has been documented and developed by many liberal theorists, and 
remarkably, by sociologists of religion such as Bryan Wilson (1926~2004), 
Thomas Luckmann (1927~), Peter Berger (1929~), and Robert Bellah 
(1927~2013).361  
In Bryan Wilson’s interpretation of secularization, traditional religion had 
become, in the modern world, primarily the concern of the individual, as “the 
process by which religious institutions, actions and consciousness lose their 
social significance”.362  Thus, there would be no requirement for religious 
                                           
361 Bryan Wilson, Religion in Sociological Perspective; Thomas Luckmann, The Invisible Religion: The Problem of 
Religion in Modern Society (New York: Macmillan, 1967); Peter Berger, The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a 
Sociological Theory of Religion (Garden City: Doubleday, 1967); Robert Bellah, “Religious Revolution”, in Beyond 
Belief: Essays on Religion in a Post-Traditional World (New York: Haper & Row, 1970).  
362 Bryan Wilson, Religion in Sociological Perspective, p.149. 
213 
teaching over value judgements. Luckmann maintained that society would be 
run by rational-based administrative organizations and by impersonal 
regulation, while individuals would internalize their particular religious faith, 
which would render religion socially invisible and irrelevant. The long-term 
consequence of the turn to inwardness and subjectivity would be an epoch-
making modern tendency towards the privatization of religion.363 Similarly, 
Berger argued that religion had become a private ethical matter irrelevant to 
the economic and political system, rather than an overarching social 
phenomenon, and that its effect on the public realm had declined, through a 
process whereby parts of society and sectors of the culture are freed from 
domination by religious institutions and symbols. That is, religion is not related 
to the structure of the universe or to history, but only to individual existence 
and psychology.364  In Richard Fenn’s view, religion is not ostracized from 
society, but is cultivated as something that does not play any important role 
for the whole of that society.365 More recently, David Voas, a quantitative 
sociologist of religion, expressed a similar idea in his argument that “religion 
will survive, as astrology has survived, but its significance will be much 
reduced”.366 In summary, the idea of privatization of religion takes a generally 
                                           
363 Thomas Luckmann, The Invisible Religion. 
364 Peter L. Berger, The Sacred Canopy, p.151; Peter L. Berger, Brigitte Berger, Hansfried Kellner, The Homeless 
Mind: Modernization and Consciousness (NY: Random House, 1973), p.113. 
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negative view of the possibility that religion can play a public role in more 
advanced society, due to the loss of public relevance and plausibility. As a 
result, the claim of religious privatization is nothing but that religion has been 
relegated and ought to remain relegated to the private sector without a public 
voice. 
Indeed, this view of the privatization of religion has been deeply embedded in 
individual mind and social culture, and entrenched in all sorts of discussion, 
historical and normative, so that it is not easy to be entirely free from its effects 
in the social-cultural atmosphere. More belligerently, the term carries negative 
rather than neutral normative connotations on the religious, and implies that 
religious faith is a last remnant of the historical process.  
 
However, particularly since the late 1980s,367 striking cases of religion’s public 
influence have been observed and reconsidered by scholars. In spite of the 
fact that in some parts of the world religion is still regarded as a private affair, 
a reconsideration has begun of the various manifestations of a dramatic and 
                                           
367 The collapse of the former Communist Bloc as a command economy in the late 1980s and early 1990s 
transformed the global political and ideological topography that had maintained rigid social and national systems 
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conflict. The globalization of super-national industrial and financial capital, and the information and 
telecommunication revolution, accelerated production, circulation, and consumption in a worldwide network under 
the strong influence of economic globalization. See Cecelia Lynch, “Social Movements and the Problem of 
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215 
worldwide increase in the political influence of religion. In many countries, the 
resurgence of conservative religious communities has produced a renewed 
appreciation of privatization theory as a sub-thesis of secularization. 
Academics and practitioners have observed that there has been a consistent 
presence and surprising vitalization of religion in the public sphere, as 
evidenced by global historical trends, and are grappling with the emphatic 
return of faith to the public table.368 In this respect, as soon as one gives 
serious consideration to a global comparative perspective and to the internal 
transformation of Christianity, one must admit that a counter-current to 
privatization is occurring in modern societies throughout the world, although, 
of course, it takes different forms according to each local context. Such 
empirical observation calls into question “the privatization of religion”, and 
leads to a search to make sense of its implications.  
This reversal of privatization has been most persuasively presented in José 
Casanova’s Public Religions in the Modern World, where he shows that the 
privatization claim is no longer either defensible or plausible, and introduces a 
new key term: “de-privatization”. According to Casanova’s definition: 
Religious institutions and organizations refuse to restrict themselves to the 
pastoral care of an individual’s soul and continue to raise questions about the 
interconnections of private and public morality and to challenge the claims of 
the subsystems, particularly states and markets, to be exempt from 
                                           
368 This is one of the most powerful implications of the post-secular. 
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extraneous normative considerations. One of the results of this ongoing 
contestation is a dual, interrelated process of repoliticization of the private 
religious and moral spheres and re-normativization of the public economic 
and political spheres. This is what I call, for lack of a better term, the de-
privatization of religion.369 
Casanova argues that religion had in fact never been absent from the public 
sphere, in either Europe or America; irrespective of whether there is a formal 
separation between state and church, religious impact remains very visible 
throughout society. He points in particular to the historical difficulties of 
maintaining the secular meta-narrative of how we all became secular in the 
public realm. Casanova’s analytical argument is widely acclaimed as having 
transformed the secularist bias in the field, and is taken seriously as an 
important marker of a “post-secular turn”. Indeed, it has sparked a wealth of 
commentary and research, and “de-privatization” is a good device to enable 
us to rethink the place and public role of religion. 
However, does this process of de-privatization of religion invalidate the whole 
corpus of privatization of religion? Is it, as Peter Berger argues, “de-
secularization”? In this context, the concept of “de-privatization” as a 
countervailing trend to “privatization of religion” may be just one element 
among many social practices and understanding, and can be seen as a 
selective explanation that overlooks two crucial points. First, there is 
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undoubtedly a continuing retreat of religion from the public sphere; traditional 
institutionalized forms of religion and church-related religiosity have suffered 
particularly sharp declines, especially in the West and its successor societies. 
All the surveys emphasize that the European population is increasingly 
disconnected from comprehensive religious doctrines and moral disciplines 
such as those regarding divorce and sexual behaviours. One claim of the 
religious privatization thesis that is not at all contentious is that there is a 
gradual weakening of the public authority of religion on ethical matters.  
Secondly, despite the many manifestations of a resurgence of religion in the 
public sphere, these are usually branded either as anti-modern fundamental 
religion resisting processes of secularization, or as a form of traditionalist 
collective identity reaction to the threat of globalization. Focusing on the 
resurgence of religion outside the modern West has allowed critics to pretend 
that these revivals are actually part of a modernizing process. Not surprisingly, 
many have taken pains to detect a “Puritan spirit” or an “inner-worldly 
asceticism” in such movements. Thus, discussions about the return of religion 
to the public table are taking place from a negative rather than positive 
standpoint, with an eye on how to deal with it rather than how to accept and 
develop it.370 In other words, religion in the eyes of cosmopolitan elites is 
either irrelevant or just reactive. This may result in a framing of the argument 
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as the western vs the non-western, because the theory cannot escape the 
criticism that the importance of religiosity persists most strongly among 
vulnerable populations, especially those living in poorer nations, facing 
personal risks and threats to their survival.371  
Considering these two crucial points, to interpret all the visible manifestations 
of Christianity in the public sphere as the triumph of religion can be an inward 
self-soothing conjecture of religious groups, and to reconstruct the meaning of 
religiosity in modern society based on a global comparative perspective alone 
is a half-baked idea at best. On the contrary, it is clear that privatization of 
religion is not the whole picture, but only one part of it. The notion of 
privatization contains fallacies, a result of confining the religious to traditional 
religious institutions and simplifying its transformation.  
In this respect, the most significant and overriding point is that we need 
alternative terms and approaches, to go beyond both religious self-centred 
interpretation and “secularist self-understanding”. 372  Our new intellectual 
reflection, as a challenge to our modern zeitgeist, should put into question the 
privatization of religion, while at the same time it should disabuse religious 
adherents of the idea that religion has been a consistent presence in the public 
sphere.373 Therefore, the thesis of this research posits that the globalization 
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of society, while structurally favouring religious privatization,374 also provides 
fertile ground for the renewed public influence of religion, focusing on the 
transformation of Christianity in the forms of its religiosity and in the way it 
engages in the public sphere rather than the dominance of institutionalized 
religion, and more significantly, on the social contribution of Christianity rather 
than the rise of politically assertive strong Christianity. 
In conclusion, just as not every element of religion is irrelevant, but not all 
elements of religion are relevant, so not every form of religion is privatized, but 
not all forms of religion are de-privatized. Here, the public presence of religion 
does not necessarily eclipse the privatized form of religion, and vice versa. 
Therefore, this research will deploy neither the theory of privatization nor that 
of “de-privatization”, but, alternatively, “the public presence of religion” as the 
social engagement of religion. Hence, I shall concentrate on the question of 
how religion engages with civil society in the public sphere, and on the process 
whereby the place and role of religion have been reorganized. 
Before engaging with the main themes, we need to give theoretical 
consideration to one important point, namely that the concept of privatization 
is too often confused with the ideas indicated by two key terms that explain 
social transformation in the modernization process: differentiation and 
individualization. This imprecision may create many misconceptions with 
                                           
Century: Challenges and Transformations (Farnham and Burlington: Ashgate, 2010). 
374 Indeed, here “particularization” of religion would be a better term rather than privatization.  
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regard to the historical reality of the transformation of religion. For instance, 
regarding functional differentiation as the privatization of religion, it can too 
easily be held that differentiation necessarily means that religion can no longer 
have public implications. Thus, in order to capture diverse historical patterns 
and ongoing global processes of privatization and the public presence of 
religion, we need to start from a theoretical consideration of the more refined 
and precise relationship between the privatization of religion on one hand, and 
differentiation and individualization on the other.  
4.1.2. Privatization & Differentiation  
Does functional differentiation necessarily lead to the marginalization of 
religion to the privatized realm? To answer this question, we need to examine 
historical aspects of social differentiation, that is, the separation of religion from 
politics, which was as much a demand for states not to interfere with religion 
as it was for particular religious views not to dominate states.375  
Functional differentiation is often said to have begun in Europe in 1648, with 
the forging of a secular state system in the wake of the Peace of Westphalia. 
In fact, this is a fallacy, demonstrably untrue. The Peace of Westphalia did not 
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make states secular, nor religion privatized. What issued from the Westphalian 
settlement was not a Europe without religion, but a Europe of primarily 
confessional states with established churches under the principle of cuius 
regio eius religio (“who rules, his religion”).376 It formulated new church-state 
partnerships, while making international relations essentially secular. 
The European path to a relatively strong secularism was not charted directly 
from the Peace of Westphalia. It was, rather, shaped by struggles against the 
enforced religious conformity that followed the 1648 treaties. The strong 
French doctrine of laïcité 377  was the product of un-churching struggles, 
against priestly authority - that continued through the nineteenth and into the 
twentieth centuries. These gave a more strident form to secularism and 
positioned it as a dimension of social struggle and liberation. More generally, 
such secularizing struggles did not confront ancient state churches but new 
church-state partnerships forged in the wake of 1648.378 
As Casanova argues, the end of the Thirty Years’ War (1618-48) did not result 
                                           
376 “What followed in European states after the Peace of Westphalia was a mixture of migration, forced conversion, 
and legal sanctions against religious minorities. Members of some minorities moved to European colonies abroad 
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in an elimination of religion from the public stage; the fact that Europe became 
particularly secular may have been the result of a strong anti-sympathy against 
new church-state partnerships forged in the wake of 1648.379 By contrast, in 
the United States, the separation of church and state, i.e. functional 
differentiation, has been accompanied neither by a process of religious decline 
nor by the confinement of religion to the private sphere; indeed, it has often 
been accompanied by high levels of religious belief and participation. Not only 
have we witnessed persistent trends toward de-secularization and de-
privatization over the last forty years, but a longer historical perspective 
suggests a continuous entanglement of religion and society.  
The secularization thesis is disaggregated by Casanova into three sub-theses: 
Secularization [Ⅰ] - the social differentiation of religion, Secularization [Ⅱ] - the 
loss of the social significance of religion, and Secularization [Ⅲ] - the 
privatization of religion.380  This distinction is useful when trying to understand 
discussion regarding the privatization of religion and when evaluating whether 
privatization has in fact occurred in any given context.381 Since in Europe the 
three processes of secular differentiation, privatization of religion, and religious 
decline have been historically interconnected, there has been a tendency to 
view them as intrinsically interrelated components of a single general 
teleological process of secularization and modernization, rather than as 
                                           
379 José Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World. 
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381 For a detailed analysis, see Chapter 2, section 2.2.2. 
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particular and contingent developments. However, there is nothing that 
indicates that they must be connected with each other, and they are not 
connected in other areas of the world. Programs of institutional separation 
between state and religion, though often imposed on religious actors by 
aggressive secularists, do not necessarily end up weakening the public 
presence of religion. The differentiation of society does not necessarily lead to 
privatization of belief, and privatization is not a necessary concomitant of 
institutional differentiation.  
Nevertheless, the differentiation thesis itself still enjoys broad acceptance. 
According to Casanova, while the two minor sub-theses of the secularization 
thesis - the decrease in the significance of religion and the privatization of 
religion - have undergone numerous critiques and revisions in the last fifteen 
years, the understanding of secularization as a process of functional 
differentiation of the various secular institutional spheres such as economy, 
law, politics and science from religion in modern societies remains. 382 
Through a number of comparative studies, Casanova has demonstrated that 
modernization has entailed secularization as functional differentiation, in which 
distinct social institutions such as governments and churches increasingly 
assume independent roles and functions, as well as discrete institutional forms.  
Indeed, this is a key component of modern secularization. Of course, the 
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specifics of political secularism vary from case to case – separation of church 
and state in America, fairness in allocation of public support to different 
religious groups in India, laïcité and the exclusion of religious expression from 
even non-political public life in France and Turkey. Although they involve very 
different stances toward the place of the church in official and social life, one 
clear historical fact that all of these cases indicate is that the more society has 
advanced, the more developed has been the differentiation between throne 
and altar. The differentiation thesis, also defended in nuanced fashion by 
David Martin,383 maintains that religion is no longer married to institutional 
power in the way that, for example, European monarchs once ruled by “divine 
right”. Religious institution no longer helps prop up overarching “sacred 
canopies”.  
If that is the case, does social differentiation (secularization [Ⅰ]) privatize and 
marginalize religion in its own specialized ghetto? Or does it create a social 
location and role in which faith can discover its own specific character, freed 
from the constraints of establishment and seductive opportunities for political 
influence? 
Of course, the separation between politics and religion, i.e. the state and the 
church, and the increasing differentiation of societal spheres, may lead to 
atrophy of religious domains, as well as implying a loss of power on behalf of 
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the churches. Furthermore, social differentiation has entailed the extension of 
religious competition and pluralism. However, this does not necessarily mean 
that religion has been completely privatized, or that religious organizations no 
longer play an important role in the public sphere. Talcott Parsons (1902~1979) 
refined the process of social differentiation as a key component of modern 
secularization.384  However, Parsons did not regard the differentiation that 
means the separation of each social sphere as a decline of religion, but rather 
as a change enabling religion better to fulfil its proper role. According to him, 
the influence of organized religion is on the wane and shifting towards the 
personal realm. However, Christian values are intertwined with western 
society and, in effect, have become a sacred core of our social system.385 In 
fact, an observation of religious processes of change shows that religion has 
not lost, but rather has gained, in public relevance.  
The establishment of a public sphere during the Enlightenment period did not 
forbid the public role of religion; rather, the differentiation brought about 
diverse patterns of Christian social engagement and opened up new 
opportunities. “Modern churches can adapt themselves to the new liberal 
paradigm by evolving from state-oriented into society-oriented institutions, and 
free citizens can found organizations with a religious purpose.” 386 
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Differentiation often contributed to increasing the autonomy and capacity of 
religious organizations to formulate their own political agendas and mobilize 
their own resources and followers.387  Eagleton describes this paradoxical 
process: 
Along with the other two symbolic domains of art and sexuality, religion was 
unhooked to some extent from secular power; and the upshot of this 
privatization for all three symbolic forms was notably double-edged. On the 
one hand, they could act as precious sources of alternative value, and thus 
of political critique; on the other hand, their isolation from the public world 
caused them to become increasingly pathologized.388 
His delineation shows that religion holds more potential than the “state could 
comfortably handle” (albeit that his term “privatization” ought perhaps to be 
replaced with “differentiation” in order to express the situation more exactly). 
When the church was subordinated to the state, she sometimes had to remain 
silent. Yet, in a situation of social differentiation, a church that remains in the 
free third position can express her opinion more openly, engage freely in social 
issues and approach the historical truth without any political interference. 
More significantly, social differentiation paved the way toward an authentic 
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religiosity emancipated from cultural and political authority, and oriented 
toward “movement” through participation, solidarity and entanglement, not 
religious dominance. In that context, religion may pursue political and public 
functions, for example, working for the preservation of human rights or 
critiquing excessive forms of capitalism.389 Insofar as religious communities 
and churches do not oppose the separation of church and state, and do not 
strive for public or legal privilege, the public presence of religion is compatible 
with the social differentiation principles of modern society.  
4.1.3. Privatization & Individualization  
It is also necessary to clarify the distinction between the thesis of privatization 
of religion, and that of individualization.390 In many cases, privatization of 
religion is treated as being synonymous with individualization of religion, and 
this creates obstacles to studying the substantial location and role of religion 
in the public sphere.391 Privatization is not the same as individualization. The 
two concepts differ in terms of the questions they ask and their primary 
concerns, even if the phenomena presented through the different processes 
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of the two theorems can partly overlap. Whereas the initial question of 
privatization of religion focuses on the radius of religious influence in the whole 
society: “To what extent does religion have an effect in society?”, that of 
individualization is related to the modes of existence or lifestyle relating to 
religion: “How does religious faith exist?” While the antonym of privatization is 
“publicization”, 392  that of individualization is “collectivization” or 
“totalitarianization”. We could therefore translate privatization of religion as 
“the withdrawal of religion into the private sphere”, while individualization of 
religion is better expressed as “coming to selfhood of religious belief”, or “self-
realization of religious belief”. 
As a consequence, we need to profile as individualization rather than 
privatization the tendency for individuals to pay less and less attention to 
external sources of religious authority and more and more attention to their 
own intuitions and feelings (Luhmann);393  to create their own collages of 
religious ideas and symbols drawn from widely differing traditions; 394  to 
cultivate a religiosity that does not belong to religious communities (Davie);395 
to give priority to the process of seeking personal authenticity rather than 
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“dwelling” in any particular faith tradition (Wuthnow);396 and to be pilgrims and 
converts rather than regular attenders (Hervieu-Léger),397 to mention just a 
few. 
Moreover, the privatization of religion thesis derives from conflict between the 
secular value system and the religious value system, while individualization of 
religion has emerged from the process of natural transformation to develop 
our individual personal faith. Consequently, privatization of religion can be 
construed as a retreat of religion from the public to the private sphere, while 
individualization is the tendency towards increasingly subjective forms of 
religion.  
From this point of view, it is important to note here that although the process 
of privatization of religion continues as a constitutive process of the late 
modern global society, the logic of individualization of religious belief can be 
compatible with the social presence of religion in the public sphere. Religion 
has been flourishing most where it appears in individualized forms of religiosity, 
but this tendency does not necessarily eclipse the social presence of religion, 
and does not imply that religion has lost its influence in our lives. 398 
Paradoxically, individualized forms of religiosity can be a manifestation of a 
new consolidation of trends and socio-political markets that go beyond one’s 
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own self-faith, which may be equated with the social presence of religion, while 
at the same time indicating a self-actualization within the spiritual life, which is 
equated with the privatization of religion. Thus, through empirical observation, 
one can find individualized forms of religion and still conclude that such 
religiosity, as opposed to privatized religion, can be compatible with a socio-
political manifestation in relation to the renewed visibility of Christianity in the 
public sphere. 
4.2. Empirical Observation on the Renewed Visibility of 
Christianity in the Public Sphere 
As a countervailing argument to the privatization thesis, scholars have 
observed that during the latter half of the twentieth century, the presence and 
visibility of religion in the public sphere actually increased. 399  This 
phenomenon has sparked new attempts to re-illuminate the place and role of 
religion in the public sphere beyond the privatization projection.  
Here, the renewed visibility of Christianity in the public sphere does not mean 
that the social position of Christianity had previously been reduced to the 
private realm, but has now returned to the public domain, but rather that it can 
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be visible and embedded in the public sphere, through transformation of its 
religiosity and of the way in which it engages with society. Thus, as 
emphasized previously, the empirical observation on the public presence of 
religion in the public sphere must be analysed in relation to forms of religiosity 
and their manifestation and implications in the socio-political realm, rather than 
in relation to institutionalized religion. This entails an exploration of the ways 
in which religious forms of Christianity transform, re-invent themselves, and 
take new shapes in a changed world, and is highly relevant to the issue of the 
value of Christianity in civil society. Although the public presence of Christianity 
is not entirely recent, it represents a new phase in the history of religion. 
This public presence of Christianity is to be found primarily in two dimensions. 
First of all, Christian socio-political engagement in public matters draws upon 
the renewed religiosity of the Christian churches. In addition to this, such social 
engagement can be traced implicitly in the various individualized forms of 
religious movements that have come to exist through a multifaceted 
transformation of Christian morphology, i.e., outside the religious domains. 
4.2.1. Illuminating the Presence of Christianity in the Public Sphere 
4.2.1.1. Considerations on the idea of public religion  
In any discussion on the growing prominence of religion in the socio-political 
discourse, it is helpful to start with the idea of “public religion” as 
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conceptualized in José Casanova’s Public Religions in the Modern World.400 
In this book, Casanova focused attention on the public presence of religion in 
the political life of various parts of the world (especially, Spain, Poland, Brazil 
and the USA), and raised critical questions on some widespread assumptions 
about secularization and its sub-thesis, privatization: 
Religion in the 1980s went public in a dual sense. It entered the “public 
sphere” and gained, thereby, publicity. Various publics – the mass media, 
social scientists, professional politicians, and the public at large – suddenly 
began to pay attention to religion. The unexpected public interest derived 
from the fact that religion, leaving its assigned place in the private sphere, 
had thrust itself into the public arena of moral and political contestation.401  
His analysis assumed the continuing presence and influence of religion in the 
public sphere as against the supposed privatization of religion and, more 
significantly, it provided an opportunity to reopen inquiry concerning the 
engagement of religion with socio-political discourse. However, Casanova 
himself later revised this framework, pointing out the main shortcomings of the 
argument: its Western-Christian centrism, the attempt to restrict modern public 
religions to the public sphere of civil society, and the national framing of 
relations of the church-state-nation-civil society without recognition of the 
transnational global dimension.402 Certainly, Casanova’s typology of public 
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religions403 would need to be modified and expanded in order to make it more 
plausible. By setting the concept in the modern frame, Casanova was clinging 
too closely to the classic religious categories; relating the argument to the 
traditional location of religion rather than its substantial action; and focusing 
solely on religion rather than religiosity or religious faith. To take an example, 
the established state church that Casanova defined as the first category of 
public religion remains just a pre-modern or modern religious symbol rather 
than an actor positively engaged in the social sector or presently embedded in 
public life. More critically, his concept of public religions might include the rise 
of assertive strong Christianity, which could be explained away simply as an 
“anti-political trend” of fundamentalism in an individual and social context that 
is not yet modernized. 404  Consequently, we need a more plausible 
conceptualization. 
4.2.1.2. Reformulating the concept of the public presence of Christianity 
Therefore, instead of the term public religions, this study will use “the public 
presence of religion” in order to describe what kind of role certain 
characteristics of religions or the religious play in the development of global 
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human society, through social participation, solidarity, and entanglement. It 
does not seek to answer the question of to what extent religion holds a 
dominant position over the secular challenge. Assessment of the public 
presence of religion is not concerned with whether religion is (re-)entering the 
public sphere, but rather with whether the socio-political actions that religion 
is taking are valid and relevant to individual life and the whole society. In this 
respect, the public presence of religion is partly a correction of both 
privatization and de-privatization as its countervailing trend. The two opposite 
terms are central to the modern discourse about the relationship of religion to 
the whole society. 
The framework of the public presence of Christianity considers three important 
factors. First, it takes into account the social involvement of Christianity in 
public, social, and daily life, not religious doctrinal issues or the religious 
system itself. Secondly, the framework is applicable to social actions within the 
boundaries of not being at odds with the principle of social differentiation. This 
stance indicates that the public presence of Christianity is generated not by 
the dominance principle, but by the movement principle, through its 
participation and entanglement, but also through mutual reflection and 
reciprocal beneficial impulse. Finally, the public presence of Christianity 
encompasses a wide range of social engagement of religion through 
individualized as well as institutionalized forms of Christianity. This means that 
the logic of the social presence of religion can be compatible with the process 
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of individualization of religious belief, not privatization.405 
4.2.2. The Public Presence of Christianity in Faith-based Social 
Praxis 
Today, the most powerful factor re-stoking academic debates over religion is 
the renewed visibility of Christianity in the public sphere, especially in the post-
secular discourse.406 In such empirically observable phenomena, we can find 
not only persistent trends of the public presence of religion, “partly” going 
beyond secularization and privatization over the last forty years, but also, in a 
longer historical perspective, we may well imagine a continuous entanglement 
of the religious with the whole society.  
The empirical manifestation of the public presence of Christianity in faith-
based social praxis can be traced at two levels: 1) The social participation and 
solidarity of Christian institutions and the churches at the ecclesiastical level, 
and 2) The public involvement of individual Christians or groups at the civil 
society level through the integrating of Christian faith and religiosity into faith-
based social organizations (FBSO) or civil society movements such as NGOs. 
Clearly, the separation of two different types of Christian visibility in the public 
sphere is an analytical, ideal-typical distinction. In actual empirical reality, the 
delineation of the different types of public presence of Christianity is by no 
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means so clear-cut. Nevertheless, the purpose of the analytical distinction is, 
first, to put into question any rigid theory of privatization that would like to 
restrict religion to the private sphere on the grounds that any form of public 
religion represents a threat to the public sphere or to democratic politics, and 
second, to display the substantial location and role of Christianity in the 
present modern world. With this in mind, the scale and range of social 
engagement among faith groups and organizations is substantial but often 
unrecognized. Research evidence in this field has accumulated steadily in 
recent years. 
4.2.2.1. The social participation and solidarity of Christian institutions and the 
churches at the ecclesiastical level  
That the landscape of renewed visibility of Christianity in the public sphere 
contains contradictions is undeniable. At one and the same time, there has 
been a trend of privatization of Christianity, seeking to relegate the institutional 
churches and their practice to a strictly circumscribed private sphere, and 
another major shift, in which the churches themselves have emerged as 
players on the social stage.407 Recognition of this paradoxical situation will be 
helpful to understand the renewed visibility of Christianity at the ecclesiastical 
level in a way that goes beyond both the privatization and the de-privatization 
theses. The question is in what sense the churches will be private, or not. 
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The churches have a long history of public engagement. Even if we confine 
our investigation to modern times, we can adduce an abundance of historical 
narratives: the Wesleyan and Moravian anti-slavery movement of the 18th 
century, the Social Gospel of the late 19th century, the civil rights movement 
of the 1950s and 1960s, and so on. Indeed, Christianity has been entangled 
in complicated ways with social activism and politics. Moreover, since the 
1960s, Christianity has resolutely carried out a ground breaking reformulation 
of its traditions at the ecclesiastical level that has been just as drastic as the 
modern secularist criticism on religious faith.  
As a representative example, the aggiornamento of the Second Vatican 
Council (1962–65) arranged a new place for the Roman Catholic Church to be 
re-embedded in the public sphere by leading the church to affirm democracy 
and religious freedom for all, not just Catholics, and to operate as a legitimate 
and autonomous actor in civil society rather than through often defensive 
“concordats” (or pacts) with individual governments.408 Casanova suggests 
this history as a pivotal context for the framework of the theory of de-
privatization: 
The aggiornamento led to a fundamental relocation of the Catholic Church 
from a state-oriented to a civil society-oriented institution. Moreover, the 
official adoption of the modern discourse of human rights allowed the Catholic 
Church to play a crucial role in opposition to authoritarian regimes and in 
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processes of democratization through the Catholic world. But the Catholic 
Church’s embrace of voluntary disestablishment did not mean the 
privatization of Catholicism but rather its relocation from the state to the public 
sphere of civil society.409  
He emphasizes the relocation of the Catholic Church as an instructive sample 
of the modern public religions, because “the modern discourse of secularism 
was often constructed in relation to Catholicism”. 
However, it is clear that there are various types of public presence of 
Christianity at the ecclesiastical level. More radical political engagement can 
be illustrated by the emergence of liberation theology in Latin America in the 
1950s-60s,410 and of minjung theology (theology of the people) in Korea in the 
1960s.411 Such theological innovation does not mean only the reconstruction 
of theological discourse, but also forces an involvement in the public agenda 
through the theological re-orientation of the traditional church. Liberation 
theology refers to forms of local or contextual theology that propose that 
knowledge of God based on revelation leads necessarily to a praxis that 
opposes unjust social and political structures. It has been described as "an 
interpretation of Christian faith through the poor's suffering, their struggle and 
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hope, and a critique of society and the Catholic faith and Christianity through 
the eyes of the poor".412 
Following the Korean War in 1953, liberal Protestantism resisted the Yushin 
military regime of the 1960s to the mid-1980s, when South Korea went through 
political turmoil, suffering corruption and dictatorship. At that time there was 
also serious exploitation of factory workers in regard to their employment 
conditions and pay. This situation led to the emergence of the distinctive 
minjung theology as a new theological paradigm to meet the needs of the 
urban poor, who were victims of the highly competitive capitalist market and 
the authoritarian military regime. Reflecting the experiences of urban workers, 
especially during the years of oppressive military rule, the focus of minjung 
theology is on the politically oppressed, the economically exploited and the 
socially alienated. 413  Theologians’ main concern was not dealing with 
individual poor people, but lay in confronting the social process and system 
that prevented the minjung from escaping their misery. In this respect, as they 
tried to deal with economic and political injustice, the minjung theologians’ 
concern was more with anything anti-minjung than with the minjung 
themselves. The National Council of Churches (NCC), a representative of 
liberal Protestantism, opposed the regime, adopting “The Human Rights 
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Declaration”, which upheld human rights against state oppression.414 
Just as Latin America brought liberation theology to world notice as an “option 
for the poor”, an approach that puts the poor first, which is exactly what Jesus 
did, so transformation of evangelical groups has brought the concept of 
“integral mission” (holistic mission) to the notice of the wider world as an 
indication of the public presence of Christianity. The term, coined in Spanish 
in the 1970s by members of the Latin American Theological Fellowship (FTL, 
its Spanish acronym) to describe an understanding of Christian mission which 
embraces both the proclamation and the demonstration of the Gospel, has 
since grown in popularity among evangelical groups across every continent. 
The Ecuadorian theologian Rene Padilla (former International Director of the 
Tear Fund) is one of the premier proponents of integral mission, a holistic 
understanding of Christian mission in which there is no artificial barrier 
between evangelization and social responsibility. “Churches are becoming 
homes to the uprooted, families for those who have no family, especially in an 
urban society hungry for fellowship and belonging arising from family 
disintegration, and secularization.”415 
On the practical side, churches and other Christian voices in the public sphere 
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assist in fulfilling essential democratic functions by advocating on behalf of 
marginalized populations and motivating participation in civil society and the 
discourses that inform political decision-making. On many pressing issues, 
such as war and peace, poverty and social justice, abortion and end-of-life 
decisions, biomedical research and human nature, religious voices are among 
the most morally strident and politically efficacious. 
 
4.2.2.2. The public involvement of individual Christians or groups at the civil 
society level through the integration of Christian faith and religiosity in FBSOs 
or civil society movements 
In this sub-section, we will explore how Christianity regenerates itself in the 
public sphere beyond the ecclesiological dimension. More precisely, the 
discussion concerns how Christian religiosity presents itself outside the scope 
of traditional religious categories, not how the institutional church participates 
in the public domain. While this issue was discussed in section 3.2.3, focusing 
on the transformation of Christianity as opposed to the subtraction theory, as 
a new attempt at a radical reworking and understanding of ecclesiology, here 
we will examine whether Christianity still has significance and potential in 
socio-political matters, contrary to the privatization of religion thesis, and how 
the public engagement of new non-church forms of Christianity presents 
themselves.  
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That Christianity has a long history of public engagement is well-known. It has 
played a vital part in motivating and shaping the convictions of public figures 
in the areas of education and welfare, government policy and moral scrutiny. 
The distinctive point of the current picture is that while before the late 1960s 
many Christian social movements were church-based, subsequently, the 
capability of the religious institutions, including the churches, transferred to 
civil society movements. Nowadays, we see the vitalized presence of new 
non-church forms of Christianity in civil society, as exemplified by faith-based 
social organizations (FBSOs) such as Oxfam (1942), Christian Aid (1957), the 
Jubilee Debt Campaign, The Common Good (1971), and the Make Poverty 
History campaign (2005). 416  Sider and Unruh’s classification offers the 
following fivefold typology for identifying the degree to which organizations are 
linked to faith: 1) faith-permeated organization, 2) faith-centred organization, 
3) faith-affiliated organization, 4) faith-background organization, and 5) faith-
secular partnership.417 This differentiation provides a useful device to alert us 
to the diverse features of FBSOs, although such organizations remain more 
complicatedly entangled than their classification, reflecting broader trends 
toward mixed partnerships of religion with the different-denominational-
religious, the other-religious, and even the secular, together with the growing 
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concerns over polarization and religious extremism.   
From the late 1980s onwards, FBSOs have taken on a greater role. Following 
the collapse of ideological boundaries, the realm of civil society began both to 
expand, and to come under the global dominance of neoliberal public policies. 
The various Christian FBSOs that take on the role of welfare provider and/or 
political actor in civil society and in modern international relations are placed 
as the empirically visible presence of religion as a counteraction to neo-
liberalism. Paul Cloke, an English human geographer, argues that the effects 
of neoliberal globalization have paradoxically created new spaces for FBSOs. 
The age of neoliberal governance has opened up a resurgence of faith-based 
activity in the public sphere - as what were previously state-provided services 
have become contracted out or excised from the palette of public activity, so 
opportunities have been created for faith-groups to ﬁll the gap, through both 
voluntary and increasingly professionalized service organizations.418 
Cloke’s profile of the growing importance of FBSO activities as the public 
presence of Christianity in civil society implies a post-secular position. As 
discussed in section 3.2.3, this is a typology of integrating Christian faith or 
religiosity into the working of the public discourse.  
Not surprisingly, many FBSOs with Christian background were initiated by 
Christian churches and organizations, yet they are not subordinate to 
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particular denominations or the local church; indeed, given that they do not 
make a direct appeal to religious doctrines, often they are not immediately 
recognizable as faith-based organizations. Rather, they are independent from 
Christian institutions and churches, and the latter participate in the projects of 
FBSOs. In this light, the public engagement of FBSOs can be read as part of 
a broader augmentation of religion’s place in the public sphere through the 
integrating of Christian religiosity into the civil society movement. In fact, the 
public proﬁle of religion in connection with FBSOs is one of the most powerful 
implications of the “post-secular”. As a result, the public presence of religion 
in civil society can no longer be disregarded.419 Luke Bretherton emphasizes 
the role of religious groups not only as “generators of social capital”, but also 
as mobilizers of people to act together and to be active citizens.420 Religions, 
according to Bretherton, are a key catalyst in post-secularist politics because 
they can mobilize people, they keep alive ultimate questions about the good 
life, and they can promote resistance to commodiﬁcation and 
instrumentalization. He argues that “the recent resurgence of religion in public 
life, and in particular in urban life, represents the ‘salvation’ of politics”.421 
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4.3. Normative Approach to the Public Presence of 
Christianity: Worrying or Welcome? 
We have noted that the visibility of religion is likely to continue, beyond the 
religious-secular cleavage in the public sphere. This is true irrespective of the 
type of religion, institutional or individualized, and especially with regard to the 
way that religious activities involve individual commitment. 
If that is the case, is the renewed visibility of Christianity in the public sphere 
worrying or welcome? Ethically and politically, should religion be restricted to 
a private sphere to help make society more durable and robust? Is some 
doctrine of privatization that limits the role of religion in public life necessary to 
build free and healthy societies? Is the requirement of secularity for democracy, 
in itself, a good thing? Must religious faith and practice be relegated to private 
matters and marginalized into the private sphere? 
Over the centuries countless arguments have been conducted concerning 
whether exclusion of religious argumentation from the public sphere may be 
impoverishing or beneficial. We will examine some of these arguments, in 
particular the assertions that the renewed visibility of religion is a source of 
social conflict and an extension of irrationality in public affairs, and that it 
represents a challenge to a secular interpretation of modernity.  
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4.3.1. Critique on Neo-atheist Discussion  
This section comprises a critique of the neo-atheist discussion on the public 
presence of religion, in which the following objections are prominent: 1) 
Religion is an obstacle to political democracy as a source of division and 
conflict, and 2) Religion is irrational and essentially at odds with science and 
evidence-based debate. 
4.3.1.1. On Christianity as a source of conflict and violence 
In light of the recent historical evidence, one must acknowledge that religion 
has not disappeared - at least not yet. Moreover, one cannot afford to ignore 
that the socio-political influence of religion has become infinitely varied in its 
manifestations, and its visibility in the public sphere will continue to be vital. 
This empirical trajectory has provoked the secularist school of thought, and in 
the past few years extreme formulations of secular views have appeared in 
the work of the so-called “neo-atheists”: for example, Richard Dawkins’ The 
God Delusion, Cristopher Hitchens’ God is not Great, Daniel Dennett’s 
Breaking the Spell, and Sam Harris’ The End of Faith.422  However, their 
version of the thesis is somewhat different from that of their predecessors and 
the old secularization theorists. The major points of difference revolve around 
                                           
422 Cristopher Hitchens, God is Not Great: How Religion Poisons Everything (London: Atlantic Books, 2007); 
Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2006); Daniel Dennett, Breaking the Spell: Religion 
as a Natural Phenomenon (New York: Penguin, 2007); Sam Harris, The End of Faith: Religion, Terror, and the 
Future of Reason (New York: W.W. Norton, 2004). For more on the “neo-atheist” debate, see the “Beyond Belief” 
conference website at www.beyondbelief2006.org. 
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their moral assessment of religion as inherently “fundamentalist”, irrational, 
violent, and repressive always and everywhere, and stigmatized as the cause 
of many of the world’s worst evils.423 For example, English biologist Richard 
Dawkins claims that: “Faith is an evil precisely because it requires no 
justification and brooks no argument. (…) Faith can be very dangerous, and 
deliberately to implant it into the vulnerable mind of an innocent child is a 
grievous wrong.”424 Similarly, in the view of Christopher Hitchens, “religion 
poisons everything”. These neo-atheists continue to believe that religion will 
eventually recede, and hope that it will do so sooner rather than later, before 
it does more damage. Such strong critique of religion has been expressed 
overly stridently. 
 
Is that really a productive attitude, or does it only compound the problem? In 
Reason, Faith and Revolution: Reflections on the God Debate, Terry Eagleton 
begins his critical polemic by criticizing the so-called neo-atheist debates on 
the grounds that “most such critics buy their rejection of religion on the cheap. 
When it comes to the New Testament, at least, what they usually write off is a 
worthless caricature of the real thing, rooted in a degree of ignorance and 
prejudice to match religion’s own.”425 That is, their prejudice and a strong 
                                           
423 Peter Beyer, “Fundamentalism and the Pluralization of Value-Orientations”, in Lisbet Christofferesen, Hans 
Raun Iversen, Hanne Petersen and Margit Warburg (eds.), Religion in the 21st Century: Challenges and 
Transformations (Surrey and Burlington: Ashgate, 2010), pp.37-50. 
424 Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion, p.308. 
425 Terry Eagleton, Reason, Faith and Revolutions: Reflections on the God Debates (New Haven and London: Yale 
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aversion emanate from ill-natured understanding of religion and religious faith. 
Taylor articulates that “an attack in religion as calling for terrible self-mutilation 
is actuated by pride”.426 
I want to argue that things are not quite as they appear. In one sense, it is not 
exactly religion that is at the root of violence in many 20th century cases. Rather, 
religion gets involved through a quite different mechanism, which itself is not 
intrinsically tied to religion. Certain notorious cases should alert us to this, and 
to a different relation between devotion and violence. Taylor makes this point 
clearly:  
I want to argue that much of the implication of religion in violence in our 
century is to be understood as the working out of what can be called identity 
struggles. These have to crystallize around definitions of one’s own and the 
other’s identities. But these definitions are not necessarily religious. On the 
contrary, they frequently turn on perceived nationality, language, tribe, or 
whatever. The point I want to make is that what drives these struggles is 
frequently very similar across the different modes of definition. That religion 
figures in the definition, as against language, say, often changes very little… 
What matters is the historical identity of the people, and here some 
monasteries and traditional sites of devotion are important markers of 
                                           
UP, 2009), p. xi. 
426 Charles Taylor, Sesokhwaoa Hyundeamoonmyung [Secularization and the Modern Civilization] (Seoul: Tasan 
Memorial Lecture, 2003), p.62. This book brings together 4 papers presented at the Tasan Memorial Lecture in 
Seoul, Korea in 2002, in which Taylor outlined his perspective on the legitimate role of religion in the modern world. 
The printed volume also includes an interview with the author. 
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territory, but little more. 
In other words, even when religion is a major source of definition in modern 
identity struggles, it tends to figure under a description which displaces the 
centre of attention from what has always been seen as the main point of 
religious devotion and practice: God, moksha, Nirvana. Which is what raises 
the legitimate question: is the struggle about religion any more.427 
His long explanation is plausible in that to paint a picture of a certain kind of 
religion as the source of conflict in the 20th century is certainly not to tell the 
whole truth. Here, Taylor provides us with useful insight in distinguishing 
religiosity and the modes of identity struggle.  
 
However, although we cannot see religion itself as a source of conflict and 
violence, the original exclusivism embedded in religion still bears the possibility 
of inducing a mutation to a violent avant-garde by combining with the other 
sources in identity struggles, such as national identity or political party. 
Therefore, while Taylor’s argumentation is plausible, it is not sufficiently 
comprehensive. A more adequate approach would recognize the multiple 
strata that religiosity displays. Moreover, the characteristics of religion are 
strikingly diverse, a reflection of the fact that human culture displays a plethora 
of different characteristic types within each tribe, so that there is a perennial 
difficulty in defining religion. Some religious adherents remain irrational, while 
                                           
427 Ibid. pp 296-7.  
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others change and develop, through both experience and the impact of 
scientific discovery on human understanding. In other words, although certain 
religions may belong to the same religious classification, they may have quite 
different characteristics. Therefore, our questions should be: What qualitative 
religion will inspire and impact on the formation of human beings? What 
element of religion will be harmful to the formation of human beings? 
4.3.1.2. On religious anti-intellectualism and rationality 
Modern Science and Religion: Are They Mutually Exclusive?428 Central to 
debates on the relationship between religion and reason is the view that 
religion is irrational and a matter of blind faith. Many secular liberal theorists 
propose that religion should be relegated to more circumscribed and private 
spheres of social interaction, and its role should be reduced to nullity, because 
they regard religion as a personal belief that cannot properly be made subject 
to public discourse.  
For example, Richard Dawkins considers that religious people are 
psychologically dysfunctional and, from the point of view of the functioning of 
society, that religions are obstacles or forces resistant to change and thus 
socially harmful. He argues that religious people are subversive of intellectual 
life, since they short-circuit rationally accepted processes of establishing 
                                           
428 For a more in-depth discussion between science and religion, see http://www.germaninnovation.org/news-and-
events/podcasts?year=2012&speaker=2ec3446c-6c0e-e211-ae88-000c29e5517f#sthash.Slv3Zllm.dpuf 
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claims to knowledge and understanding. 429  Dawkins draws a distinction 
between people of faith and those who are “bright”, that is, who have a world 
view that is “free of supernatural and mystical elements”. He makes binary 
opponents of “bright” and “faith-heads”, regarding the latter as being infected 
by a deluding “virus”, strongly “other” to scientific rationality, led by a 
misconceived religious irrationality. However, a wider assessment of public 
faith discourages the drawing of a fixed binary divide and the mutual “othering” 
of faith and secularity. Sharp and ongoing controversies notwithstanding, 
science and rationalism do not confront faith in necessary philosophical 
opposition. As a philosopher, Michel Onfray is fiercely opposed to the anti-
intellectualism that he finds in the three great monotheistic religions. He argues 
that “monotheism loathes intelligence, that sublime gift defined as the art of 
connecting what at first and for most people seems unconnected”. 430 
Exploring the nature of religious belief, Sam Harris argues that religion 
involves such a misuse of our minds that it constitutes “a vanishing point 
beyond which rational discourse proves impossible”.431 According to Harris, 
religious belief fails the test of propositional truth because it floats free of 
evidence and reason, taking refuge in an internal coherence that is immune to 
falsification by new knowledge and events.432 Thus: “We must find our way to 
                                           
429 Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion. 
430 Michel Onfray, Atheist Manifesto: The Case Against Christianity, Judaism, and Islam, trans. by Jeremy Leggatt 
(NY: Arcade Publishing, 2007), p.67. 
431 Sam Harris, The End of Faith, p.25. 
432 Ibid. pp.75-76. 
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a time when faith, without evidence, disgraces anyone who would claim it. (…) 
It is imperative that we begin speaking plainly about the absurdity of most of 
our religious beliefs.”433 
It is not easy to find a positive passage about religion in the writings of these 
neo-atheists. Their argumentation is occupied with an ill-natured interpretation 
of the Bible that hardly contributes to a deeper understanding of religion’s 
significance today.434 As far as the tension between rationality and faith is 
concerned, neo-atheist debates need to be reconsidered at two levels, as 
captured succinctly in the introduction to Edurado Mendieta and Jonathan 
Vanantwerpen’s The Power of Religion in the Public Sphere: 
Many of our dominant stories about religion and public life are myths that 
bear little relation to either our political life or our everyday experience. 
Religion is neither merely private, for instance, nor purely irrational. And the 
public sphere is neither a real or straightforward rational deliberation nor a 
smooth space of unforced assent.435 
First, the religiosity of Christianity is not purely irrational; even if one concedes 
that there is a certain part of Christianity that is unable to solve the tension 
between faith and reason through rational means, that should not be defined 
as irrational.  
                                           
433 Ibid. p.48. 
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435 Edurado Mendieta and Jonathan Vanantwerpen (eds.) The Power of Religion in the Public Sphere (NY : 
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On the question of faith and reason, the neo-atheist conviction of theological 
blindness is due to the fact that they regard religious statements as being the 
same kind of thing as scientific ones, reducing faith to positive knowledge. 
Herbert McCabe holds that Christian faith is reasonable but not provable, 
pointing out that demanding definitive and absolute proofs can actually be a 
reactionary move.436 Of course, none of this is to suggest, as Dawkins seems 
to suspect, that religious claims require no evidence to back them up, or that 
they express merely “poetic” or subjective truths. Debates over neo-atheist 
scientific positivism have been well-covered in Eagleton’s writing: 
Religious faith is not in the first place a matter of subscribing to the proposition 
that a Supreme Being exists, which is where almost all atheism and 
agnosticism goes awry. God does not exist as an entity in the world. Atheist 
and believer can at least concur on that. Moreover, faith is for the most part 
performative rather than propositional.437 
In this respect, Eagleton expands the meaning of faith to the articulation of a 
loving commitment rather than a description of the way things are, referring to 
the vital point made by prominent French philosopher Alain Badiou: faith 
consists in a tenacious loyalty to what he calls “a truth event”.438 There is a 
remote parallel between this and Karen Armstrong’s claim that religious faith 
                                           
436  Herbert McCabe, Faith within Reason (London: Continuum, 2007). Herbert McCabe (1926-2001) was a 
Dominican Father and theologian. 
437 Terry Eagleton, Reason, Faith and Revolutions, p.111. 
438 Ibid. pp.117-120; See also Alain Badiou, Being and Event (London: Continuum, 2005). 
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is something that people do, thus “its truth is acquired by practical action”.439 
In line with this thinking, Habermas notes that the very ideas of freedom, 
emancipation, and liberation developed in largely religious discourses in 
Europe, and this continues to inform their meaning. 440  Calhoun also 
demonstrates the religious roots of public reason, arguing that religion is part 
of the genealogy of public reason itself.441 
Secondly, putting together both the capacity of rationality and its limits, the 
claim that the methods of empirical science alone can define reason is self-
refuting.  As Charles Taylor points out, “to hold that there are no assumptions 
in a scientist’s work which aren’t already based on evidence is surely a 
reflection of a blind faith, one that can’t even feel the occasional tremor of 
doubt”. 442  Taylor maintains that “the pure face-off between religion and 
science is a chimaera, or rather, an ideological construct”.443 Criticism of 
secular reason comes from various adherents who by no means doubt the 
capacity of reason in itself. Their point is rather that reason is insufficient and 
must be enriched with a religious perspective.  
In conclusion, faith and reason have never been simple opposites, but rather 
have been mutually enriching. The religious are in conflict with reductive 
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rationalism and materialism, not with rationality and science per se. As 
Eagleton asserts, “the emergent interest in nature was not a step outside a 
religious outlook, but a mutation within it”.444 Rationale alone cannot in the 
long run guarantee that either rights or duties are defended. Rationale, if left 
by itself, can be abused in many different ways. Ratzinger's conclusion is that 
rationale needs religion in order not to go astray. However, correspondingly, 
religion also relies on rationale, without which it is prone to degenerate into 
unruly fanaticism.445 
4.3.2. Transformation of Socio-political Stance in Christianity: from 
Dominance to Movement 
Aside from the teleological projection of the neo-atheists, debate over the 
public presence of religion is well expressed in “a conversation-stopper” 
worded by American philosopher Richard Rorty, 446  which relates to two 
concerns: First, can religion communicate with public discourse in a plural 
society? (4.3.2.) Secondly, can a metaphysical sense of religion communicate 
with rational process? (I will deal with this topic in 4.3.3.)  
 
                                           
444 Terry Eagleton, Reason, Faith and Revolutions, p.76. 
445  Habermas's and Ratzinger's introductory contribution is reproduced in Jürgen Habermas and Joseph 
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As we have explored in empirical research, the new visibility of Christianity in 
the public sphere is not necessarily a return to a previous exclusive and 
dominant order. Rather, the public presence of Christianity takes place 
according to the principle of movement through participation and 
entanglement, not according to the principle of dominance. As long as it does 
not seek to dominate, Christianity can be reintroduced into the public sphere 
as a legitimate actor of civil society.  
Therefore, the latent possibility of Christianity in the public sphere has to be 
analysed in relation to a method whereby Christianity engages in the public 
domain, and to its authentic contribution to socio-political matters, not in terms 
of a system of dominance. The public presence of Christianity is now best 
represented as a social movement, which is to do with seeking to participate 
and to entangle with those outside Christian circles on various issues. Indeed, 
the public presence of Christianity as a social movement is embodied through 
those two important processes: “participation” and “entanglement”. 
4.3.2.1. The participation of Christianity 
Above all, we need to be aware that the way religion engages in the public 
sphere is changing: having left behind its status of dominance and control, it 
has become a movement that challenges and serves. At the ecclesiastical 
level Christianity has given up its links with old structures of power and, more 
radically, at the civil society level, has emerged as a social actor, taking up 
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various causes and even being listened to. The growing prominence of religion 
in political discourse is matched by popular fervour for various social 
movements of Christianity.  
Religion can be a significant agent for participation and solidarity that move 
beyond tension between normativity and creativity. Participation and solidarity 
are important agents to integrate value into civil communities.  
Hans Joas emphasizes this point in the concluding part of his book, The 
Creativity of Action, as follows:  
Today, the concept of participation refers to the desire for public, tangible 
sociality and serious creative activity within the community - a desire which 
the tendency towards privatization has not yet completely silenced. By 
participating in the organizations and institutions of democratic politics and 
culture, as well as in the social movements which form the fluid substratum 
of democracy, people are able to experience a rational pursuit of interests, 
moral commitment and creative self-fulfilment in a form in which these three 
are not separated from each other. Participation can be said to be a practical 
form of integrated creativity only if it is not exclusively the pursuit of one’s own 
interests or a merely normative obligation, uncoupled from the self-fulfilment 
that takes place in the private sphere. (...) Much as participation may be a 
key word to describe a creativity that is not limited narrowly to a privatistic 
understanding. (...) Participation has its place within each person’s individual 
258 
balance of modes of action.447 
Indeed, participation in the public sphere may contribute to this solidarity. 
Solidarity is not just a condition for reciprocal exchange of reasons in public 
discourse; it can also produce creative actions and events. Departing from his 
earlier pronouncements on this point, Habermas now seems convinced that at 
this later stage of global modernization religions may provide some resources 
to counter the lack of solidarity and other deficiencies of a consumer and 
success-oriented society. The appearance of increasing religiosity, the growth 
of many new religious movements and the maintenance of religion through 
participation and engagement manifest the fact that the religious can be 
compatible with the public sphere without antagonism; it can inspire the 
formation of human being and contribute to the development of global 
community. 
4.3.2.2. The entanglement of Christianity 
It is alleged that one reason why religion has been and ought to remain 
privatized is that, in socio-political discussion, the monotheistic value system 
of religion cannot be concerned with the multiplicities of values in a plural 
society or with the relevant response to any public reality.  
However, the privatization project of religion became too doctrinaire and went 
                                           
447 Hans Joas, The Creativity of Action, trans. by Jeremy Gaines and Paul Keast (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), 
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too far. In The Naked Public Square Richard John Neuhaus, an outstanding 
American Christian cleric, claims that nowhere is the public square actually 
“naked”, i.e. “neutral”, and ironically the separation of religion from politics may 
hand over democratic mobilization to groups such as the Moral Majority, which 
makes public claims on the basis of “private truths”.448 He maintains that: “the 
integrity of politics itself requires that such a proposal be resisted. Public 
decisions must be made by arguments that are public in character”. 449 
Extending such discussion, Habermas demands that for religion to pose its 
significance in the public sphere the religious person must consider his or her 
own faith reflexively, to see it from the point of view of others and relate it to 
secular views. John Rawls initially excluded religious reasons from public 
debates; late in his life he reconsidered that position and argued that they 
should be included as long as they could be translated into secular terms.450 
Rawls uses the notion of “translation” to describe the way in which the rational 
arguments of religious people are rendered accessible to secular interlocutors. 
However, in order to bridge the religious and the non-religious, the idea of 
translation alone is limited. 
 
In fact, Christianity does not make public claims on the basis of “private truths”. 
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Rather, as we examined in the empirical research, Christianity continues to 
hold a sense of attunement with wide reality, and tries to find an accord in an 
entanglement between a natural view and a religious view, the individual and 
the social, by reproducing a method to communicate with secular society, and 
by making a vital challenge for contemporary society by integrating religiosity 
into the public sphere. 
Casanova’s delineation shows this contextual situation well:  
Religion always transcends any privatistic, autistic reality, serving to integrate 
the individual into an intersubjective, public and communal world. 
Simultaneously, however, religion always transcends any particular 
community cult, serving to free the individual from any particular world, and 
to integrate the same individual into a trans-social, cosmic reality.451 
This view on the integration of Christianity is articulated in the notion of “the 
very unsecular entanglement” that can be observed empirically as well as 
legally in a whole range of diverse patterns of church-state-civil society all 
across Europe.452 Although the word “always” may weigh upon one’s mind, 
the public presence of religion, in the majority of cases, shows that religion 
becomes involved in public issues and communicates with civil society through 
“entanglement”. This concept of “entanglement” seems consonant with the 
                                           
451 José Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), p.216. 
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notion proposed by the Danish philosopher of law, Lisbet Christoffersen: a 
historically based “intertwinement” of religious and socio-cultural 
institutions.453 In a similar sense, in conceptualizing the post-secular situation, 
Justin Beaumont pays attention to “opening up possibilities for new 
interconnectivities between diverse social realities” (for example, extra-
religious, inter-religious, intra-religious, and pre-secular, secular, post-secular, 
trans-secular) within the prevailing secularized social structures of modern late 
capitalism.454 Indeed, the public presence of religion through “entanglement, 
intertwinement, or interconnectivities” retains more than visibility, that is to say, 
a “mutual reflection” and “incorporation by reciprocal learning process”.  
Here, the deployment of the concept “entanglement” in this research indicates 
an interweaving of distinct threads through a historical process, even though 
differentiation suggests a clear separation between religion and society. More 
significantly, various forms of Christianity, beyond institutionalized religion, are 
deeply entangled within the public sphere. 
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4.3.3. Intellectual Challenges: Beyond an Aggressive Atheistic 
Naturalism and a Self-assertive Classic Transcendentalism  
4.3.3.1. Naturalism and transcendentalism  
Following the critique of the neo-atheist discussion and the defensive stance 
on the public presence of Christianity, I now want to explore the further stages 
of intellectually responsible discussion about how religion, particularly 
Christianity, relates to secular thinking in the modern society, which may be 
one of the central tenets of discussion concerning the place and role of religion 
in the twenty-first century.  
The current intellectual controversy culminates in a tension between the 
secularism of the naturalistic worldview and the metaphysics of revealed 
religion.455  On the one hand, the trend of scientific naturalism frequently 
operates as the foundation for an objective scientific self-understanding in 
everyday life. On the other hand, the metaphysical thinking of religious 
doctrine may be an epistemological frame that implies reaching beyond this 
world to eternity and to God. 
Understanding the relationship between the immanent and the transcendent 
                                           
455 See Roger Trigg, Religion in the Public life: Must Faith Be Privatized? (Oxford, Oxford UP, 2007), pp.190-208.  
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is very important when viewing the place of Christianity in the public sphere of 
twenty-first century society. There is an assumption that the world can be 
neatly divided into the immanent and transcendent, and many people assume 
that religious transcendence is irrelevant to our daily life in the immanent frame. 
This clear distinction between the immanent and the transcendent is the 
precondition to declare the immanent world as the only reality, and implies a 
great sorting out, in which the natural becomes a level that can be described 
and understood on its own. As a result, scientific-technical progress and 
material development in the natural and immanent frame have led to an 
increasing and irreversible “disenchantment” of the world, which has made 
appeals to religion less urgent or credible.456 However, this understanding is 
misguided; indeed, the proper understanding of the relationship between the 
immanent and the transcendent is stymied by such a binary view, and 
furthermore such an epistemological frame is not conducive to the 
development of the civil society.  
 
This research involves two questions on each side of the supposed divide: (1) 
Should modern reason treat metaphysics as a sort of absence? Is excluding 
the transcendent conducive to social development? (2) Should Christianity 
predicate its existential basis upon the transcendent frame? Does the 
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authenticity and vitality of Christianity depend just on the transcendent 
religiosity? 
 
To move forward in this dispute, I examine the recent works of Jürgen 
Habermas and Charles Taylor to attempt to theorize the place and meaning of 
religion in the public sphere. For them, understanding the secular society is 
based on Habermas’s term, “post-metaphysical thinking”, and Taylor’s 
“immanent frame".457 The two scholars have been characterized as mediators 
between the secularism of the scientific worldview and the metaphysics of 
revealed religion, between the immanent and the transcendent. 458  Their 
primary focus is not all of the religious, but a more moderate, intellectually and 
ethically balanced faith, which is different from religion itself or fundamental 
religion - for lack of a better term. 
4.3.3.2. Habermas’s post-metaphysical thinking: soft naturalism  
The main tenet of Habermas’s recent narrative regarding religion is based on 
“post-metaphysical thinking”: “fallibilistic but non-defeatist post-metaphysical 
thought differentiates itself from both sides (the secularism of the scientific 
world view and the archaic ways of thinking of religious doctrine) by reflecting 
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on its own limits and on its inherent tendency to overstep these limits.”459  
Habermas is critical of the Western metaphysical tradition and its exaggerated 
conception of reason. But he cautions against the temptation to relinquish this 
conception altogether. In opposition to the radical critics of Western philosophy, 
Habermas argues that post-metaphysical thinking can remain critical only if it 
preserves the idea of reason while stripping it of its metaphysical trappings. 
Habermas contributes to this task by developing further his distinctive 
approach to problems of meaning, rationality and subjectivity. 
In a recent interview with Eduardo Mendietta on this subject, Habermas 
addresses a “terminological lack of clarity” by stipulating that the post-secular 
indeed does not fully map onto the post-metaphysical: “Post-metaphysical 
thinking remains secular even in a situation depicted as ‘post-secular’; but in 
this different situation, it may become aware of a secular self-
misunderstanding.”460 
It is prepared to learn from religion, but remains agnostic in the process. It 
insists on the difference between the certainties of faith, on the one hand, 
and validity claims that can be publicly criticized, on the other; but it refrains 
from the rationalist presumption that it can itself decide what part of the 
                                           
459 Jürgen Habermas, Between Naturalism and Religion, trans. Ciaran Cronin (Cambridge and Malden : Polity, 
2008), pp. 5-6.  
460  Eduardo Mendieta, “A Postsecular World Society? On the Philosophical Significance of Postsecular 
Consciousness and the Multicultural World Society: An Interview with Jürgen Habermas”, trans. by Matthias Fritsch, 
The Immanent Frame (April, 2010),  Available at http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/wp-content/uploads/2010/02/A-
Postsecular-World-Society-TIF.pdf 
266 
religious doctrines is rational and what part irrational. … However, an apology 
of faith with philosophical means is not the task of philosophy proper. At best, 
philosophy circles the opaque core of religious experience when reflecting on 
the intrinsic meaning of faith. This core must remain so abysmally alien to 
discursive thought as does the core of aesthetic experience, which can 
likewise only be circled but not penetrated by philosophical reflection.461 
As a consequence of this ambivalent attitude of post-metaphysical thinking, 
Habermas proposes a new approach, which he calls a “soft naturalism”.462 
According to this view, the human world originates from nature but cannot be 
reduced to natural occurrences. Consciousness is not simply an insignificant 
by-product of various brain processes as a “hard naturalism” would allege. 
While consciousness stems from biological evolution, it becomes a 
precondition for all of human civilization once it begins to function. This 
approach indicates a radical challenge to Enlightenment secular “naturalism” 
as a method of inquiry and analysis. Religion also plays a vital role in that 
civilization, as the source of indispensable cultural values. Thus, Habermas 
sees no possibility that the transcendent may become obsolete. Rather, in a 
recent essay, he proposes a more inclusive approach to the role of religion in 
the public sphere than he was previously willing to permit.463 
                                           
461 Jürgen Habermas, Between Naturalism and Religion, p143. See also Chapters 5 and 8. 
462 Ibid. pp.153, 166, 208. 
463 Jürgen Habermas, “Religion in the Public Sphere” (paper presented at The Holberg Prize Seminar, Bergen, 
Norway, 30 November, 2005). It is available at 
 http://www.holbergprisen.no/images/materiell/2005_symposium_habermas.pdf# nameddest=habermas; “Religion 
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As Habermas has intimated, the tenor of the conversation between faith and 
social science requires reflexivity on both sides. Habermas, for his part, places 
his trust in the idea that both rights and obligations will arise out of actual 
human interaction, that is to say: the activity of communication. But at the 
same time, he admits that what he calls "post-metaphysical thought" is clearly 
at a loss when it comes to notions of the good or exemplary life. Such notions 
must be discernible in order to give people tangible guidelines for their conduct 
and their dreams.464 
When Christianity was united with the Greek philosophical tradition, the latter 
was enriched with crucial concepts from the former; Habermas mentions as 
an example "embodiment", "disposal", and "fulfilment". Post-metaphysical 
thought has renounced all claims, and Habermas anticipates the need for 
translations from religious language. He mentions one example, namely how 
the Jewish-Christian notion that mankind is the image of God is translated to 
a secular notion of human value. Of course, this is not a new translation, but 
Habermas feels that its power must be renewed, perhaps in such a way that 
a human being must be treated as if they were the image of God, even if there 
does not happen to be any God. 
 
Habermas sees political liberalism as in need of new moral insights and 
                                           
in the Public Sphere”, European Journal of Philosophy, Vol.14.1 (2006):1-25, p.1. 
464 http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2008-04-01-liedman-en.html#footNoteNUM20 
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commitments, and recognizes religion as a potential source of renewal. 
However, such renewal should not take the form of a direct appeal to religious 
doctrines or comprehensive worldviews in ways that foreclose public debate.  
We should recognize, as Habermas does, the importance of religious 
motivations and understandings (and indeed, organizational networks and 
practices) in a range of social movements during the 20th century, in Europe 
as well as America, and worldwide. Such arguments with respect to faith, 
reflecting on the functional advantages and beneficial effects of Christianity, 
can lead to interesting research. 
4.3.3.3. Taylor’s rethinking of the immanent frame: immanent transcendence  
I turn now to the leading political theorist and socio-religious thinker, Charles 
Taylor, whose methodology and arguments contain more radical reflection on 
the secular than do those of Habermas.465 Taylor embraces what Jürgen 
Habermas has called a post-metaphysical thinking, and maintains that the 
world has moved beyond an anti-metaphysical discourse.466 While Habermas 
emphasizes a reflective form of reasoning, that is, how a naturalistic standpoint 
                                           
465 Yet, here Taylor’s framework does not represent simply a “post-secular” stance as such; that is, it does not 
equate the secular with a secularistic certainty that was, by Habermas’s own account, a mistake. This 
understanding of the post-secular neatly aligns with what Taylor, at the very beginning of A Secular Age, calls 
“Secularity1” and “Secularity2”. In A Secular Age Taylor’s purpose is to demonstrate that there is another, much 
more fundamental sense of the secular that is not captured by the classic idea of patterns of institutional separation 
and “secularistic certainity”. Because this third sense of the secular comprehends precisely those forms of religiosity 
that are now most widely mobilized, resurgence of religion is not evidence of a new post-secular dispensation. 
466 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age. See also Michael Warner, Jonathan Van Antwerpen, and Craig Calhoun, (eds.), 
Varieties of Secularism in a Secular Age (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010). 
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adopts religious transcendence to a functional role for the advancement of the 
civil society, Taylor’s central purpose is to make it clear that increased options 
and growing pluralism result in a deep mutual “fragilization”. 467  He 
emphasizes the changes in the conditions of belief associated with his 
articulation of “Secularity 3”,468 and thus de-dramatizes some of the conflicts 
between the religious and the secular, assessing both the problems with an 
exclusively non-religious spiritual outlook and the problems besetting 
contemporary religiosity.469  
We have certainly gone, over many centuries, from a situation in which 
everyone believed in God to one in which that stands as only one option 
amongst many, and in which secularism, at least among critical intellectuals, 
has established itself as the “default option”. In our modern secular society, 
the secular appears now as the whole of reality, while the religious is 
increasingly perceived not only as the residual category, the other of the 
secular, but also as a super structural and superfluous additive, which both 
                                           
467 The rise of a so-called secular option entails a fundamental shift in the preconditions for faith. Ever since this 
shift, believers have had to justify their particular faith, such as the Christian, not just as a specific confession or 
with respect to other religions, but also as faith per se, vis-à-vis a lack of faith that was initially legitimized as a 
possibility and then, “normalized” in certain countries and milieus. Of course, the rise of the secular option should 
not be understood as the cause of secularization; but it does establish it as a possibility. In the first instance, then, 
the optionality of faith arises from the fact that it has in principle become possible not to believe, and subsequently 
from the conditions of religious pluralism as well.  
468 Taylor’s “Secularity3″ refers to the condition in which the Western religious subject (and, increasingly, the non-
Western religious subject) is faced with the choice of unbelief as a live option.  
469 The points of difference between Jürgen Habermas and Charles Taylor can be traced in their dialogue in a 
symposium convened by the Institute for Public Knowledge at NYU, the Social Science Research Council and the 
Humanities Institute at Stony Brook University. See Michael Warner, Jonathan VanAntwerpen, and Craig Calhoun 
(eds.), Varieties of Secularism in a Secular Age. See also Charles Taylor, A Secular Age. This monumental opus 
is devoted to trying to illuminate the relationship between immanence and transcendence, and in particular the 
historical establishment and intellectual contours of what he calls “the immanent frame”. 
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humanity and societies can do without. The western secularity is often 
understood as the result of a fundamental change in sensibility marked by 
“disenchantment”, or the systematic repression of the “magical” elements of 
religion.470 Secularists believe that the lower, physical or immanent order is 
all that there is, and that the higher, metaphysical or transcendent order is a 
human invention. However, Taylor regards secularity as “the great invention 
of the West”,471 and “the modern social imaginary”.472 There are various ways 
to think about the relationship, but for my purposes, Charles Taylor’s view 
works well: 
The great invention of the West was that of an immanent order in Nature, 
whose working could be systematically understood and explained on its own 
terms, leaving open the question whether this whole order had a deeper 
significance, and whether, if it did, we should infer a transcendent Creator 
beyond it. This notion of the “immanent” involved denying - or at least 
isolating and perhaps problematizing - any form of interpenetration between 
the things of Nature, on the one hand, and the “supernatural” on the other, 
be this understood in terms of the one transcendent God or of Gods or spirits, 
or magic forces or whatever.473 
Such a contrasting view between the secular and the religious can also be 
                                           
470 “Disenchantment” in his usage really translates Weber’s term “Entzauberung”, the core concept of which is 
“Zauber”, or “magic”. 
471 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age, p.15. 
472 Charles Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries (Durham, North Carolina: Duke UP, 2004). 
473 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age, pp.15-16. 
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discerned in Taylor’s dyadic terms distinguishing two dimensions of existence: 
“immanent” and “transcendent”; “secular” refers to what pertains to a self-
sufficient, immanent sphere and is contrasted with what relates to the 
transcendent realm, often identified as “religious”. This binary distinction can 
then undergo a further mutation, via a denial of the transcendent level, into a 
dyad in which one term refers to the real “secular”, and the other refers to what 
is merely invented “religious”; or where “secular” refers to the institutions we 
really require to live in this world, and “religious” or “ecclesial” refer to optional 
accessories, which often disturb the course of this worldly life.474  
In his great work, A Secular Age, Charles Taylor seeks to trace how what he 
calls “exclusive humanism” or “self-sufficient humanism”, i.e. “a humanism 
accepting neither final goals beyond human flourishing, nor any allegiance to 
anything else beyond this flourishing”, came to be a widespread option, by 
exposing an ideologically slanted secularist assumption that no reasons of 
God, belief, or the transcendent have had anything to do with the process of 
building the edifice of modern knowledge.475 
Nevertheless, Taylor argues that it is not a valid method to reject altogether 
the “immanent frame” that lies at the heart of the modern secular orientation. 
Rather, he recognizes the immanent frame as a decisive this-worldly structure 
                                           
474 Charles Taylor, “Western Secularity”, in Craig Calhoun, Mark Juergensmeyer, and Jonathan Van Antwerpen 
(eds.), Rethinking Secularism, p.34. 
475 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age, pp.18, 427-30. 
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for the understanding of our current condition, including human life,476 and 
one that remains an option within today’s modern secularity. That is, the 
immanent frame does not cast light upon the entire world. Therefore, he insists 
that the immanent should not be closed to transcendence, but should be open 
to its possibility.477 The immanent frame, he suggests, is “not usually, or even 
mainly a set of beliefs which we entertain about our predicament”, but rather, 
“the sense context in which we develop our beliefs”.478 
 
In this vein, Taylor’s argument is twofold. First, he emphasizes that religion 
and spirituality are not extinguished in the social condition that is reformulated 
in the immanent frame; rather, the religious shape and belief condition of the 
present age have been transformed.479  
My hypothesis is that this new creation of a civilized, polite order succeeded 
beyond what its originators could have hoped for and that this, in turn, led to 
a new reading of what a Christian order might be, one that was seen 
increasingly in immanent terms.  
This version of Christianity was shorn of much of its transcendent content 
and was thus open to a new departure, in which the understanding of good 
order (what I call “modern moral order”) could be embraced outside of its 
                                           
476 Charles Taylor, “The Immanent Frame”, in A Secular Age, pp.539-93. 
477 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age, pp.427–30, 300; See also Michael Warner, Jonathan Van Antwerpen, and Craig 
Calhoun (eds.), Varieties of Secularism in a Secular Age. 
478 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age, p.549. 
479 Ibid. p.549. 
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original theological, Providential frame work and in certain cases even 
against it.480  
His perspective shows that the line between secular and religious is not as 
sharp as many philosophical and other accounts suggest. On the one hand, 
religious people cannot escape the prominence and power of the secular in 
the modern world, and on the other hand, while the norms of secular 
argumentation may obscure deep evaluative commitments, they do not 
eliminate them. Further, religion’s commitments and opening to 
transcendence remain possible within the immanent frame, even as new 
forces push for “the closure of immanence”. We have to notice, therefore, that 
disenchantment does not necessarily lead to the end of religion; conversely, 
the accommodation and embrace of the transcendent does not necessarily 
mean enchantment by religious mysticism. 
 
Taylor’s second goal is to make the idea of transcendence one that can be 
interpreted, and to re-embed it in the public sphere as a new challenge for “the 
closure of immanence”. According to Taylor, the transcendent represents 
sources of meaning that lie beyond this-worldly life. Transcendence may also 
have other dimensions, for example a belief in something which transcends 
nature and the world. Here, the crucial feature of the transcendent is that it 
                                           
480 Charles Taylor, “Western Secularity”, p.50. 
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presents other motivations and resources for our intellectual perspectives, 
which legitimately transcend the limits of “scientific naturalism” and “immanent 
materialism”.481 The transcendent contains “great metaphysical mysteries”, 
as if there were some sort of solution, at least in some objective sense of 
solution. The point of discussion is not exhausted by life, the fullness of life, 
even the goodness of life. Then, acknowledging the transcendent means 
seeing a point beyond that. One form of this is the insight that we can find in 
suffering and death: not merely negation, the undoing of fullness and life, but 
also a place to affirm something which matters beyond life, on which life itself 
originally draws. 
 
Taylor does not wish to see religion as just a number of engaging practices or 
quasi-ethnic customs, and is critical of suggestions that the “essence of 
religion” lies in the answers it offers to the question of meaning, which he sees 
as an approach that absolutizes the modern predicament. Religion, for Taylor, 
entails some sort of transcendence, especially the sense that there is some 
higher good, beyond human flourishing. Yet, in the meantime, the discussion 
has overcome his still rather sceptical view of this kind of a discourse, which 
he associates with a calling into question of human rationality and theoretical 
truth, although the situating of metaphysics in the context of social life, global 
                                           
481 Taylor’s discussion of immanent materialism can be found in Charles Taylor, A Secular Age, pp. 360-8, 398-401, 
541-550. 
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history and in an expressive functioning of language is recognized by 
Taylor.482   
 
In conclusion, both Habermas and Taylor are concerned not with the survival 
of religion as a species in danger of becoming extinct, but with arbitrating the 
sharp distinction between the natural and the religious, the immanent and the 
transcendent, and with finding ways to integrate the religious into the public 
sphere. Both see the exclusion of religion from the public sphere as 
undermining the solidarity and creativity they seek.   
Habermas emphasizes mutual conjunctive agreement by presenting the 
translation of religious language for religious people on the one hand, and soft 
naturalism for non-religious people oriented by scientific naturalism on the 
other. Taylor stresses mutual recognition and co-operation in common 
pursuits by making clear the possibility of the transcendent in the immanent 
frame. 
Habermas’s argument leaves open the worries that the translation proviso is 
necessarily asymmetrical, and that the call to recognize explicitly religious 
voices in the public sphere is at least partially instrumental. Taylor’s approach 
is often criticized as an unduly idealist mode of socio-historical understanding 
and a romanticist view of our current alienation.483 Yet despite these concerns, 
                                           
482 Meave Cooke, Language and Reason: A Study in Habermas’s Pragmatics (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 
1997). 
483 Gregor McLennan, ‘Spaces of Post-secularism’, in J. Beaumont, A. Molendijk and C. Jedan (eds.), Exploring the 
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and despite the two scholars’ tendency to take a cursory attitude to opposing 
views, their reflexive insight is very valid and effective. 
4.3.3.4. An open space for mutual possibilities between the secular and the 
religious  
Notwithstanding intellectually thoughtful consideration on the relationship 
between the immanent and the transcendent beyond an aggressive atheistic 
naturalism and a self-assertive classic transcendentalism, the negative view 
of transcendence should be revisited in the practical sense. Here, it is 
important to note that, in spite of the axiomatic possibilities and positivity of the 
transcendent, many people still seem rather disinclined to accommodate 
religious transcendence. A possible reason for such denial or deferral may be 
the tendency to merge traditional religious elements with a transcendent 
disposition. To put it concretely, the root notion of anti-transcendence is a 
contrast not to the transcendent itself, but to religious transcendent 
characteristics combined with religious elements such as 1) religious 
hierarchical authority, 2) external reference for ethics, and 3) providential 
frame of authoritarian metaphysical theism.  
The first of these relates to an anti-sympathy against religious authority 
combined with the transcendent, which is linked to anticlericalism. Historically, 
the sacred was situated in a hierarchical world, a great chain of being. The 
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secularist critique was practically directed against ecclesiastical institutions, 
which were seen to be authoritarian and repressive; and it developed a 
philosophical, aesthetic, and moral argument against the very idea of a 
personal God. 
Secondly, a direct appeal to the absolute, a transcendent notion of ultimate 
truth, is a step outside the bounds of reasoned public discourse. Such 
arguments presume that absolutes, or higher-order value, are absent from 
ordinary rational discourse and introduced only by religious belief. Human 
beings, as moral agents, can exercise their duties only when they are free, 
and in exercising these moral duties, there is no need to posit a superior being, 
hence morality does not require authoritative religious presuppositions.  
Thirdly, transcendence combined with a providential frame of authoritarian 
metaphysical theism certainly deconstructs autonomous selection and 
decision making. Of course, in this context, the rejection of transcendence is 
the only option, because this world is not mechanically operated by a 
providential frame. 
In conclusion, transcendence as the possibility to go beyond the natural and 
the immanent is quite different from a metaphysical absoluteness combined 
with traditional religious elements. It does not mean the absolute, the other, or 
the authoritative; rather, it can operate with autonomy. 
 
On the other hand, the argument seems to be one more postmodern epistemic 
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frame in which religion, based on its difference from the non-religious, should 
be accepted by and coexist with civil society, as long as it is reasonably 
adapted to the secular world. The case is also postmodern corollary that like 
Derrida the deep suspicion of fixed, binary polarities that characterizes modern 
thinking frame is final destination.484 
To go beyond the immanent and the transcendent does not mean simply to 
construct a transitional zone between them; nor does it mean co-existence. 
Habermas and Taylor’s suggestions of “soft naturalism” and “immanent 
transcendence” are to pave the way to overcome this clear dichotomous view 
within a world in which the natural and the supernatural, the immanent and the 
transcendent are distinguished, and more significantly, where the 
transcendent makes sense most clearly in the immanent frame of a firm footing 
in the “natural” as an autonomous order.  
 
In this vein, denying transcendence means denying the fact that human life 
finds any point beyond itself. The strong sense that has permeated human 
history, that there is something more, that human life aims beyond itself, is 
stamped as an illusion, and a dangerous illusion at that, one that always 
threatens to breed disastrous, anti-human consequences. The denial gives 
rise to what we might call an exclusive humanism, that is, one based 
                                           
484 Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, corrected, ed. and trans. by Gayatri Spivak (Baltimore and London: Johns 
Hokins University Press, [1967]1997), p.323. 
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exclusively on a notion of human flourishing, which recognizes no valid aim 
beyond this. Taylor explains the transcendent as seeing a point beyond such 
human flourishing: 
Acknowledging the transcendent means being called to a change of identity. 
(…) a calling for a radical decentring of the self, in relation with God. (…) So 
acknowledging the transcendent means aiming beyond life, or opening 
yourself to a change in identity. (…) Renouncing, aiming beyond life, not only 
takes you away, but also brings you back to flourishing.485 
Christian faith can be seen in the same terms. We should note that religion 
saturates reality rather than being side-lined.486 However, this view does not 
necessarily relate to institutionalized religion, as it is about what religion is, or 
can be about. 
4.4. Reconsideration on the Value and Potential of 
Christianity as Reflexive Agent in a Re-modern Paradigm  
More radical reconsideration on the role of religion in society and politics can 
be traced in the remarkable renewed interest among many leading European 
intellectuals who are normally associated with irreligious or areligious currents. 
Alain Badiou (1937〜 ), Giorgio Agamben (1942〜 ), Terry Eagleton (1943
                                           
485 Charles Taylor, Sesokhwaoa Hyundeamoonmyung [Secularization and the Modern Civilization], pp.358-361. 
486 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age, p.816. 
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〜 ) and Slavoj Žižek (1949〜 ),487 among others, have been fascinated by 
the ability of religion, particularly Christianity, to inspire people to monumental 
projects. Their primary concern is not to oppose religious faith, but to 
understand it and its inherent potential, particularly in its socio-political 
concerns.488  
We encounter, in this context, the promise of a return to a social philosophical 
mode for religion. Theology or religious studies, rather than being marginally 
disregarded in many faculties of humanities and social science, are 
increasingly being seen as necessary for the interdisciplinary analysis of our 
contemporary situation, and further, are reconfiguring the very makeup of the 
humanities in general, with disciplines like philosophy, political science, 
literature, history, psychoanalysis, and critical theory in particular feeling the 
impact of this return.489 It seems that Christianity’s primary and immediate 
significance is being seen in terms of a worldly spirit. As Eagleton has pointed 
out, “one of the places to which those radical impulses have migrated is – of 
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all things – theology”.490 
This situation is well expressed in Creston Davis’s introduction to the debate 
between Slavoj Žižek and John Milbank. 
For whatever the epoch of “modernity” really is - and I am convinced that we 
will struggle for a coherent conception of it for a long time to come - reason’s 
stance against myth, superstition, and the theological in order to access 
reason, pure and autonomous reason, has proved at least wanting, if not 
downright irrational. If the middle Ages failed to employ enough reason 
(which is debatable, if not a flat-out stereotype, in itself), then secular 
modernity has employed too much of it (even to the point of contradiction!). 
Thus, to hazard an admittedly premature conjecture (and this is my 
conjecture): the return to the theological in our time may be a call, once again, 
to strike a balance between reason and myth, between belief and faith, 
between political struggle and the secular state, and between the divine and 
the human.491 
As Davis states, it is axiomatic that secular modernity enhances human well-
being, on a scale unprecedented in human history, but at the same time it can 
imprison and dehumanize people, by subjecting them to an unrelenting series 
of rationalistic and mechanic rules and disciplines. Secular thought still has 
insufficient expressive potentiality and lacks sensitivity in dealing with 
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unsuccessful lives, unreasonable life plans, or polluted societal conditions. 
Religion stands as better equipped. Thus, this philosophy has something to 
learn from religion, as long as religion is freed from dogmatism and coercive 
guilt. 
It would be overstating the case to claim that the European intellectuals are 
caught up in religious belief or support a descriptive post-secular situation. 
Nevertheless, they exhibit a kind of fascination that stems from the same 
historical situation, typically referred to as postmodern or post-secular. The 
criticism against modernity that originated in France in the 1960s was very 
intense. So-called postmodern philosophy showed how violent and fabricated 
“the truth” pursued by modern philosophy might be. The criticism of 
philosophers like Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Gilles Deleuze, and Jean-
François Lyotard led to dismissal of “the truth”, “the subject”, and “causes”, the 
reckless pursuit of which had suppressed and excluded the potential of all else. 
Postmodern philosophy declares that philosophy or theology no longer have 
to yearn for the truth. 
In fact, thinkers such as Badiou, Agamben, Eagleton and Žižek express 
various misgivings about some of the meanings attributed to the post-secular, 
such as a descriptive notion of the contemporary situation by those who want 
to promote a particular religion. Their discussions are not about a disembodied 
belief, but rather concern the true radical nature of Christianity and its political 
import. 
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In this context, this section will explore important issues with reference to two 
major figures, Alain Badiou and Slavoj Žižek, focusing on truth, subject and 
materialist theology. From dialogue between theology and social philosophy, 
the issues discussed will show the potential of Christianity as reflexive agent 
and cosmopolitan actor, while at the same time pointing out its intrinsic defects.  
4.4.1. Alain Badiou’s Evental Truth as Procedure towards an 
Interruptive Event beyond Private, Exclusive, and Absolute truth 
The notion of “the truth” is a pivotal contested issue in the question of how 
religion reproduces value in socio-political action for global progress as an 
alternative to “lost causes”, because ethical direction can arise only in relation 
to truth. Alain Badiou contends that ethics designates above all “the incapacity, 
so typical of the contemporary world, to name and strive for a Good”, and also 
“the absence of any project, of an emancipatory politics, or any genuinely 
collective cause”. 492  Badiou’s notion of the truth process is important in 
understanding his formulation of ethics, for he believes that “the only genuine 
ethics is of processes of truth”,493 and if humans do not participate in a truth 
process, they are, Badiou says, “beneath Good and Evil”.494  
 
Notwithstanding the fact that the notion of the truth is decisive in understanding 
                                           
492 Alain Badiou, Ethics, pp. 30, 31. 
493 Ibid. p. 28. 
494 Ibid. p. 59.  
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the formulation of ethics for socio-political action, postmodern philosophy 
expelled that notion, declaring that philosophy or theology would no longer 
have to yearn for the truth, and that there is no universal truth. In fact, the 
belligerent postmodern approach to the truth concept was unleashed as a 
countervailing process to the modern notion of truth that is possessed privately 
and proven right by the modern monolithic schema of either religion or reason. 
The postmodern criticism argued that to enter the socio-political arena making 
public claims on the basis of private and exclusive truths, irrespective of 
whether these are based on religion or reason, can be a source of violence 
and an oppressive mechanism. Therefore, because reason as well as religion 
is based on a belief in its monopoly on truth, it should no longer be considered 
a truth, but an anti-truth.  
On this point, our question should be: how can Christianity overcome the 
private and exclusive truth and reconstruct the new notion of the truth? In an 
attempt to reconsider the notion of truth and reformulate it based on a “re-
modern paradigm”, this study deploys Badiou’s 495  notion of the truth 
process.496 Badiou recalled “the truth” that had been expelled by postmodern 
philosophy, and attempted to reconstruct a new truth concept not only to evade 
the modern totality and unqualified power of truth, but also to overcome the 
relativism, scepticism or nihilism of postmodern philosophy. However, he does 
                                           
495 Alain Badiou (1937-) is the most significant contemporary French philosopher.  
496 For a more in-depth account of “re-modernities”, See Chapter 2 sections 2.1.3. and 2.1.4. 
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not seek to deny all of postmodern philosophy. Rather, he represents a truth 
that is definitely different from the traditional and conventional truth, absorbing 
the criticism of postmodern philosophy. In Ethics, Badiou addresses a new 
dimension of truth.497  
As Peter Hallward states in the preface to Badiou’s Ethics: “The realm of 
knowledge is essentially static, ‘objective,’ and structured according to the 
interests of those who govern and dominate the situation.”498 Yet, the truth, 
by contrast, is neither reducible to objective knowledge, nor a static and finite 
proposition classified by an identification system. Rather it is involved in acts 
of faith.499 The truth, for Badiou, consists in the real process of a fidelity to 
what he calls an “event”.  
I shall call a truth the real process of a fidelity to an event: that which this 
fidelity produces in the situation. (…) Essentially, a truth is the material course 
traced, within the situation, by the evental supplementation. It is thus an 
immanent break. “Immanent” because a truth proceeds in the situation, and 
nowhere else – there is no heaven of truths. Break because what enables the 
truth-process – the event – meant nothing according to the prevailing 
language and established knowledge of the situation.500 
                                           
497 Alain Badiou, Ethics. The book should be regarded as divided into two parts: the first three chapters constitute 
a vigorous attack on the ideological foundation and assumptions of contemporary ethics, and the final two chapters 
propose “the ethics of truths”.  
498 Peter Hallward, “Translator’s Introduction”, in Alain Badiou, Ethics, p. ix. 
499 Alain Badiou, Being and Event, trans. by Oliver Feltham (London: Continuum, 2005). 
500 Alain Badiou, Ethics, pp. 41-2. 
286 
Here, he emphasizes that a truth is not a transcendentally pre-existing idea or 
dogmatic principle; rather, it is achieved through a procedure of evental fidelity. 
Thus, truth is not the champion leading us from the front, but a new way of 
being that follows the bearer of fidelity to the event. Here the event refers to 
an unpredictable supplement which “cannot be reduced to its ordinary 
inscription in what there is”; which “bring[s] to pass something other than the 
situation, opinions, and instituted knowledges”; which is unnameable and 
ungraspable within the context in which it occurs; and which “vanishes as soon 
as it appears”.501 To think from the perspective of its evental supplement and 
to engage in the supplement is an evental fidelity. Thus, fidelity to the event is 
the process that facilitates a real radical break with the status quo within the 
context in which the event takes place.502 
For Badiou, truth is the material manifestation of the event through history, a 
process that can take place only through the faithful participation of the subject 
who takes part in the truth. “Whatever the circumstances, a truth is something 
that takes place at a particular time and under particular circumstances: to 
enter into the composition of a subject of truth can only be something that 
happens to you”.503  
“A truth-process is heterogeneous to the instituted knowledge of the 
                                           
501 Ibid. pp.41,67. 
502 Ibid. p. 41. 
503 Ibid. p. xxxi 
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situation”,504 but it is also “the sole source of new knowledges”.505 Thus, “we 
shall say that the truth forces knowledges”.506 “Truth for Badiou thus evokes 
the logic of being true to something, of holding true to a principle, person, or 
ideal”507 and the act of remaining true to the “event”. Further, Badiou’s truth 
means neither monothetic totality nor universality, rather always “truths” as 
plural forms. For him, truths crop up in multiple conditions and indiscernible 
contexts. If we do not acknowledge the event, we cannot grasp Badiou’s truth 
notion. To be faithful to an event is to move within the situation that this event 
has supplemented, by thinking the situation according to the event. This, of 
course – since the event was excluded by all the regular laws of the situation 
– compels the subject to invent a new way of being and acting in the situation. 
Badiou explains a truth-process using love as an example.  
It is clear that under the effect of a loving encounter, if I want to be really 
faithful to it, I must completely rework my ordinary way of living my situation. 
(…) An evental fidelity is a real break in the specific order within which the 
event took place.508  
Only when we can be faithful to an encounter with the other, and transform 
oneself to fit to the other, can we be a real subject. Like truths, so too the 
                                           
504 Ibid. p.43. 
505 Ibid. p.70.  
506 Ibid. p.70. Forcing is what happens between truth and knowledge. For a more in-depth account of “force”, see 
p.87, note no.2. 
507 Peter Hallward, “Translator’s Introduction”, in Alain Badiou, Ethics, p. x. 
508 Alain Badiou, Ethics, p.42. 
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subject does not exist in advance. Human beings only become subjects when 
they open themselves up to an “event” and remain faithful to its “truth”.509 This 
affirmation of and devotion to the truth process might be summarized in the 
phrase “Keep going!”510  
Shifting our attention to Badiou’s Saint Paul: The Foundation of Universalism, 
we are able to see how all of this may be applied in the case of religion.511 
There, he presents the potential of religion, particularly Christianity, as a 
producer of truth processes and as a truth-bearing ethical subject. Badiou’s 
work reveals many insights on both the potential of Christianity and its intrinsic 
limitations. It implies that there is a big gap between the dogmatic truth and 
the evental truth. 
Badiou construes the event of Christ as an interruptive event in Paul’s case, 
one that is beyond the opinions of the time. According to Badiou, one becomes 
an authentic human subject, as opposed to a mere anonymous member of the 
biological species, through one’s passionate allegiance to such a revelation. 
As Eagleton expresses it, “truth is also a question of solidarity, involving as it 
usually does the birth of a believing community such as the church. This 
commitment opens up a new order of truth, and being faithful to this truth is 
what Badiou means by the ethical.”512  
                                           
509 Ibid. p.43. 
510 Ibid. p.79. 
511 Alain Badiou, Saint Paul: The Foundation of Universalism, trans. by Ray Brassier (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2003). 
512 Terry Eagleton, Reason, Faith and Revolutions: Reflections on the God Debates, p.118. 
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4.4.2. Slavoj Žižek’s Materialist Theology and New Subject  
The nihilism of capitalism and the self-enclosed structure of materialism 
stimulated thinkers to find a new way forward, a new source of hope. This 
ultimately opened the portal to theological discourse. Slavoj Žižek keeps an 
eye on Christianity, along with Marxism-Leninism, as the only effective 
counterweight to unbridled capitalism or militant neo-liberalism.513 His thinking 
is directed towards overcoming post-structuralism and postmodernism, and 
establishing a new subjectivity. 
A new field 514  is emerging to which the well- known designations 
“poststructuralism,” “postmodernism,” or “deconstructionism” no longer apply; 
even more radically, this field renders problematic the very feature shared by 
Derrida and his great opponent, Habermas: that of respect for Otherness. (…) 
The main feature of this field is its theologico-political turn: a decidedly 
materialist focus on theological topics (in a mode that totally differs from the 
late-Derridean negative theology of Otherness).515 
According to Žižek, post-structuralism, which began in criticism of modern 
subjectivity, denies the possibility of the subject by denying the subject itself. 
Ultimately, post-structuralism operates as a conservative ideology to confirm 
                                           
513 Slavoj Žižek, “The Thrilling Romance of Orthodoxy”, in Creston Davis, John Milbank and Slavoj Žižek, (eds.), 
Theology and the Political (Durham, NC, and London: Duke UP, 2005), pp.52-71; In Defense of Lost Causes 
(London and NY: Verso, 2009). 
514 He refers to Giorgio Agamben and Alain Badiou as the main figures of the new field and also would immodestly 
include himself in this series.  
515 Slavoj Žižek and John Milbank, The Monstrosity of Christ, pp.254-255. 
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the maintenance of the status quo. Žižek points to the “liberalistic cynicism” 
and “religious fundamentalism” of the “perfect ideological supplement” of 
capitalism produced under post-structuralism.516 It is true that religious belief, 
taking a perverse form, operates as a ruling ideology to manipulate 
conformism in capitalist society.517  
However, to reveal a perverse aspect of religion is not the same as discarding 
religious faith or giving up the value of the Christian legacy. While Žižek admits 
Christianity’s perverse core, he nevertheless sets his sights upon the potential 
of Christianity as a unique emancipatory exit from the deadlock of capitalism. 
He assumes that Christianity is able to assemble devout multitudes that yearn 
for something other than consumption or rapacity in a time of unbridled 
liberalism. 
Žižek’s thought can be regarded as a socio-philosophical response to the 
question: Is it possible to resist? That is, is it possible that we might be 
awakened as the subject of reflective-sensibility and praxis-sensibility? Here, 
his major idea is to sound out the possibility of the new subject and the self as 
a defensive agent of “lost causes”, i.e. to cultivate the universal subject and 
subjectivity for revolution. If so, How? 
On this point Žižek’s basic framework is to unite the theological and the 
material to fund resistance to capitalist nihilism, i.e. to recover or reconnect 
                                           
516 Slavoj Žižek, On Belief, p.12. 
517 Slavoj Žižek, The Puppet and the Dwarf. 
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transcendence with a militant materialism. This presupposes a fundamental 
reality which he redefines through the kenosis of God in Christ, seen in the 
event of the death of Christ. Žižek, following Badiou, subscribes to the theme 
of the interruptive event. He argues that “God is no longer the Highest Being 
watching over our destiny, but a name for radical openness, for the hope of 
change, for the always-to-come Otherness, etc.”518 
Žižek’s “God” reveals himself in a radically self-emptying process, to the point 
where God’s love for the world results in sacrificing his own transcendence in 
order to be more fully God. Žižek takes God’s act of revelation without 
reservation - revelation means absolute kenosis, after which transcendence 
has now arrived in the heart of the material world completely devoid of the 
protection that transcendence guarantees.519 This theo-political discussion is 
expressed precisely in “the subject without subjectivity” or “the subject without 
the real”. 
Therefore, for Žižek, “the breakthrough of faith” has an ambivalent meaning. 
On the one hand, penetration through faith is the only possible way to bring 
about the generation of something new, by completely changing the existing 
order, while on the other, one has to break through religious faith itself, desiring 
for the Big other’s power. 
Following Badiou and Žižek, Christianity is taken to be a universal religion as 
                                           
518 Slavoj Žižek, “Dialectical Clarity versus the Misty Conceit of Paradox”, in Slavoj Žižek and John Milbank, The 
Monstrosity of Christ, p.256. 
519 Creston Davis, “Holy Saturday or Resurrection Sunday?”, p.18. 
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a defensive subject of lost causes, through the interconnection between 
Christian religion and an idealist materialism without any collapse into a 
triumphant celebration of the ideal. In such an arrangement, societal 
participation and solidarity occur only in circumstances of weakness rather 
than in celebration and aspiration. In both cases, religion, and particularly 
Christianity, appears as a key “site of resistance” against the alienation of what 
is perceived as a singularly western modernity. There is scope for 
rapprochement in the form of bringing love, hope and charity into praxis, as for 
example on the issues of homelessness and fair trade. Both of these socio-
philosophical implications can indeed be traced to the so-called “postsecular” 




As Craig Calhoun suggests, the categorization of religion as an essentially 
private affair is misguided; indeed, religion has never been essentially 
private.521 Processes of modernization do not necessarily lead to a weakening 
                                           
520 Paul Cloke, “Theo-ethics and Radical Faith-based Praxis in the Postsecular City”, in Arie L. Molendijk, Justin 
Beaumont and Christoph Jedan (eds.), Exploring the Postsecular: The Religious, the Political and the Urban 
(Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2010), pp.223-41. 
521 Craig Calhoun, “Secularism, Citizenship, and the Public Sphere”, in Craig Calhoun, Mark Juergensmeyer and 
Joanathan Van Antwerpen (eds.), Rethinking Secularism (Oxford and NY: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp.54-
74; José Casanova, “The Religious Situation in Europe”, in Hans Joas and Klaus Wiegandt (eds.), Secularization 
and the World Religions (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2009), pp.75-91. 
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of the significance of religious faith and practices in society. Rather, the 
process of modernization could be accompanied by a religious transformation. 
The public visibility of religion is likely to continue into the future, whether as 
institutional religion or as individualized types of religion beyond the religious-
secular cleavage.  
“The privatization of religion” is distorted and misunderstood, not only by 
unreflective secularism, the liberal understanding of global civil society that 
greatly underestimates the place and role of religious organizations or 
imagines cosmopolitanism as a sort of escape from culture into a realm of 
reason where religion has little influence; but also because of the obscure and 
muddled use of certain terms in the social scientific fields, particularly the 
relationship of privatization to differentiation and individualization. In short, 
privatization cannot be equated with either of those terms. While differentiation 
and individualization can lead to privatization, conversely either process can, 
and often does, result in the public presence of religion in various ways.  
The paradoxical landscape of the renewed visibility of religion in the public 
sphere is central to this chapter’s empirical observation. The public presence 
of religion is taking place concurrently with the privatization of religion. 
Whereas the social influence of the religious institutions and the churches 
have gradually declined, at the same time Christianity remains a specific 
source of meaning and moral potential in schools, social welfare, academia, 
politics, and international development.   
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With regard to the public presence of Christianity, it is important to note that 
this does not represent a return of religion to a previous order, but rather that 
religious morphology, religiosity, and its way of engaging in society have 
reformatted based on individualized forms of religion, and have taken on a 
new role and various new actors in the public sphere.  
In this vein, it can be held that religion should not be read merely as a 
“dependent variable” to social change such as processes of rationalization, 
social differentiation, and cultural pluralization, but rather as an “independent 
variable” that can influence the public and social trends. 522  Religion and 
modernity are not incompatible in principle; rather, many examples can be 
found in which religion takes on modern characteristics and has even been the 
vehicle of modernization processes as a politically, economically, socially, and 
culturally stimulating factor. The spread of democratic civil society greatly 
increased the opportunity for religious actors to compete freely for political 
influence. Renewed recognition of this situation during the second half of the 
twentieth century led to significant changes in the social attitudes of 
Christianity, as well as in the attitude of civil society to religion. 
From the normative perspective, some continue to express concern about the 
renewed visibility of Christianity in the public sphere. Just as a neighbour may 
remain a source of both surprise and irritation, so the public presence of 
                                           
522 R.S. Warner, “Work in Progress toward a New Paradigm for the Sociological Study of Religion in the United 
States”, American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 98.5 (1993): 1044-1093 
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religion has socio-political relevance, but can also have an anti-political 
tendency. Indeed, the return of religion to the social scientific agenda is to a 
large extent a product of the wide-ranging public relevance of religion, 
especially with regard to immanence and transcendence. Furthermore, a 
wider assessment of public faith discourages the drawing of a fixed binary 
divide and the mutual “othering” of faith and the secular. Such an assessment 
must involve a moving beyond particular projects of achieving mutual 
understanding and conceiving of progress in entirely secular terms. In this 
sense, consideration of the post-secular public discourse can potentially be 
helpful for improving the way we think about new projects of mutual 
understanding and social solidarity based on choice rather than mere 
imposition or inheritance.  
From a more radical perspective, there is, among many leading European 
intellectuals, a remarkable renewed interest in the role of religion in society 
and politics. Their primary concern is not with faith itself, based on religious 
doctrine, but with its inherent potential, particularly in its socio-political 
concerns. The discussion shows that Christianity has potential as a reflexive 
agent in the global age, but also intrinsic limitations which it must overcome to 
fulfil that role.  
The next question is no longer whether religion will remain private, but how the 
public presence of Christianity can be contained within acceptable limits, so 
that it does not present a major threat to our modern secular liberal democratic 
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structures. More significantly, the question should be how we can bring out the 
latent possibilities of religion, not demolish its potential along with the negative 
elements of religion. We must be careful that we do not “throw out the baby 
with the bathwater”.  
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Chapter 5. Conclusion: Toward Authentic 
Christianity in a Re-modern Paradigm: 
Ecclesiastical Dis-Re-establishment, Public 
Presence of Faith, and Integration of Christianity 
 
As discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, contrary to the “subtraction story” and 
“privatization of religion”, Christianity has neither disappeared, nor retreated 
into the private realm. Rather, it has transformed itself into new forms with new 
characteristics, and continues to play a significant role in the public sphere, by 
engaging in society through new ways, a development that unleashes its 
potential as a reflexive agent for individuals, society, and the global 
community.523 
 
This reflexive view on secularization also indicates that people today are 
neither more nor less religious than they may have been in the past, and no 
one region is more or less religious than other regions. Instead, contrary to the 
logic of subtraction, absence, or relegation, the condition of religious belief or 
the characteristics of religiosity are constantly changing, according to 
particular time and space, and to the prevailing educational, economic, 
political and socio-cultural context. Such change in the condition of religious 
                                           
523 Markus Vinzent, “Re-Modernities: or the Volcanic Landscapes of Religion”, Journal of Beliefs & Values, Vol. 32. 
2 (August 2011): 143–160; Marius C. Felderhof, Revisiting Christianity: Theological Reflections (Surrey and 
Burlington: Ashgate, 2011); Ulrich Beck, A God of One’s Own (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008).  
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belief brings about a concomitant change of religiosity, and the change of 
religiosity brings further change to religious form and the religious landscape. 
Yet, this does not imply that religious change is always a “dependent variable”. 
To put it another way, the whole process of the change is progressed through 
reciprocal action.  
In this research, the individualization of religion is captured as the most 
prominent and fundamental phenomenon of religious transformation. In short, 
the individualization of religion means a new journey for religiosity free from 
religious authority and religious doctrinal discipline. “Legitimization of belief is 
moving from religious authorities, guarantors of the truth of belief, to individuals 
themselves, who are responsible for the authenticity of their own spiritual 
approach.”524 
We can easily trace such religious individualization in the transformation of 
Christianity examined in Chapter 3: in the global expansion of Ev+Pen+Ch 
Christianity as church-based individualized types of Christianity combining 
individualized religiosity and spiritual mutation of existing religious institutions; 
in the mushrooming of implicit Christianity combining individualized religiosity 
and spiritual faith; and in FBSOs, which combine individualized religiosity and 
life-oriented action.  
The concept of individualization of religion as a sociological framework proves 
                                           
524 Hervieu-Léger, Danièle, "In Search of Certainties: The Paradoxes of Religiosity in Societies of High Modernity", 
The Hedgehog Review  Vol. 8.1/2 (2006): 59-68. 
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the “transformation of Christianity” as the possibility and potential of 
Christianity at the individual and social level. Further, sociological 
contemplation on transformation of Christianity posits that Christianity 
transforms itself from religious institutionalized religiosity into more 
individualized, life-oriented, and community-oriented religiosity. Such 
transformation does not necessarily imply the weakening of religious 
institutions or churches, as we witnessed with regard to the global expansion 
of evangelical mutations. The possibility of religious institutions or of the 
churches depends not on what the advancement of secular reason and 
naturalism may show, but on how they transform themselves and whether they 
continue to make sense. This study defines the whole picture of such 
transformation as “ecclesiastical dis-re-establishment”.  
Markus Vinzent’s theological reflection also shows that “individualization of 
religion” is verified by the notion of the kingdom of God, through an important 
biblical insight: “The kingdom of God is within you” is opposed to “The kingdom 
of God is amongst you”. 525  Religious individualization allows us to hold 
Christian faith even at a position far removed from religious institutions and 
theological authority, as long as individuals do not give up the communicative 
process with the whole community. This sociological and theological 
                                           
525 Markus Vinzent, “Salus Extra Ecclesiam? Meister Eckhart’s Institutionenskepsis“, in Dietmar Mieth & Britta 
Müller-Schauenburg (eds.), Mystik, Recht und Freiheit: Religiöse Erfahrung und kirchliche Institutionen im 
Spätmittelalter (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2012), pp.158-168. The Latin phrase extra Ecclesiam nulla salus means: 
"outside the Church there is no salvation". The 1997 Catechism of the Catholic Church explained this as "all 
salvation comes from Christ the Head through the Church which is his Body”. 
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discussion can be best explicated in a re-modern framework with regard to the 
feature that the transformation of Christianity indicates the refurbishment of 
Christianity toward individual spirituality and socio-political publicity, and in a 
post-secular framework526 with reference to the feature that it also indicates 
multiple–directional mobility of both institutional and individual religiosities.  
In light of this, the assumption that secularization theory is irresistible must be 
dismissed; rather, a new epistemological changeover is inevitable. Therefore, 
the focus of our discussion now should no longer be the question of “religious 
or secular?”, but that of “what religiosity, and for what reason?” 
Another important point in discussion about the transformation of Christianity 
is the renewed visibility of Christianity in the public sphere. According to the 
process of transformation, while some parts of Christianity remain as 
marginalized private religiosity, yet other parts have continued social influence 
in the public sphere. This possibility of social location and role of Christianity 
is to do not with the advancement of “differentiation” or “individualization” 
discussed in Chapter 4.1, but with Christians’ own ways of making sense of 
how to live well and how to do well, whether as individuals, groups, or the 
church. This study defines such possible and sustainable visibility in the public 
sphere as the “public presence” of Christianity. Empirical observation on this 
                                           
526 Of course, here the meaning of “post-secular” is employed to refer to the concept specified in Chapter 2, sections 
2.2.3 and 2.2.4: not as a clear descriptive position driven by a strong anti-secular thrust, but as a thoroughly 
reflexive account of transformation of Christianity, a change in the spectrum of consciousness on possibilities of 
religiosity, and a normative reflection on the religious.  
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phenomenon can be traced primarily in two dimensions: in socio-political 
engagement in public matters by the Christian churches, and implicitly in the 
various FBSOs which represent individualized forms of religiosity. This can 
also be regarded as a radical transformation of Christian morphology, i.e. 
outside of religious domains. Importantly, the public presence of Christianity is 
performed through “participation” and “solidarity”, not through the dominance 
of Christianity through Christendom.527 The end of Christendom does not 
mean the end of Christianity. It might even mean a new beginning.528 
“Participation” and “solidarity” represent a creative action principle to 
overcome the non-committed theo-socio-political philosophy spawned by the 
postmodern culture and socio-political stance.529 When we move from the 
statement that religion has ceased to play any role in world politics to the 
assertion that religion plays a key role in world politics, this does not imply a 
victory for the fundamentalists, but indicates the start of a shift towards a 
cosmopolitan way of seeing.530 This insight is also an important re-modern 
approach to the possibility and potential of Christianity.  
In this context, the belligerent neo-atheist attack on religion under slogans 
such as “God is not great”, “the God delusion”, and “religion is full of poison to 
                                           
527 Christendom is a condition where the whole society or culture is impregnated with Christian belief and practice; 
where the society and culture is united around some form of Christian belief, and belonging to society is connected 
with belonging to the church. 
528 See Chapter 4 “Religion Today” in Charles Taylor, Sesokhwaoa Hyundeamoonmyung [Secularization and the 
Modern Civilization] (Seoul: Tasan Memorial Lecture, 2002).  
529 Hans Joas, The Creativity of Action, trans. by Jeremy Gaines and Paul Keast (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), 
pp.255-6. 
530 See Ulrich Beck, A God of One’s Own, Chapter 4, and pp.225-7. 
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society” comes out of a biased normative perspective. Neo-atheist thinkers still 
believe that religion will eventually recede and hope that it will do so sooner 
rather than later - before it does more damage. Their statements are 
preoccupied with an ill-natured interpretation of religiosity, and their most 
critical critique of religion is based on an accusation of religious private and 
exclusive truth. Yet, against this argument, this research focuses on a revised 
Christianity that is involved in public issues and communicates with civil 
society through “entanglement”. The conceptualization of “entanglement” 
opens up possibilities for the relationship of Christianity to multiple social 
realities, and an interplay of Christianity with diverse social subjects.  
In social science, countless arguments have been conducted concerning the 
role of religion in politics. Habermas has discussed the possibility and 
usefulness of religion in natural society, while Taylor has explored the 
importance of transcendence in the immanent frame, re-illuminating the 
possibility of religiosity and the religious in the late modern world. The 
conceptualization of Habermas’s “soft naturalism” in post-metaphysical 
thinking and of Taylor’s “immanent transcendence”, although they tend to the 
ideal rather than the practical, pave the way for progress beyond a clear 
dichotomous view within a world in which the natural and the supernatural, the 
immanent and the transcendent, are distinguished; and more significantly, the 
transcendent makes sense most clearly in the immanent frame. This raises 
questions not only with regard to the public funding of religion, but also with 
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regard to whether religious arguments have a legitimate place in public debate 
More radically, for left-wing European intellectuals like Badiou, Agamben, 
Eagleton and Žižek, religion, particularly Christianity, is reconsidered as a 
challenge, ignition point or criterion that can address the atmosphere of non-
directional crisis and fragmentation of value created by postmodern 
philosophy, when all norms have evaporated. They assume that Christianity 
is the only serious challenger to the militant neo-liberalism that predominates 
in our times.531 Žižek argues that “religion appears as a key site of resistance 
against the alienations of what is perceived as a singularly Western 
modernity”.532  From this point of view, important elements of enlightened 
secularity in particular can be understood, not as Christianity’s defeat, but as 
its displacement. However, it does not mean that they are caught up in 
renewed religious belief.  
Their discussions concern not a disembodied belief, but the true radical nature 
of Christianity and its political import. In this context, their socio-philosophical 
application to theology can indeed be regarded as a “post-secular” epistemic 
turn, corresponding to the “scepticism” about the secular narratives of 
Enlightenment.533 Juxtaposition and integration between theology and social 
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philosophy, focusing on agenda for the whole of society, like truth, subject and 
materialist theology, present the potential of Christianity as reflexive agent and 
cosmopolitan actor and possibility, going beyond the intrinsic defects of 
Christianity in a re-modern paradigm. 
In conclusion, while the trend of secularization has evidently made deep and 
extensive progress in many areas around the world during the last several 
centuries, the historical evidence also shows counter-examples where the 
significance of religion has increased. In contrast to secular modernity, the 
post-secular view, through reflexion on the transformation, public presence, 
and potential of Christianity, presents various routes for Christianity as a 
reflexive agent for the global society.534 Further, I argue that evaluating the 
strength of Christianity in any society has more to do with the integrity of the 
Christian church and religiosity within the whole society, and this has to be 
constantly re-assessed, however difficult that may be. To what extent will a 
Christianity that has undergone an inner renewal be able to open its mind to 
the individualization specific to the modern age so as to gain a new religious 
vitality? In this respect, the question of mediation or, in D. Bonhoeffer’s term, 
of “who is Christ for us today” is still very much alive. 
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